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Case No. 20140753-SC 
INTHE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plain tiff IP eti ti oner, 
v. 
ADAM HOWARD JONES, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Brief of Petitioner 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The magistrate refused to bind Jones over for trial on official 
misconduct and wih1ess tampering. The State appealed to the court of 
appeals, which affirmed the magistrate's ruling. See State v. Jones, 2014 UT 
App 142, 330 P.3d 97 (Addendum A). This Court issued a writ of certiorari 
to review the court of appeals' decision, and thus has jurisdiction under 
Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-3-102(5) (West 2009). 
STATEMEf"1T OF THE ISSUES 
The existence of probable cause at the preliminary hearing stage often 
turns on reasonable inferences from the evidence. And the evidence often 
supports more than one reasonable inference. When reasonable inferences 
conflict, the magistrate must adopt the one favoring the prosecution. As 
this Court recently made clear in State v. Maughan, a magistrate may not 
weigh inferences in light of the totality of the evidence- that is, adopt a 
defense-friendly inference on the basis that it is just as likely or even more 
likely true than a prosecution-friendly one. A magistrate who does that 
oversteps his bounds and usurps the jury's role. 
Here, both the magistrate and the court of appeals refused to draw 
prosecution-friendly inferences on the basis that they were less or "just as 
likely" as defense-friendly inferences in light of the "totality of the 
evidence." 
This Court granted review on two issues: 
1. "Whether the court of appeals erred in determining [the State] 
presented insufficient evidence at Uones's] preliminary hearing to warrant 
inferences that he committed official misconduct." 
2. "Whether the court of appeals erred in determining [the State] 
presented insufficient evidence at Uones's] preliminary hearing to warrant 
inferences that he tampered with a witness." 
Standard of Review. This Court reviews the court of appeals' decision 
for correctness, "recognizing that the correctness of its decision turns in part 
on whether it applied an appropriate standard of review in affirming the 
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magistrate's decision," which is "a mixed determination ... entitled to some 
limited deference." State v. Maughan, 2013 UT 37, ,I12, 305 P.3d 1058. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statutes are reproduced in Addendum B: 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-201 ( official misconduct); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508 (witness tampering); 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-2.1, -2.2 (relevant portions of Cohabitant 
Abuse Procedures Act). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of facts. 2 
Alleged official misconduct. Kamas City Police Chief Adam Jones had a 
long history of dealing with his alcoholic brother Travis. When drunk, 
Travis acted II stupid," "unreasonable," and II extremely violent," 
particularly toward his girlfriend Darcy Martinez. R29:5-8, 25; State's Exh. 1 
at 6-17. Darcy sometimes called Jones to calm Travis when he was drunk. 
R29:5, 7-8, 25; State's Exh. 1 at 3-4, 11. Before February 2011, Darcy 
1 Unless otherwise noted, the State cites the current versions of 
statutes for the Court's convenience. 
2 Because Jones has not been convicted, he retains the presumption of 
innocence. Consistent with the bindover standard, the facts are stated "in 
the light most favorable to the prosecution," with all "reasonable 
inferences" drawn in favor of the prosecution. See State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, 
110, 20 P.3d 300 (citation and quotation omitted). The State has attached the 
preliminary hearing transcript and police interview transcript as Addenda 
Cand D. 
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"luckily" had always called Jones when he was off-duty. State's Exh. 1 at 
11. 
But this time, Darcy called Jones on his personal cell phone at about 
9:45 p.m., when Jones was on duty, in uniform, and in his office. R29:4, 
State's Exh. 1 at 3-4. According to Jones, Darcy said that he "needed to 
come over and talk [to] or take care of" Travis. R29:3-5, 56-57.3 Jones 
"didn't want to deal with" the fighting between Travis and Darcy; he had 
dealt with it "a hundred times before." R29:4-5; State's Exh. 1 at 9. But he 
immediately drove his patrol car the four blocks to their home. R29:4-5; 
State's Exh. 1 at 5. 
Jones was met by a drunk and underwear-clad Travis. State's Exh. 1 
at 6-7. Travis pointed to scratches on his chest and said, ,.,look what she did 
to me." R29:4-6; State's Exh. 1 at 5-7. He insisted that Jones speak to Darcy 
about it. R29:4-6; State's Exh. 1 at 5-7. 
Jones found Darcy in the garage. State's Exh. 1 at 7. She said that 
Travis II can't do this to me anymore." R29:5-6, State's Exh. 1 at 7. She said 
that Travis was II out of control" and had kicked her in the leg. R29:5-6; 
3 Jones later changed his story, telling investigators that Darcy did not 
tell him why she wanted hiin to come over, and that he had assumed she 
wanted help with her ten-year-old son. R29:4; State's Exh. 1 at 4. 
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State's Exh. 1 at 7. Jones said he looked at her leg, but claimed he saw no 
injury. R29:6; State's Exh. 1 at 8. 
Travis then came into the garage and repeated, "look what she did to 
me." State's Exh. 1 at 8. Darcy insisted that Travis had scratched himself 
and she asked Jones to "calm him down." State's Exh. 1 at 7-8. 
Jones replied, "he's my brother; ... I cannot deal with him." Id. at 7. 
Jones asked Darcy if she wanted to call the sheriff's office to "file a report," 
but she declined because she could not "afford" to have Travis go to jail 
"again." Id. at 8. Jones left the garage to speak with Travis, who admitted 
to scratching himself to get Darcy arrested. R29:6; State's Exh. 1 at 8. 
Jones put Travis-who was "on the verge of[] passing out" -to bed, 
and told the couple to stay away from each other. R29:23; State's Exh. 1 at 9. 
He told them that if they wanted file a police report, they would have to call 
the Summit County Sheriff's Office because Jones could not be 
professionally involved where his family was concerned. R29:6-7, 22, 66. 
Jones left without arresting or citing Travis, writing a report, or giving 
Darcy written notification of her rights as required by the Cohabitant Abuse 
Procedures Act. See R29:13-14; State's Exh. 1 at 10, 12-13. 
Jones then returned to the station, where he clocked out from his shift 
shortly after 10:00 p.rn. State's Exh. 1 at 12. 
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About 45 minutes later, Jones saw on his home computer that Summit 
County Sheriff's deputies had been dispatched to Travis's home on a 911 
call. State's Exh. 1 at 14. Jones listened to the unfolding events on his police 
radio. R29:35-36, 59; State's Exh. 1 at 14. Darcy called Jones later that night, 
but he "knew that she was calling" about Travis, so did not answer. R29:59. 
When deputies arrived at the home, Darcy was "crying" and 
"obviously distraught." Id. at 36. Travis was "loud," vulgar, and "[v]ery 
aggressive," to the point that they had to handcuff him. Id. at 36, 45. The 
deputies saw "injuries on both Darcy" -including bruising on her leg-and 
her ten-year-old son. Id. at 46, 51; State's Exh. 1 at 1. They arrested Travis, 
who "kept up with a violent, vulgar tirade the whole way to the jail." 
R29:46. Around midnight, the deputies learned that Jones had been to the 
home earlier. Id. at 48. 
Alleged witness tampering. The next morning, Jones visited Travis in 
jail. Id. at 53-54. Because Travis's cell was near the booking counter, the on-
duty deputy overheard their conversation: Jones told Travis that he had 
been to the home the night before, but that Travis was "passed out on his 
bed." Id. at 55-56, 63-64. Jones told Travis that he needed to" do something 
about his drinking." Id. at 56. 
-6-
After talking to Travis, Jones told the on-duty deputy that Darcy had 
called him the night before to "come over and talk [to] or take care of his 
brother"; that Travis was "passed out, intoxicated in his bed" when Jones 
arrived; and that Jones had "instructed her not to wake him up." Id. at 56-
57, 63-64. 
B. Summary of proceedings. 
The State charged Jones with three counts: (1) official neglect and 
misconduct, a class A misdemeanor; (2) in the alternative, official 
misconduct, a class B misdemeanor; and (3) witness tampering, a third 
degree felony. R30-33, 58. Only counts (2) and (3) are at issue here.4 
Both remaining counts relate to Jones's alleged failure to comply with 
the Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act (the Act), Utah Code Ann.§ 77-36-1 et 
seq. Under the Act, when a peace officer "responds to a domestic violence 
call and has probable cause to believe" that someone has committed 
domestic violence, he must arrest or cite the alleged offender. Id. § 77-36-
2.2(2) (a). If the officer "has probable cause to believe that there will be 
continued violence against the alleged victim," he must arrest the alleged 
offender. Id. § 77-36-2.2(2)(b)(i). Where-as here-two or more parties 
4 Although the State appealed the magistrate's ruling refusing to bind 
over on (1)-official neglect and misconduct-it did not seek (and this 
Court did not grant) certiorari review on the court of appeals' affirmance on 
that count. 
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complain of domestic violence, the officer must determine who the 
"predominant aggressor was," taking into account any prior complaints, 
current injuries, the likelihood of future injury, and the possibility of self-
defense. Id. § 77-36-2.2(3). Once the officer has made that determination, 
he must arrest or cite accordingly. Id. 
If the officer does not arrest or cite an alleged offender, he must 
nevertheless "notify the victim of the right to initiate a criminal 
. . ' 
proceeding," and "the importance of preserving evidence"; give the victim 
"written notice" of their "rights and remedies" under the Act; and "submit 
a detailed, written report specifying the grounds for not arresting any 
party." Id. §§ 77-36-2.2(2)(c) & (5)(a)-(b); -2.1(2)(a). 
Jones filed a motion to dis1niss the charges after preliminary hearing. 
R34-49. The State opposed the motion. R51-69. 
Arguments on official misconduct. A (1) "public servant" commits 
official misconduct when he (2) "knowingly refrains from performing a 
duty imposed on him by law" (3) with the intent "to benefit himself or 
another." Id. § 76-8-201. A "public servant" is "any officer or employee of 
the state or any political subdivision of the state .... " Id. § 76-8-101(5). 
Jones conceded in the trial court that as a police officer, he "was a 





cause for official misconduct because the evidence showed that he 
responded to his brother's home not in his capacity as a police officer, but as 
a private citizen and brother; that he was not "responding" to a domestic 
violence call because the girlfriend did not allege domestic violence when 
she called Jones; and that he did not have probable cause to believe that his 
brother committed domestic violence where his girlfriend had no mark on 
her leg. R44-45, 47-48. Thus, defense counsel argued, he had no duty to 
comply with the Act. R46-48. He also argued that he did not act to benefit 
himself or another because he repeatedly offered to call the sheriff's office, 
but the girlfriend refused. R45-46. 
The State's theory on official misconduct was that Jones-a police 
officer-was a public servant who was aware of domestic violence, but who 
knowingly refrained from performing the duties that the Cohabitant Abuse 
Procedures Act imposed on him and that he did so with the intent to benefit 
himself and/ or his brother. See R60-66. 
The State argued that the evidence- Jones being on duty, in uniform, 
in his police car, and being met with his brother's allegation of domestic 
violence when he arrived-supported a reasonable inference that Jones was 
acting as a police officer rather than as a brother. R60. 
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The State further argued that the evidence supported a reasonable 
inference that Jones had "refrained from performing" his duties under the 
Act because Jones had probable cause to believe that his brother had 
committed domestic violence against his girlfriend where Darcy alleged 
that Jones had kicked her, yet he did not cite or arrest his brother, did not 
give the alleged victim written notice of her rights and remedies under the 
Act, and did not submit II a detailed, written report specifying the grounds 
for not arresting any party." R62-66. 
The State also argued that the evidence supported a reasonable 
inference that Jones refrained from complying with the Act with the intent 
to benefit himself or another by saving himself and/ or his brother the 
embarrassment, trouble, and expense of complying with the arrest, citing, 
and reporting requirements. R61-62. 
Arguments on witness tampering. A person commits witness tampering 
when (1) he believes that" an official proceeding or investigation is pending 
or about to be instituted,'' or intending "to prevent an official proceeding or 
investigation," he (2) '' attempts to induce or otherwise cause another person 
to" either "testify or inform falsely" or "withhold any testimony [or] 




Jones argued that he lacked the mental state to commit witness 
tampering because (1) he did not believe that an investigation into his 
conduct was proceeding because he visited his brother so soon after the 
previous night's events; and (2) that Jones's lie to his brother was "not 
inconsistent" with what Jones told investigators, but rather was "nothing 
more than an explanation of the events the night before," because the 
brother was in bed asleep before Jones left. R41-43. 
The State's theory on witness tampering was that Jones knew that he 
had failed to comply with the Act and also knew - from monitoring his 
computer and police radio- that Sheriff's deputies responded to the house 
on a domestic violence call 45 minutes after he left. R67-68. Thus, he could 
reasonably believe that they would discover his failures and launch an 
"official proceeding or investigation," or at least that he "intend[ed] to 
prevent" such an investigation. To hinder or prevent that investigation, he 
then tried to induce his brother to testify or inform falsely by suggesting 
(falsely) to his brother that he had been passed out the entire time Jones had 
been at his house the night before. R66-69. 
The State argued that the most reasonable inference from Jones' s lie to 
his brother-repeated to the on-duty jail deputy-was that Jones wanted his 
brother to back up this false story either to prevent an investigation into 
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Jones's handling of the call or to influence its outcome. R68. Indeed, the 
State argued, it was difficult to conceive of another motive for making the 
patently false statement to his brother and then ensuring that the on-duty 
jail officer heard it. Id. ("Jones's false statement has no rational purpose but 
to influence his brother's memory and hinder any potential investigation."). 
Magistrate's ruling.5 After hearing the preliminary hearing evidence, 
the magistrate granted Jones's motion to dismiss all charges. R75-85. The 
magistrate refused to bind over on official misconduct because-although 
Jones had conceded that as a police officer he was a public servant-it 
found that Jones had not gone to the house as a police officer. Rather, he 
had gone to the house as a brother. R80. Though the magistrate 
acknowledged that Jones was in uniform, on duty, and driving his police 
car, he dismissed the import of that evidence because Darcy called him on 
his personal cell phone and he went II a few minutes before the end of his 
shift." Id. The magistrate opined that if Jones had appeared "at a stranger's 
door," the State's argument "might have some merit." Id. The magistrate 
concluded that because Jones was not then acting as a police officer, he was 
not a public servant with any legal duties to carry out. RB0-82. The 
magistrate also found "no evidence" that Jones was "respond[ing] to an 
5 The Magistrate's bindover ruling is attached as Addendum E. 
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allegation of domestic violence," Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-2.1(1), reasoning 
that Darcy's phone call did not mention domestic violence, there was "no 
altercation in progress when he arrived," and "no sign of a previous 
altercation." Id. at 80-82. 
The magistrate refused to bind over on witness tampering because he 
concluded that nothing showed that Jones believed an investigation into his 
conduct was pending or that he intended to prevent an investigation. R83. 
The magistrate did not address the alternative "intent to prevent an 
investigation" element. R82-83. On the element of "induc[ing] another to 
testify or inform falsely" or "withhold" information or testimony, the 
magistrate reasoned that Travis's being awake or asleep had nothing to do 
with whether Jones had complied with the Act because, the magistrate 
believed, the only statutory duty at issue was Jones' s failure to give Darcy 
victim information, which rendered Jones's lie to Travis "immaterial." R83-
84. 
Court of appeals decision. The State appealed the dismissal, and the 
court of appeals affirmed. 
On the official misconduct count, the court of appeals agreed with the 
magistrate that Jones was not acting as a police officer- and therefore not as 
a public servant-when he responded to (and while he was at) his brother's 
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house. Jones, 2014 UT App 142, if28. The court of appeals acknowledged 
that some evidence "viewed in isolation" -such as Jones's being on duty, in 
uniform, and driving his patrol car- could support an inference that Jones 
was acting as a police officer when he first "became aware" of a domestic 
violence allegation. Id. at ,r,r22, 24, 28. But instead of adopting this 
prosecution-friendly inference, the court of appeals found it unreasonable in 
light of the "totality of the evidence." Id. at ,r,r24, 28, 33. The court instead 
adopted a defense-friendly inference, under the "totality of the evidence," 
that Jones was not acting as a police officer, but "solely as a family 
member," when he responded to his brother's home. Id. at if if 24, 33. The 
court of appeals drew this inference from the fact that once Jones learned of 
the domestic violence allegation, he-with the victim's assent- decided not 
to "spring into action" or to II treat the situation as a law enforcement 
matter." Id. at if if 24, 28, 33. 
The court of appeals also agreed with the magistrate that because 
Jones did not make an II official police response," he had not "responded" to 
a domestic violence report for purposes of the Act, and that the Act's 
requirements were therefore not triggered. Id. at 121. Though the court of 
appeals agreed with the State that "the Act is not limited to situations where 
a call to authorities specifically alleges domestic violence," it did not find an 
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"official" respon~e here because Darcy called Jones on his personal cell 
phone and both Jones and Darcy told the investigator that Jones was not 
called in his official capacity. Therefore, the court reasoned, his response 
was" solely in his capacity as Travis's brother." Id. at ,r,r21 n.6, 22-24. 
In reaching this conclusion, the court took "some guidance" from two 
cases that neither the magistrate nor the parties had cited: State v. Gardiner, 
814 P.2d 568 (Utah 1991) and Salt Lake City v. Christensen, 2007 UT App 254, 
167 P.3d 496. The majority believed that Gardiner and Christensen stood for 
the proposition that whether an officer is on duty is not dispositive of 
whether he is acting as an officer. Rather, the question was whether an 
officer was acting as an officer or was on a "personal frolic." Jones, 2014 UT 
App 142, if28. Because the majority believed that Jones was acting as a 
brother rather than an officer, it characterized his on-duty, in-uniform 
response in his patrol car as a "personal frolic to attend to family matters." 
Id. at ,r,r20, 28. 
Judge Christiansen dissented from this part of the opinion. She 
reasoned that even if Jones was not initially responding to a report of 
domestic violence, Darcy's later allegation that Travis had kicked her 
triggered Jones's duties as a police officer under the Cohabitant Abuse Act. 
Id. at ,I42. Judge Christensen read the Act as removing "some of the 
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discretion a police officer" otherwise might have "in responding to 
allegations of domestic violence" by requiring "certain procedures on the 
part of those police officers." Id. Because- as all agreed, id. at if 14 n.4 -
Jones had not complied with the Act, Judge Christensen would have bound 
over on the official misconduct charge. Id. at if 42. 
The court unanimously affirmed the magistrate on the witness 
tampering count. On the believing-an-investigation-was-pending prong, 
the court declined to infer that Travis's later arrest on domestic violence 
charges "would have necessarily led to an investigation of Jones's actions," 
even though it acknowledged that the inference was a "reasonable" one. Id. 
at if 32. Rather, based on its prior holding that the "totality of the evidence" 
showed that Jones was on a "personal frolic," it concluded that Jones could 
not have believed that an investigation into his actions was likely. Id. at 
'if33. By reiterating its prior holding that Jones had no duties with which to 
comply, the court of appeals implicitly held that he had no reason to expect 
an investigation into what he did or did not do. 
The court of appeals also refused to infer Jones' s belief in a pending 
investigation from the fact that he lied to Travis at the jail. Id. at 134. 
Rather, court of appeals chose the "just as likely" inference that Jones lied as 




brother. Id. at 136. The court stated that it might have adopted the State's 
proposed inference if there were "independent evidence" to support it. Id. 
But because Jones's belief in an investigation was "not the only possible 
explanation of Jones' s" lie, the inference that Jones lied because he believed 
an investigation was pending was "speculation rather than reasoned and 
logical deduction." Id. at 1133-36. Like the magistrate, the court of appeals 
did not address the "intent to prevent an investigation" prong of witness 
tampering. The court of appeals also did not reach the question of whether 
Jones had tried to induce his brother to testify or inform falsely. 
The State timely sought a writ of certiorari, which this Court granted. 
Order of November 25, 2014. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
At preliminary hearing, magistrates consider the full evidentiary 
picture before them in deciding what inferences from the evidence are 
reasonable. But this Court made clear in State v. Maughan that considering 
the "totality of the evidence" is not license to weigh the relative merits of 
reasonable inferences. Yet that is precisely what the court of appeals did 
here when it refused to adopt the State's reasonable inferences in favor of 
other inferences it deemed "just as likely" or more likely in light of the 
"totality of the evidence." 
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Official misconduct. To show probable cause for official misconduct, 
the State had to present evidence which supported reasonable inferences 
that Jones (1) was a public servant; (2) who "knowingly refrain[ed] from 
performing a duty imposed on him by law"; (3) "with intent to benefit 
himself or another." 
The State presented evidence that Jones was the Kamas City police 
chief; his brother's girlfriend called and asked him to "take care of" his 
brother; he immediately responded to this call while on duty, in uniform 
and in his police cruiser; he knew that his brother and the girlfriend had a 
history of domestic violence; he knew that his brother abused alcohol and 
when doing so became violent; his brother was drunk when Jones arrived; 
both his brother and the girlfriend alleged domestic violence while Jones 
was present; he investigated the allegations and found his brother's 
allegation to be false; and he did not comply with the requirements imposed 
on police officers under the Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act. 
This evidence gave rise to the reasonable inferences that Jones was 
acting as a police officer and not just a brother; Jones had a duty to- but did 
not-comply with the Act; and that Jones swept his brother's wrongdoing 
under the rug to benefit himself and/ or his brother. 
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Rather than drawing these reasonable inferences in favor of the 
prosecution, the court of appeals weighed competing inferences under the 
"totality of the evidence" and determined that other inferences were more 
reasonable. For example, the court of appeals refused to adopt the 
reasonable inference that Jones was acting as a police officer. Instead, it 
gave greater weight to the competing inference that Jones was at the house 
merely as a brother because the girlfriend had called Jones on his personal 
cell phone and did not want the brother arrested. It also improperly 
disregarded Jones's statement to a jail deputy that the girlfriend had called 
Jones and asked him to "take care of" his brother, focusing instead on 
Jones's later self-serving statement to investigators that the girlfriend did 
not say why she wanted him to come. 
In holding as it did, the court of appeals effectively rendered an 
officer's duties in domestic violence cases discretionary, which undermines 
the legislature's purpose in passing the Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act. 
Witness tampering. To show probable cause for witness tampering, 
the State needed to present evidence and reasonable inferences that Jones 
(1) believed "that an official proceeding or investigation [was] pending or 
about to be instituted" or "inten[ ded] to prevent an official proceeding or 
investigation"; and (2) "attemp[ed] to induce or otherwise cause another 
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person to" either "testify or inform falsely" or "withhold any testimony [or] 
information." 
The State presented evidence that Jones knew that sheriff's deputies 
responded to Travis's home 45 minutes after Jones left and arrested his 
brother for domestic violence; the deputies saw an injury to the girlfriend's 
leg; Jones did not comply with his duties under the Act; Jones went to visit 
his brother in jail the next day; and Jones lied to his brother and the jail 
deputy, saying that his brother had been asleep the whole time that Jones 
was there. If investigators believed that Travis had been asleep the whole 
time, they would have had no basis for believing that Jones had violated the 
Act. And the existence of this case showed that there in fact was an 
investigation into Jones's conduct. 
The court of appeals again failed to draw reasonable inferences in 
favor of the State-for example, that Jones believed his failure to comply 
with the Act would or could come under investigation, or that he at least 
wanted to prevent any investigation into it. Instead, the court of appeals 
believed that the "totality of the evidence" showed that Jones was acting as 
a brother, not a police officer, and thus had no reason to fear an 
investigation into his failures. As for Jones' s lie itself, the court of appeals 
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refused to adopt the State's reasonable inference that by lying, Jones was 
trying to convince his brother to repeat the lie to investigators. 
The court of appeals twice erred on this count by (1) analyzing the lie 
under only one alternative of the first prong of witness tampering-that is, 
whether the lie showed that Jones believed an investigation into his conduct 
was pending; and (2) rejecting a reasonable inference in favor of bindover 
on the basis that it was "just as likely" that Jones lied to his brother as a 
social courtesy. 
This Court should reverse and order the magistrate to bind over 
Jones on official misconduct and witness tampering. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The court of appeals erred in this case-just as it did in State 
v. Maughan- by weighing competing reasonable inferences. 
The court of appeals here repeated the same error that it made in State 
v. Maughan, 2013 UT 37, ,I17, 305 P.3d 1058: searching the "totality of the 
evidence" to find what it considered to be the most reasonable inferences 
from the evidence. 
Though courts certainly consider the entire evidentiary picture at 
preliminary hearings, this Court made clear in Maughan that this is not 
license to weigh competing reasonable inferences and to reject those that 
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run in the State's favor. This Court should reverse and reaffirm the proper 
standard articulated in Maughan. 
A. Though courts look to the "totality of eviden°ce" at 
preliminary hearings, this does not permit them to weigh 
competing reasonable inferences. 
"To bind a defendant over for trial, the State must show 'probable 
cause' at a preliminary hearing by 'present[ing] sufficient evidence to 
establish that the crime charged has been committed and that the defendant 
has committed it. 111 State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, ,r10, 20 P.3d 300 (citations 
omitted). The probable cause standard is "relatively low" -the same as that 
for obtaining an arrest warrant. Id. at ilif 10, 16 ( quotation and citation 
omitted); see also State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29, if 18, 137 P.3d 787. Under both 
standards, the prosecution must present evidence sufficient only to 
"'support a reasonable belief" that the defendant committed each element of 
the charged crime. State v. Ramirez, 2012 UT 59, if9, 289 P.3d 444 (quoting 
Virgin, 2006 UT 29, if17). When determining probable cause, a magistrate 
"must view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution 
and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the prosecution." Clark, 
2001 UT 9, ,r10 ( quotation and citations omitted); see also Virgin, 2006 UT 29, 
if24 (same); State v. Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51, 'ff3, 26 P.3d 223 (same). 
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An inference differs from speculation in that for an inference, there is 
a "'foundation in the evidence upon which the ultimate conclusion is based; 
in the case of speculation, there is no underlying evidence to support the 
conclusion."' State v. Garcia-Vargas, 2012 UT App 270, if 17 n.5, 287 P.3d 474 
( quoting Harding v. Atlas Title Ins. Agency, Inc., 2012 UT App 236, if 7, 285 
P.3d 1260). 
An inference is reasonable if a "reasonable jury could accept it." 
Ramirez, 2012 UT 59, ifl4 (citing Virgin, 2006 UT 29, if22). This includes 
inferences based on circumstantial evidence- which is often the only kind 
of evidence available. See Maughan, 2013 UT 37, if 15; Ramirez, 2012 UT 59, 
,I12. An inference is umeasonable only if it falls "to a 'level of inconsistency 
or incredibility' that no reasonable jury could accept it." Ramirez, 2012 UT 
59, ,I14 (quoting Virgin, 2006 UT 29, if22). Because the existence of probable 
cause is such a fact-intensive issue, the reasonableness of a given inference 
will depend upon the "totality of the circumstances." In re I.R.C., 2010 UT 
41, iJ22, 232 P.3d 1040. 
But considering the totality of the evidence "does not encompass an 
assessment of whether [one] inference is more plausible than" another. 
Ramirez, 2012 UT 59, ,IlO. The "bindover standard does not call for an 
evaluation of the totality of the evidence in search of the most reasonable 
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inference to be drawn therefrom." Maughan, 2013 UT 37, ifl7. Indeed, a 
court must accept a prosecution-friendly reasonable inference even where a 
defense-friendly inference appears more likely in light of the "totality of the 
evidence." Maughan, 2013 UT 37, ,r17; see also Ramirez, 2012 UT 59, if9-10. 
Where there are competing, conflicting inferences, the magistrate must 
accept the prosecution-friendly inferences and reject the defense-friendly 
inferences. See, e.g., Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51, if20 (reversing refusal to bind 
over "[a]lthough defendants' characterizations of the facts may also be 
plausibly inferred from the evidence"). 
As this Court has repeatedly recognized, preventing magistrates from 
weighing the merits of competing reasonable inferences protects the jury's 
role. See, e.g., Maughan, 2013 UT 37, ,r21 (citing Ramirez, 2012 UT 59, ifl0). 
When a court looks to the "totality of the evidence" to choose among 
competing inferences, it usurps the jury's role and "overstep[s] [its] 
bounds." Maughan, 2013 UT 37 ,r16. 
Drawing inferences is an exercise in logic, and formal logic illustrates 
the different roles of magistrate and jury. The magistrate's task of drawing 
inferences is a matter of inductive logical reasoning-taking a set of 
premises (pieces of evidence) and detennining what possible reasonable 




Inductive Logic, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Oct. 29, 2012) 
http://plato.stanford.edu/ entries/logic-inductive/. Thus, an "inductive 
logic is a system of evidential support that extends deductive logic to less-
than-certain inferences." Id. For example, consider the following premises: 
(1) Adam has smiled a lot today. 
(2) Ada1n has not frowned at all today. 
(3) Adam has said many nice things to people today, and no 
unfriendly things. 
(4) Adam's dog died today. 
(Modified from Paul Teller, A Modern Formal Logic Primer, Volume I: Sentence 
Logic 2 (1989); available at tellerprimer. ucdavis.edu/ pdf / lchl. pdf (last 
accessed February 4, 2015)). There are a number of conflicting reasonable 
inferences that can be drawn from this evidence, including: Adam is happy 
that his dog died; Adam is happy for another reason, even though he knows 
his dog died; Adam is in denial about his dog's death; Adam is really sad 
that his dog died and is feigning happiness; or Adam does not yet know 
that his dog died. 
In many cases, magistrates are faced with alternative and similarly 
conflicting inferences from the evidence. But at the preliminary hearing 
stage, the magistrate merely asks whether an inference supporting guilt is 
reasonable. If it is, the magistrate must adopt it. To add to the example 
above: if Adam ran over his dog and were charged with the dog's death, the 
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magistrate would have to adopt the reasonable inference in support of 
guilt-that Adam is happy that his dog died, which supports a guilty 
mental state-even though other inferences may be appear to be just as 
reasonable or even more reasonable. 
The jury's task, on the other hand, is a matter of abductive logical 
reasoning-actually choosing which inference(s) best explain the evidence. 
Igor Douven, Abduction, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Mar. 9, 2011) 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abduction/ (citing sources for pro-
position that "trust in other people's testimony ... has been said to rest on 
abductive reasoning"). To again use the example of Adam and his dog, it 
would be up to a jury to decide how Adam actually felt about his dog's 
death, and whether he intended it. 
Preserving these distinct roles is important in a system of increasing 
burdens. Probable cause is about reasonable possibilities, and preliminary 
hearings exist only to "ferret out groundless and improvident 
prosecutions." Virgin, 2006 UT 29, if20. If a reasonable inference supports 
bindover, then the prosecution is by definition not "groundless," and the 
matter proceeds to the next stage. 
Guilt is about the truth, which the State must prove at trial beyond a 







chooses what he believes is the most reasonable inference, he in effect 
decides what the truth is. This effectively raises the State's burden at 
preliminary hearing to guilt beyond a reasonable doubt-a burden that the 
State manifestly does not bear at that stage. Ramirez, 2012 UT 59, ,I9 ("[T]o 
justify binding a defendant over for trial, the prosecution need not present 
evidence capable of supporting a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt.") (citation and quotation omitted). 
Recognition of these differing roles is apparent- if unexpressed- in 
setting different standards of review for bindover and jury decisions. 
Magistrates get "limited" or no deference because, absent credibility 
findings, the appellate court is in just as good of a position as they are to 
reason inductively. Cf Ramirez, 2012 UT 59, ,I7 (explaining that magistrate's 
ability to make credibility findings is "limited," which limits bindover 
discretion). 
Juries get near-absolute deference because they are uniquely tasked 
with determining guilt, which relies on abductive reasoning. Courts lack a 
set of agreed-upon standards by which to judge abductive reasoning, 
because though "there exists a great deal of practical wisdom about how to 
evaluate" the relative merits of inferences, "no one has been able to 
formulate the exact theory which tells us exactly when an [inference] is 
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really good." Teller at 3. Thus- absent a flagrant due process violation 
such as deciding guilt on a coin toss-appellate courts do not review a 
jury's reasoning, only whether there is a rational basis for the verdict. See 
generally State v. Jones, 2015 UT 19, if 68, _ Utah Adv. Rep._ (explaining 
that review of jury verdicts is "highly deferential"). 
Maughan makes plain that at preliminary hearings, magistrates may 
not reason abductively-that is, choose among reasonable inferences which 
it believes best explains the evidence. 2013 UT 37, if 14. Maughan and his 
friend Glenn Griffin were charged with aggravated murder. Id. at ,r,r3-4, 15. 
Maughan was initially cooperative with police and implicated Griffin in the 
murder. Id. at ,r,r4, 9. Griffin was tried first. The State granted Maughan 
use immunity and called him as a witness at Griffin's trial. Id. at ,rs. But 
Maughan refused to testify against Griffin, even after the court informed 
him that he risked a finding of contempt or prosecution for obstruction of 
justice. Id. at ,r 6. 
The State charged Maughan with obstruction justice for refusing to 
testify. Id. at ,r1. After a preliminary hearing, the magistrate refused to bind 
over because, in its view, the State presented no evidence that Maughan 
acted to obstruct Griffin's prosecution. Id. at ,rs. Rather, the magistrate 
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believed that Maughan had acted to benefit himself by not giving 
incriminating testimony before his own trial. Id. at ,r9. 
The State appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed. Though the 
court of appeals agreed with the State that it had presented some evidence 
that Maughan acted to benefit Griffin, it believed that the more reasonable 
inference was the one the magistrate adopted-that Maughan acted to 
benefit himself. Id. at ,Ill. 
This Court unanimously reversed, holding that that there was "no 
room in the liberal bindover standard for second-guessing the 
reasonableness of" a state-friendly inference, and that "evidence of a 
friendship between Maughan and Griffin supported a reasonable inference 
that Maughan wished to impede Griffin's prosecution." Id. at ,r,r13, 15. 
This Court also explicitly rejected a totality analysis: "[I]t may be arguable 
that the 'totality of the evidence' even weighs in favor of the conclusion" 
put forth by defense counsel, "[b]ut our bindover standard does not call for 
an evaluation of the totality of the evidence in search of the most reasonable 
inference to be drawn therefron1." Id. at ,rl7. 
The court of appeals has fallen into that error here. It began by citing 
State v. Graham, 2013 UT App 109, 302 P.3d 824, for the proposition that it 
"evaluate[s] proposed inferences under the totality of the circumstances, not 
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just those circumstances that support the inference." Jones, 2014 UT App 
142, if 22. That may be true where a magistrate is deciding the 
reasonableness of an inference by reasoning inductively. But it does not 
give the magistrate license to weigh the inferences by reasoning 
abductively. Indeed, the Graham court itself recognized this, citing this 
Court's decision in I.R. C. for the proposition that courts may only decline 
bindover "when the evidence, considered under the totality of the 
circumstances, 'is wholly lacking and incapable of reasonable inference to 
prove some issue which supports the [prosecution's] claim."' 2013 UT App 
109, if9 (quoting I.R.C., 2010 UT 41, if22). 
B. Because the court of appeals weighed competing reasonable 
inferences, it erroneously rejected reasonable inferences that 
established probable cause for the charged offenses. 
Rather than looking to the totality of the evidence to determine 
whether an inference was reasonable, the court of appeals looked to the 
totality to determine which inferences were most reasonable. That is 
precisely what this Court forbade in Maughan. Viewed in the proper light, 
the evidence here permits reasonable inferences that Jones committed both 
official 1nisconduct and witness tampering. 
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1. There was probable cause for official misconduct because 
it is reasonable to infer that Defendant received an 
allegation of domestic violence while on duty, yet failed 
to act on it. 
For purposes of this case, official misconduct required evidence that 
Jones (1) was a public servant who (2) "know:ingly refra:in[ed] from 
perform:ing a duty imposed on him by law" (3) "with an intent to benefit 
himself or another." Utah Code Ann.§ 76-8-201. Jones conceded in the trial 
court that a police officer qualifies as a public servant. R44. 
Public servant element. The State presented evidence that Jones was on 
duty, in uniform, and driv:ing his police cruiser when he responded to 
Travis's house that night; Jones responded immediately to Darcy's call; 
Darcy called him to "take care of" Travis; when Jones arrived, he separated 
Travis and Darcy to :investigate what happened; Travis alleged that Darcy 
scratched him; Darcy insisted that Travis scratched himself and alleged that 
Travis had kicked Darcy in the leg; Travis admitted to scratch:ing himself; 
and Jones did not arrest or cite Travis, write a report of the incident, or give 
Darcy any victim information. R29:3-7, 14, 56-57; State's Exh. 1 at 3-5, 7, 9. 
This evidence supports the reasonable inference that Jones was acting 
as a police officer when he went to his brother's house and heard allegations 
of domestic violence, thereby satisfying the first element. Indeed, the court 
of appeals correctly held that Darcy made an "allegation of domestic 
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violence" to Jones. See Jones, 2014 UT App 142, if28; cf Coffey v. Superior 
Court of Sacramento County, 82 P. 75, 77 (Cal. 1905) (permitting prosecution 
of city police chief for failure to enforce gambling laws where he had 
"knowledge of the facts calling for official action"). And that Jones went 
immediately gives rise to the reasonable inference that Jones perceived the 
situation to be more urgent than he later would have had the investigators 
believe. 
Duty element. The evidence also supports the reasonable inference 
that Darcy's allegations-combined with Jones's knowledge of Travis's 
history of drunken violence with Darcy-triggered Jones's duties under the 
Act. There was thus probable cause to believe that Jones had failed to 
comply with a duty imposed on him by law, which satisfied the second 
element. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-201. 
The court of appeals acknowledged that the State presented evidence 
that Jones was acting "in a law enforcement capacity": he was "on duty, in 
uniform, and driving a police vehicle;" he "responded immediately to 
[Darcy's] call rather than waiting the fifteen minutes until he went off 
duty;" and he "investigated the incident at Travis's house 'as a police officer 
would."' Jones, 2014 UT App 142, ,r22. But-just as it had in Maughan - it 
held that this prosecution-friendly inference was unreasonable when 
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compared with the defense-friendly inference. Id. at 124. Because it 
believed that "undisputed testimony" showed that Jones was responding 
"purely to an unofficial family matter," the court concluded that Jones was 
not acting as a public servant, but as a brother, and thus had no legal duties 
with which to comply. Id. at ,r,r22-24. 
This was error on two levels. First, it was not "undisputed" that 
Jones went to his brother's home merely on family business. Though Jones 
told investigators that Darcy did not tell him why she wanted him to come 
over, and that he assumed it was to talk about problems with her son, Jones 
told the jail deputy that the girlfriend called and asked him to "talk or take 
care of his brother." Compare R29:3-5, 56-57; State's Exh. 1 at 3-5 with R29:4; 
State's Exh. 1 at 5. Both the magistrate and the court of appeals were 
required to accept that statement as true for purposes of bindover. 
Maughan, 2013 UT 37, ,I17. 
Second, the court of appeals turned a totality-of-the-evidence search 
for a reasonable inference into a search for the most reasonable inference-
conducting an abductive search in the guise of an inductive one. Because it 
0 
acknowledged that the State's inference that Jones was acting as an officer 
had evidentiary support, Jones, 2014 UT App 142, ,J22, it should have found 
this inference reasonable. 
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In holding that Jones was acting as a brother rather than an officer, 
the court of appeals relied on cases - which the parties did not cite -
discussing the scope of a police officer's authority. See Jones, 2014 UT App 
142, ,r,r25-28 (discussing State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568 (Utah 1991) and Salt 
Lake City v. Christensen, 2007 UT App 254, 167 P.3d 496). It relied on 
Gardiner and Christensen to hold that an officer could engage in a "personal 
frolic" - and thus act in a non-law enforcement capacity, even when on-
duty- provided that he decides not to "spring into action" as an officer. 
Jones, 2014 UT App 142, ,r,r27-28 (citation omitted). 
Neither Gardiner nor Christensen support the court of appeals' 
holding. Indeed, if anything, they actually support the State's proposed 
inference that Jones was acting in a law enforcement capacity. 
In Gardiner, officers responded to a noise complaint at the Vernal City 
Airport and a tip that minors were consuming alcohol. 814 P.2d at 569. 
When they arrived, they found a party, smelled alcohol, and saw people 
who appeared to be minors. Id. One officer tried to go inside, but Gardiner 
stopped him and asked if he had a warrant. Id. The officer said he did not, 
but tried to go in anyway. Id. Gardiner punched the officer in the face. Id. 
When the officer told Gardiner that he was under arrest, Gardiner again 
punched him in the face. Id. 
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The State charged Gardiner with, among other things, two counts of 
assaulting a police officer. Id. Gardiner claimed that the officer was 
attempting an unlawful warrantless entry, and was thus not acting as a 
police officer. Id. This Court disagreed, holding that, even assuming that 
the entry would have been unlawful, the officer was "'acting within the 
scope of his authority'" because he responded to a call complaining of noise 
and reporting underage drinking; he was "in uniform and on duty" at the 
time; and he was attempting to perform a police function. Id. at 575. 
If the officer in Gardiner was acting as a police officer, then Jones 
was - both responded to calls for assistance; both were on duty; both were 
in uniform; and both performed a police function on arrival. 
Likewise, Christensen. There, an officer - though in uniform and 
monitoring a police radio-was working as a security guard at LDS 
hospital. 2007 UT App 254, ,I3. The officer received word over his radio 
that Christensen was coming to the emergency room from a domestic 
violence incident. Id. Christensen arrived acting "belligerent, loud, and 
rude." Id. at iJ4. When the officer and another man tried to subdue him, 
Christensen "clenched his fists" and "cursed at" one of the men. Id. at ,rs. 
The officer was able to take Christensen to the ground and handcuff him, all 
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while Christensen swung his fists and kicked his legs at him and the other 
man. Id. 
The State charged Christensen with assaulting a police officer. 
Christensen claimed that the officer was acting as a security guard, and was 
thus on a "personal frolic." Id. at if 12. The court of appeals disagreed, 
holding that even though the officer was initially working as a security 
guard, he acted as a peace officer in subduing Christensen because he 
"spr[a]ng into action" in order to "preserve law and order." Id. at iJ14. 
The court of appeals here interpreted this language to mean that an 
officer could decline to "spring into action," even while on duty. Jones, 2014 
UT App 142, if28. But it cited no affirmative authority for this proposition. 
Indeed, it is difficult to believe that the Christensen court intended such a 
result where it emphasized that the "'nature of a policeman's job is that he 
be fit and armed at all times, whether on or off duty, and subject to respond 
to any call to enforce the laws and preserve. the peace,"' and that "'any 
action taken by him toward that end, even in his official off-duty hours, falls 
within the performance of his duties as a police officer."' Christensen, 2007 
UT App 254, ,I14 (quoting Banks v. Chicago, 297 N.E.2d 343, 349 (Ill. App. 
1973)). 
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If this is true where an officer is off-duty, it is doubly true where, as 
here, he is on-duty. And as Judge Christiansen recognized in dissent here, 
even if Jones's response to Travis's home began as a personal frolic, it 
changed entirely once Darcy alleged that Travis had committed domestic 
violence against her, triggering Jones's duties under the Act. Jones, 2014 UT 
App 142, ,r,r40-41 (Christiansen, J., dissenting). Indeed, it changed even 
earlier, when Travis alleged that Darcy had assaulted him. R29:4-6; State's 
Exh. 1 at 5-7. 
Further, the notion that an on-duty officer can decline to "spring into 
action" to enforce the law is a dangerous one - particularly in the domestic 
violence context, where an officer's discretion is severely limited- and 
would undermine the purposes of the Act. 
The Act requires that an officer "shall give written notice to the 
victim, in simple language," describing victim's rights, services, and 
resources, Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-2.1(2). This protects victims by helping 
them understand how to escape abusive situations. The Act also requires 
that officers in domestic violence cases "shall arrest" offenders for whom 
they have probable cause and "shall submit a detailed, written report 
specifying the grounds" for their action/inaction. Id. at § 77-36-2.2(2), (5). 
This protects victims by removing abusers, or at least ensuring that they 
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will answer for their abuse. This is crucial in the domestic violence context, 
where victims often protect their abusers by lying and refusing to cooperate 
with law enforcement. See, e.g., State v. Poole, 2010 UT 25, 232 P.3d 519 
(child sex abuse victim refuses to testify against defendant/father); State v. 
Timmerman, 2009 UT 58, 218 P.3d 590 (spousal rape victim refused to testify 
against defendant/husband); State v. Garrido, 2013 UT App 245, 314 P.3d 
1014 (domestic violence victim repeatedly lied and refused to testify against 
defendant/boyfriend based on fear of retaliation). 
The Act's reporting requirements also provide critical information to 
police. Domestic violence cases present "one of the most potentially 
dangerous, volatile arrest situations confronting police." State v. Vallasenor-
Meza, 2005 UT App 65, if16, 108 P.3d 123 (citations and quotation omitted). 
The more complete the record of an offender's and victim's police 
interactions, the better prepared officers will be able to anticipate problems 
and seek peaceful resolution of volatile situations. Indeed, the Act requires 
officers to consider prior complaints and the likelihood of future injury in 
their investigations, which they cannot adequately do without that 
background information. See Utah Code Ann.§ 77-36-2.2(3). 
Legislative history illustrates the importance of requiring on-duty 
officers to comply with the Act. See generally Soriano v. Graul, 2008 UT App 
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188, if 8, 186 P.3d 960 (consulting legislative history where it supported plain 
reading of statute). The Act came about in response to an "epidemic" of 
domestic violence. House Floor Debate on H.B. 314/5.01, February 21, 1995, 
at 1:35:10-15.6 Lawmakers were concerned about the high number of 
domestic violence assaults, their effect on children, and the high rate of 
unreported incidents. Id. at 1:32:45, 1:33:51-1:35:07. They passed the Act to 
combat the root causes of these problems. Id. at 1:41:27-47; see also House 
Floor Debate on H.B. 314/5.01, February 22, 1995 at 1:35:02-34.7 They later 
required reporting to provide crucial information to those who study the 
causes of domestic violence in order to understand and prevent it. See 
Senate Floor debate on S.B. 242, March 5, 2008, at 1:03:30-4:18. 8 
6 1995 General Legislative Session, Representative Marda Dillree, 
available at http:/ /utahlegislature.granicus.com/MediaPlay.php?clip 
_id=9328&1neta_id=406185 (last accessed Feb. 6, 2015). 
7 1995 General Legislative Session, Representative Marda Dillree, 
available at http://utahlegislature.graicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?clip_id 
=9330&meta_id=406212 (last accessed Feb. 6, 2015). 
8 General Legislative Session, Senator Jon Greiner, available at 
http:/ /utahlegislature.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?clip_id=17332&met 
a_id=512158 (last accessed Feb. 6, 2015). 
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The legislature also stressed the importance of compliance with the 
Act to obtain and retain federal grant funds. 9 See House Floor Debate on 
H.B. 314/S.01, February 22, 1995, at 23:10-24:25. 
In deciding that an on-duty officer could choose not to comply with 
the arresting, citing, and reporting duties, the court of appeals effectively 
rendered these mandatory duties discretionary suggestions-even for on-
duty officers. This undercuts the legislature's express desire to remove 
officer discretion in domestic violence cases, protect and inform victims, 
and obtain funding to investigate and prosecute offenders-effectively 
eviscerating the Act. 
In.tent to benefit element. Though the court of appeals' holding made 
reaching the third element unnecessary, the State also showed probable 
cause that Jones acted "with an intent to benefit himself or another." Utah 
Code Ann.§ 76-8-201. The State presented evidence that Jones was tired of 
9 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 13925(b)(6) (requiring state agencies 
receiving grant funds to provide report detailing use and "additional 
information as the agency shall require"); Catalog of Federal Domestic 
Assistance, "Violence Against Women Act Court Training and 
Improvement Grants," https://www.cfda.gov/?s=program&mode= 
form&tab=step 1 &id =ed04daa 1e78505f2363e13ee03 76c7 4a (last accessed 
4/11/2013) (listing approved uses of grants from United States Department 
of Justice under the Violence Against Women Act, including "infonnation 
about perpetrator behavior," law enforcement h·aining, and "issues relating 
to victim's needs"). 
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dealing with his brother and his domestic violence issues. R29:4-5, 7; State's 
Exh. 1 at 9. This relationship supported the reasonable inference that Jones 
acted to benefit himself by sparing himself the time and effort required to 
comply with the Act, as well as avoiding the potential embarrassment and 
family friction associated with arresting one's own brother. Cf Maughan, 
2013 UT 37, ,r1s (holding that II evidence of a friendship between Maughan 
and [his co-defendant] supported a reasonable inference that Maughan 
wished to impede Griffin's prosecution"). 
The State also presented evidence that Travis had a history of 
domestic violence and that he and Darcy could not II afford" to have Travis 
go to jail II again." R29:7; State's Exh. 1 at 8. This supported a reasonable 
inference that Jones refrained from performing his duties to benefit Travis, 
who would be spared the time and expense of another arrest and court 
proceeding, as well as the consequences of an additional domestic violence 
conviction. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §922(d)(9) (2013) (prohibiting gun possession 
by person convicted of misdemeanor domestic_ violence);_ Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 76-3-204 (setting maximum six month term of imprisonment for class B 
1nisdemeanor); 76-3-301 (setting maximum $1000 fine for class B 
misdemeanor); 76-5-102 (designating simple assault as class B 
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misdemeanor); 77-36-1.1 (providing enhanced penalties for subsequent 
domestic violence convictions). 
*** 
In sum, the State adduced sufficient evidence to show probable cause 
that Jones committed official misconduct. The evidence supports the 
inferences that he acted while on duty, learned of alleged domestic violence, 
investigated as an officer would, and refused to comply with his statutory 
duties out of a desire to help himself or others. In holding to the contrary, 
the court of appeals weighed the relative merits of competing reasonable 
inferences, usurped the role of the jury, and undermined the purposes of 
the Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act. 
2. There was probable cause for witness tampering because 
it is reasonable to infer that Defendant lied to his brother 
in an attempt to get his brother to repeat the lie to 
investigators. 
As charged in this case, witness tampering has two elements: (1) a 
belief "that an official proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be 
instituted" or an "intent to prevent an official proceeding or investigation"; 
and (2) an" attempt[] to induce or otherwise cause another person to" either 
"testify or inform falsely" or "withhold any testimony [or] information." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508(1)(a)-(b). 
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Essentially, the statute prohibits efforts to influence another from 
telling the truth when those efforts are calculated to interfere with the 
criminal justice process. The statute applies whether or not those efforts are 
successful, and whether or not the process has started, or will ever start. See 
State v. Yanez, 2002 UT App 50, ,I,I14-15, 42 P.3d 1248 (holding that threat 
subsection of statute does not require proof of actual or pending 
investigation, but only proof of "a credible threat of bodily harm to another 
based on that person's status-past, present, or future- as a witness"); State 
v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874, 876-77 (Utah 1985) ("The statute requires no more 
than a defendant believe an official proceeding or investigation to be 
underway."); see also Carlsen v. Morris, 556 F.Supp. 320, 322 (D. Utah 1982) 
("The intent of the statute is to prevent interference with the fair 
administration of justice .... "). 10 
Both elements concern a defendant's mental state, which is "rarely 
susceptible of direct proof," but may "be inferred from conduct and 
attendant circumstances in the light of human behavior and experience." 
State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878, 881 (Utah 1981), overruled on other grounds as 
10 Bradley and Carlsen focused solely on the victim's belief in a 
pending investigation because the statute did not yet have the alternative 
element of "intent to prevent an official proceeding or investigation," which 
was added in 2004. See 2004 Utah Laws 594-95. 
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recognized in State v. Alexander, 2012 UT 27, ,r32 n.56, 279 P.3d 371. Context 
matters. For example, 11 an apparently innocent statement such as, 'I'd be 
careful crossing the street if I were you,' can be merely helpful advice to a 
senior citizen," but spoken "in another context it may well be perceived ... 
as a threat." State v. Spainhower, 1999 UT App 280, ,r7, 988 P.2d452 (citation 
and quotations omitted). 
The court of appeals concluded that the State's proffered inference-
that Jones lied to Travis in jail in the hope that Travis would repeat that lie 
to investigators-was umeasonable in light of "the totality of the evidence." 
Jones, 2014 UT App 142, ,r,r32-36. The court reasoned that this inference was 
"not the only possible explanation" for Jones's lie, and was "speculati[ve]" 
in the absence of "independent evidence" that Jones knew an investigation 
into Travis's conduct would lead to an investigation of Jones' s conduct. Id. 
The court of appeals instead adopted the "just as likely" defense-favorable 
inference that Jones was politely avoiding conversation about the previous 
night's events. Id. at if 133-36. In so holding, the court of appeals made the 
same error that it made in Maughan: mischaracterizing as "speculative" 
what was actually an inference from circumstantial evidence. See Maughan, 
2013 UT 37, ,r,rll-15; see also Ramirez, 2012 UT 59, ,r,r6, 11-12. 
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Investigation element. The evidence showed that Travis had a history 
of being a violent drunk and committing domestic violence against Darcy; 
Jones immediately responded to Darcy's request that he "take care of" 
Travis; when Jones arrived, Travis was drunk; Darcy said that Travis kicked 
her and was "out of control"; Travis initially accused Darcy of assaulting 
him, but soon thereafter admitted having scratched himself and lied to try 
and get Darcy arrested; and Jones had to put Travis to bed warned the two 
to stay away from each other. R29:3-7, 7-8, 23, 25, 57; State's Exh. 1 at 3-9, 
11, 15-17. 
This evidence permits the reasonable inference that Jones had 
probable cause to believe that Travis assaulted Darcy, thereby triggering the 
Act's duties. As explained, once an officer has probable cause to believe 
that an act of domestic violence has occurred, the Act requires an officer to 
arrest or cite an offender, or write a report explaining why he did not, and 
provide certain information to the victim. Utah Code Ann.§ 77-36-2.2(2)(a). 
And if a police officer fails to perform a necessary duty, he may face 
prosecution for official misconduct. Id.§ 76-8-201. 
The State presented evidence that Jones was the Kamas City police 
chief; Jones did not arrest Travis, cite him, or write a report saying why he 
did neither; Jones did not provide Darcy with any victim information; and 
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Jones learned that night that sheriff's deputies arrested Travis for domestic 
violence and saw injury to Darcy's leg. R29:14, 35-36, 59; State's Exh. 1 at 12, 
14. 
This evidence supported the reasonable inferences that as a police 
chief, Jones knew about the Act and his duties; he developed probable cause 
to believe that Travis committed domestic violence against Darcy; he knew 
that he should have complied with the Act, but did not; Jones's failures 
would likely come to light as the sheriff's office investigated Travis, which 
in turn would prompt an investigation into Jones's handling of the matter; 
and that an investigation into Jones' s failures could result in fines, jail time, 
and the likely loss of position, thereby giving Jones a motive to try to cover 
his tracks. The State thus showed probable cause that Jones believed "that 
an official investigation" was II pending or about to be instituted" - as 
indeed it was- or at least that he intended to II prevent" such an 
investigation. Utah Code Ann.§ 76-8-508(1). 
Inform falsely element. The State also presented evidence that Jones 
went to visit Travis in jail the next morning; that Jones told both Travis and 
the jail deputy-contrary to Jones's later statements-that Travis had been 
asleep while Jones was there the night before. R29:53-57, 63-64. In 
connection with the totality of other evidence discussed above, this 
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evidence supports the reasonable inference that Jones lied to Travis-who 
was likely hung-over, and possibly memory-impaired-in an attempt to get 
Travis to repeat the lie to investigators. 
Jones could have believed that he could prevent an investigation into 
his own conduct if he could persuade Travis to say that Travis was asleep 
while Jones was there. If that had been the case, then Jones arguably would 
not have had probable cause to believe that Travis had committed domestic 
violence or that there was any reason to believe that Darcy was in any 
future danger. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-2.2(2). If Travis had been 
sleeping as Jones had suggested to him, nothing would have supported 
Darcy's claim that Travis had kicked her or that she was in any kind of 
danger, since he claimed he saw no visible injury to Darcy-even though 
sheriff's deputies saw bruising on her leg 45 minutes later. 
And absent probable cause, Jones would not have had a duty to 
comply with the Act. See id. (mandating arrest or citation if probable cause 
to believe act of domestic violence committed and mandating arrest if 
probable cause to believe there will be continued violence against alleged 
victim). The State thus showed probable cause that Jones "attempt[ed] to 
induce or otherwise cause" Travis to "inform falsely ... [or] withhold any .. 
. information." Id. § 76-8-S0S(l)(a)-(b). 
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Although the evidence might also support other explanations for 
Jones's lie to Travis, the court of appeals "jumped the gun" by choosing 
among those reasonable inferences. Maughan, 2013 UT 37, ,r21. The 
decision of whether the evidence supporting a defense-favorable inference 
renders the prosecution's theory unworthy of belief should have been left to 
a jury, not to the magistrate or the court of appeals. See Virgin, 2006 UT 29, 
if 24 ( explaining magistrate duty to view all reasonable inferences in favor of 
prosecution at preliminary hearing stage); cf State v. Norton, 2000 UT App 
307U, *1 (holding evidence sufficient for witness tampering even though 
uthere was more than one way a jury could have deciphered defendant's 
comments"); Spainhower, 1999 UT App 280, if14 (holding evidence sufficient 
for witness retaliation where defendant told victim, "I'm going to get you" 
and followed her through a grocery store). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse and remand with 
a mandate to the magistrate to bind Jones over on official misconduct and 
witness tampering. 
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Opinion 
GREENWOOD, Senior Judge: 
1 I The State appeals from the magistrate's dismissal of 
criminal charges against defendant Adam Howard Jones. 
The State charged Jones with one count of official neglect 
and misconduct, a class A misdemeanor, see Utah Code 
Ann. § 10-3-826 (LexisNexis 2012); one count of official 
misconduct, a class B misdemeanor, see id. § 76-8-20 I; and 
one count of tampering with a witness, a third degree felony, 
see id. § 76-8-508(1 ). The magistrate dismissed all three 
counts after a preliminary hearing. detem1ining that there was 
insufficient evidence to bind Jones over for trial on any of the 
three counts. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
1 2 At the time of the events giving rise to this case, Jones 
was the police chief of Kamas, Utah. Jones's brother, Travis, 
lived in Kamas with his girlfriend (Girlfriend). Jones knew 
that Travis had a history of alcohol abuse and resulting violent 
behavior and that Travis's alcohol abuse had led to incidents 
of domestic violence with Girlfriend. In the past, Girlfriend 
had called Jones for help with Travis when Travis was drunk, 
although these calls had previously occurred only when Jones 
was off duty. Some of these calls occurred as much as six 
years earlier, when Travis and Girlfriend lived in West Valley 
City. Girlfriend had not called Jones about problems with 
Travis for approximately one year. 
13 On February 15, 2011, Jones was on duty in his office. His 
shift was to end at 10:00 p.m. At about 9:45 p.m., Girlfriend 
called Jones on his personal cell phone and asked him to 
come to the house that she *99 shared with Travis. Jones 
later told the State's investigator that he asked Girlfriend why 
she wanted him to come over, but she did not give him a 
reason, and that he assumed the call was about problems 
concerning her son. In any event, Jones immediately left his 
office, in unifmm, and drove his police cruiser the four blocks 
to Travis's house. 
1 4 When Jones arrived at the house, he was met by a 
drunken Travis clad only in his underwear. Travis was calm, 
although inebriated. Travis pointed to scratch marks on his 
chest and told Jones, "[L]ook what [Girlfriend] did to me." 
Jones then located Girlfriend in the garage, where she told 
Jones, "[Travis] can't do this to me anymore," that Travis 
. ..:Jl' 
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was "out of control," and that he had kicked her in the leg. 
Jones examined Girlfriend's leg but observed no injury or 
impainnent in her ability to walk. 
~ 5 While Jones and Girlfriend were talking, Travis entered 
the garage and again accused Girlfriend of scratching his 
chest. Girlfriend told Jones that Travis had scratched himself 
and asked Jones to calm Travis down. Jones responded that 
he could not deal with Travis because the two were brothers 
and asked Girlfriend if she wanted to call the Summit County 
Sheriff's Office to file a rep011. She declined, telling Jones that 
she was not afraid of Travis. Jones then spoke with Travis 
alone, and Travis admitted that he had scratched himself in 
an effort to get Girlfriend an-ested. 
,r 6 Travis appeared to be on th~ verge of passing out, so 
Jones put him to bed and told the couple to stay away from 
each other. Jones also told them that if they wanted to make 
a police report they would have to call the sheriffs office 
because Jones could not become professionally involved in 
his own family matters. Jones left Travis's house after being 
there a total of fifteen to twenty minutes and clocked out from 
his shift a little after 10:00 p.m. Jones did not arrest or cite 
Travis, write a report about the incident, or give Girlfriend 
written notice of her rights as a domestic violence victim. 
,r 7 A short time later, Jones observed on his home computer 
that sheriffs deputies had been dispatched to Travis's house. 
When the deputies an-ived there, they found Girlfriend crying 
and obviously distraught, with injuries that included bruising 
on her leg. Girlfriend's ten-year-old son had also suffered 
injuries. The deputies an-ested Travis, who was loud, vulgar, 
~nd very aggressive. Deputies also learned that Jones had 
been at the house earlier. Jones monitored the situation on 
his police radio, but the detai]s of what he may have heard 
are unknown. Later that night, Girlfriend called Jones again. 
Jones assumed that Girlfriend was calling about Travis and 
did not answer his phone. 
,i 8 The next morning, Jones went to visit Travis in jail. 
Travis was in a holding cell near the booking counter, and 
the sheriffs deputy working at the counter overheard parts of 
their conversation. Jones told Travis that Jones had been at 
Travis's house the night before, that Travis was passed out in 
his bed while Jones was there, and that Travis needed to do 
something about his drinking. As Jones was leaving, he spoke 
with the deputy directly about the prior evening's events and 
repeated his statement that Travis was passed out while Jones 
was at the house. He also told the deputy that Girlfriend had 
indicated in the phone call that he needed to come over to 
"talk or take care of' Travis. 
1 9 As a result of these incidents, the State charged Jones 
with official neglect and misconduct-or, in the alternative, 
the lesser offense of official misconduct-for his handling 
of the incident between Travis and Girlfriend on the night 
of February 15. The State's theory of misconduct under 
both counts was that Jones had failed to comply with the 
requirements imposed on law enforcement officers by Utah's 
Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act, see Utah Code Ann. §§ 
77-36-1 to -10 (LexisNexis 2012 & Supp.2013). The State 
also charged Jones with witness tampering because of his 
statements to Travis during the jail visit the next morning, 
where he told Travis that he had been passed out during 
Jones's visit. 
4U 10 At Jones's preliminary hearing, the State called only three 
witnesses. Craig Gibson, the State's investigator, testified 
about *100 his March 7, 2011 interview of Jones, a 
transcript of which was admitted into the record. 2 Sheriffs 
Deputy Richard Jones described his response to the dispatch 
call from Travis's house on the night of February 15 after 
Jones had been there. And Sheriffs Deputy Trace Thomsen 
testified about statements that Jones made to both him and 
Travis at the jail on the morning of February 16. 
1 11 After the preliminary hearing, Jones fi1ed a motion to 
dismiss, which the magistrate granted as to all three counts. 
In its dismissal order, the magistrate ruled that the State had 
failed to demonstrate probable cause to believe that Jones had 
committed any of the three charged crimes. As to the official 
neglect and misconduct charge, the magistrate ruled that 
Jones was only alleged to have violated his duty as a police 
officer, not as a municipal officer as required by Utah Code 
section I 0-3-826, and that the appropriate misconduct charge 
was therefore official misconduct pursuant to section 76-8-
201. As to the official misconduct charge, the magistrate ruled 
that Jones was under no obligation to comply with the duties 
imposed upon police officers responding to domestic violence 
incidents because he went to Travis and Girlfriend's house as 
a family member, Girlfriend's call did not mention domestic 
violence, and there was no altercation occun-ing when Jones 
arrived at the house. Finally, as to the charge of witness 
tampering, the magistrate ruled that there was no evidence 
of one of the elements of the crime: that Jones believed that 
an official proceeding relating to his actions was pending or 
about to be initiated at the time he spoke to Travis in the jail. 
The State appeals from the magistrate's dismissal order. 
r 
lii;i.::J 
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ISSUE AND ST AND ARD OF REVIEW 
1 15 In dismissing the official neglect and misconduct charge, 
the magistrate concluded that Utah Code section 10-3-826 
"talks about official neglect and misconduct and encompasses 
the special functions of the municipal officer'' and that 
[11 [2] [3) ,r 12 The State argues that the magistrate "[t]hose types of functions do not relate to the general duties 
erred in dismissing each of the three charges against Jones of a police officer." The magistrate also referred to Karnas 
at the bindover stage. The magistrate's bindover decision 
"is a mixed determination that is entitled to some limited 
deference." State v. Maughan, 2013 UT 37, ,r 12, 305 P.3d 
1058; see also State v. Machan, 2013 UT 72, ,r 18, 322 P.3d 
655 ( describing the magistrate's discretion at the bindover 
stage as "limited discretion"). The State is entitled to have 
a defendant bound over for trial if it presents "evidence 
sufficient to support a reasonable belief that the defendant 
committed the charged crime," and in making its bindover 
detem1ination the magistrate "must view all evidence in the 
light most favorable to the prosecution and must draw all 
reasonable inferences in favor of the prosecution." Maughan, 
2013 UT 37, ,r 14, 305 P.3d 1058 (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
ANALYSIS 
,r 13 The magistrate dismissed the three counts against 
Jones on three distinct rationales. We examine each of the 
magistrate's rulings in turn and determine that each ruling 
was an appropriate exercise of the magistrate's "limited 
discretion." See Machan, 2013 UT 72, ,r 18, 322 P.3d 655. 
I. Official Neglect and Misconduct 
,r 14 The magistrate first addressed the charge of official 
neglect and misconduct. Official neglect and misconduct, a 
class A misdemeanor, occurs when "any municipal officer 
shall at any time wilfully omit to perfonn any duty, or 
wilfully and corruptly be guilty of oppression, malconduct, 
misfeasance, or malfeasance in office." Utah Code Ann.§ 10-
3-826 (LexisNexis 2012). 3 The State charged Jones with one 
count of official neglect and misconduct, alleging that, as the 
Karnas police chief. Jones was a municipal officer and that 
he failed to perfonn his duties when he did not comply with 
the requirements of the Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act (the 
Act) while responding to an incident of domestic violence at 
Travis's *101 house. 4 
City Ordinance # 02-1, which governs the Kamas police 
department, 5 to determine that Jones was alleged to have 
violated not his duties as the police chief but rather his general 
duties as a police officer under paragraph 3 of the ordinance. 
See Kamas, Utah, Ordinance# 02-1, para. 03 (May 28, 2002) 
(enumerating the additional powers and duties of policemen). 
Accordingly, the magistrate concluded that the appropriate 
charge was official misconduct under Utah Code section 76-
8-201 and declined to bind Jones over on official neglect and 
misconduct under section 10-3-826. 
[4] ,r 16 We agree with the magistrate's legal ruling 
regarding the meaning of the statute and ordinance. There was 
no evidence that Jones was acting in his capacity as the police 
chief-i.e., failing to perfonn a duty arising exclusively from 
his status as the police chief-when he went to Travis's 
house on the night of February 15. Cf State v. Tolman. 
775 P.2d 422, 425 (Utah Ct.App.1989) (interpreting official 
misconduct statute to apply only to public servants acting in 
their capacity as public servants). Any duties under the Act 
arose only due to Jones's general status as a police officer. 
See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-2.1 (1 )(LexisNexis 2012) 
("A Jaw enforcement officer who responds to an allegation of 
domestic violence shall use all reasonable means to protect 
the victim .... " (emphasis added)). Further, to the extent that 
Kamas City Ordinance # 02-1 imposed an independent duty 
on Jones to comply with the Act, that duty applied to all 
Kamas police officers and not exclusively to the police chief. 
See Kamas, Utah, Ordinance # 02-1, para. 03 (''The chief 
of police and all police officers of the City shall have the 
following powers and duties .... "). 
[51 ,r 17 In sum~ the magistrate correctly interpreted Utah 
Code section 10-3-826 as being limited to acts or omissions 
relating to the special functions of a municipal officer in his 
or her capacity as a municipal officer. The magistrate also 
properly detern1ined that there is no evidence that Jones failed 
to perfonn any duty imposed upon him by virtue of his status 
as the Kamas police chief, as opposed to his status as a Kamas 
police officer or a police officer generally. Accordingly, the 
magistrate appropriately declined to bind Jones over for trial 
on the charge of official neglect and misconduct under Utah 
Code section 10-3-826. 
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*102 II. Official Misconduct 
1 18 The magistrate next addressed the State's alternative 
charge of official misconduct, a class B misdemeanor. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-201 (LexisNexis 2012). Official 
misconduct is committed when "[a] public servant ... 
knowingly refrains from perfonning a duty imposed on him 
by law or clearly inherent in the nature of his office" and does 
so "with an intent to benefit himself or another or to hann 
another." See id. The State's theory of official misconduct 
against Jones was that he was a public servant by virtue of 
his status as a police officer, that he failed to comply with 
his law enforcement duties under the Act when he responded 
to Girlfriend's allegation of domestic violence against Travis, 
and that he did so to benefit either himself or Travis. 
1 19 The magistrate dismissed the official misconduct charge, 
stating that a police officer's duties under the Act "are 
predicated on the ... officer responding to an allegation of 
domestic violence." The magistrate dete1mined that Jones 
was not responding to an allegation of domestic violence 
because Girlfriend called him as Travis's brother, not as a 
police officer; Girlfriend's call did not mention domestic 
violence; and there was no ongoing altercation when Jones 
arrived at Travis's house. The magistrate concluded that 
"[t]here is no showing that [Jones] was responding to an 
allegation of domestic abuse, [and] therefore the [Act] and the 
duties arising under it have no application to [Jones] in this 
incident." 
[6] 1 20 Again, we agree with the magistrate. The Act does 
[7] 121 Although the Act does not provide a definition of the 
type of police response that triggers the Act's various duties, 
a reading of the Act as a whole indicates that it is intended to 
apply only to official police responses to domestic violence. 
For example, the Act refers variously to "respond[ing] to 
an allegation of domestic violence," Utah Code Ann. § 77-
36-2.1 ( 1 ); "domestic violence call[s]," id. § 77-36-2.2(1) 
(Supp.2013); and "complaints of domestic violence," id. § 
77-36-2.2(3). Read in the context of a statute governing the 
activities oflaw enforcement officers, the language employed 
by the legislature indicates that the Act's duties apply only 
when a police officer is making an official police response to 
a domestic violence incident. 6 
[8] [91 1 22 The State argues that the circumstances 
surrounding Jones's visit to Travis's house give rise to a 
reasonable inference that Jones was responding in a law 
enforcement capacity. These circumstances include the facts 
that Jones was on duty, in unifom1, and driving a police 
vehicle; responded immediately to Girlfriend's call rather 
than waiting the fifteen minutes until he went off duty; 
and investigated the incident at Travis's house "as a police 
officer would." We must accept an inference as reasonable 
"unless it falls to a level of inconsistency or incredibility that 
no reasonable jury could accept it." State v. Machan, 2013 
UT 72, 1 8, 322 P.3d 655 (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted). However, we evaluate proposed inferences 
under the totality of the *103 circumstances, not just 
those circumstances that support the inference. See State v. 
Graham, 2013 UT App 109, 19, 302 P.3d 824 (stating that 
inferences to support a bindover must be evaluated "under the 
totality of the circumstances"). 
not impose its duties on all police officers at all times but ,I 23 The totality of the circumstances of the February 15 
rather on police officers who are responding to allegations of 
domestic violence. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-2.1 ( 1) 
(LexisNexis 2012) ("A law enforcement officer who responds 
to an allegation of domestic Fiolence shall use all reasonable 
means to protect the victim .... " (emphasis added)). Further, 
this com1 has previously determined that a public servant 
does not commit the crime of official misconduct unless he 
or she acts in the "capacity" of a public servant. See State 
v. Tolman, 775 P.2d 422, 425 (Utah Ct.App.1989) ("[T]he 
prosecution was required to prove that Tolman ... acted in 
his capacity as a public servant .... "). Thus, Jones committed 
official misconduct under Utah Code section 76-8-201 only 
if he failed to perform a duty in his "capacity" as a police 
officer. See id. 
incident includes undisputed evidence that Girlfriend called 
Jones on his personal cell phone and that Jones responded to 
that personal call solely in his capacity as Travis's brother. 
Gibson, the State's investigator, testified that he interviewed 
both Jones and Girlfriend and that both of them indicated 
that Jones was not called there in his police capacity. Thus, 
neither Jones nor Girlfriend believed Jones was present as 
a police officer. The evidence further indicates that Jones 
informed Girlfriend at the scene that he could not become 
professionally involved because he was Travis's brother and 
that Jones repeatedly offered to contact the sheriff's office if 
Girlfriend desired official law enforcement involvement. 
,r 24 Under the totality of the circumstances, we cannot 
accept as reasonable the State's proposed inference that 
Q 
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Jones responded to Girlfriend's personal call as a police 
officer making an official response to a domestic violence 
call. The undisputed evidence is that Jones was summoned 
and responded solely as a family member. The evidence 
that the State relies on-Jones's police unifonn and other 
accoutrements of official involvement-are consistent with 
an inference of official capacity when viewed in isolation but 
not when viewed in light of the undisputed testimony that 
Jones's visit to Travis's house was purely an unofficial family 
matter. In other words, in light of all of the evidence presented 
to the magistrate, the inference presented by the State "falls 
to a level of inconsistency or incredibility that no reasonable 
jury could accept it." Machan, 2013 UT 72,, 8,322 P.3d 655 
( citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
~ 25 In reaching this conclusion, we take some guidance 
from two Utah cases addressing the crime of assaulting a 
peace officer and, in particular, that crime's element that an 
assaulted officer be "acting within the scope of authority as 
a peace officer" at the time of the assault. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-102.4(2)(a) (LexisNexis Supp.2013). In State 
v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568 (Utah 1991), a divided supreme 
court affim1ed the defendant's conviction despite the fact that 
the assault occun-ed as the defendant was resisting an illegal 
search by the officer. See id. at 570-75. The court held that, 
despite the illegality of the search the officer was still acting 
within the scope of his authority at the time of the assault. See 
id. at 575. In analyzing the scope of authority question, the 
court employed the test of "whether an officer is doing what 
he or she was employed to do or is 'engaging in a personal 
frolic of his [or her] own.'" Id. at 574 (alteration in original) 
(quoting United States v. Heliczer, 373 F.2d 241, 245 (2d 
Cir.1967)). 
1 26 In Salt Lake City 11• Christensen, 2007 UT App 254, 
167 P.3d 496, this court affirmed a conviction for assaulting 
a peace officer that arose from a uniformed officer's off-duty 
employment as a hospital security guard. Id. ,1 12-13. The 
court concluded that the officer was acting within the scope 
of his authority as a peace officer at the time of the assault 
despite his private employment status, explaining, 
It is true that upon Defendant's atTival 
at the emergency room, [ the officer] 
was acting as [a hospital] employee 
and not as a peace officer. But 
when Defendant took a defensive 
stance, clenched his fists, and made 
verbal threats of physical violence, 
[the officer's] primary role shifted 
r\ i,---. 
from that of a security guard to that 
of a peace officer. It was in his 
law enforcement capacity that [the 
officer] took Defendant under control 
and prevented the escalation of further 
violence. 
Id. , 14. The court ultimately held that "when a law 
enforcement officer responds to preserve law and order or to 
detect and deter crime, he is acting 'within the scope of his 
authority as a peace officer' even though he may be working 
at another job." Id. (citation omitted). 
4j\ 27 Thus, at least for purposes of the crime of assaulting a 
peace officer, 7 we know *104 that even a uniformed, on-
duty police officer is not acting within the scope of his law 
enforcement capacity while he engages in a "personal frolic." 
Gardine1~ 814 P.2d at 574 (citation and intemal quotation 
marks omitted). Conversely, even off-duty officers may act 
within the scope of their law enforcement capacity when they 
act "to preserve law and order or to detect and deter crime." 
Christensen, 2007 UT App 254, 4il l 4, 167 P .3d 496; see also 
id. ("[E]ven peace officers who are 'off duty' will typically 
sp1ing into action when circumstances so require, i.e., when 
the law has been or is about to be broken."). 
, 28 Analyzing the evidence presented below through the 
lenses of Gardiner and Christensen, Jones's initial decision to 
go to Travis's house in response to Girlfiiend's personal call 
can be reasonably characterized only as a personal frolic to 
attend to family matters. When Jones arrived at the house and 
became aware of Girlfriend's allegation of domestic violence, 
he declined to "spring into action" and treat the situation as 
a law enforcement matter. See Christensen, 2007 UT App 
254, , 14, 167 P.3d 496. To the contrary, Jones advised 
Girlfriend that he could not become professionally involved 
because of his relationship to Travis, and he repeatedly 
offered to involve the sheriffs office to respond to the incident 
in an official law enforcement capacity. Girlfriend did not 
object to Jones's statements and, in fact, endorsed those 
statements. Furthermore, Jones observed no visible signs of 
domestic abuse-other than Travis's self-inflicted scratches 
-and, when Jones left the house, all was calm and Travis 
was sleeping in his bed. In short, nothing occurred during 
Jones's visit to the house to conve1t the incident from a purely 
personal incident into a law enforcement matter. 8 
,i 29 For all of these reasons, we agree with the magistrate that 
it cannot be reasonably inferred from the State's evidence that 
: ' -:· 
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Jones's interaction with Travis and Gir]friend on the night of 
February 15 was anything other than a family matter. Because 
the evidence below, presented as a whole, does not suppo11 a 
reasonable inference that Jones was responding to a domestic 
violence allegation in his officia] capacity, we affirm the 
magistrate's refusal to bind Jones over for trial on the charc1e ::> 
of official misconduct. 
III. Witness Tampering 
~ 30 Finally, the magistrate addressed the charge of witness 
tampering. 
A person is guilty of the third degree 
felony of tampering with a witness if, 
believing that an official proceeding or 
investigation is pending or about to be 
instituted, or with the intent to prevent 
an official proceeding or investigation, 
he attempts to induce or otherwise 
cause another person to . . . testify or 
infom1 falsely .... 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508(1) (LcxisNexis 2012). The 
State's the01y of witness tampering against Jones was that 
Jones believed that there would be an official investigation 
into his handling of the incident with Girlfriend and Travis. 
Jones then attempted to get Travis to cover up the events of 
that incident by te11ing Travis the next morning that he had 
been passed out during the time that Jones was at his house. 
~ 31 The magistrate dismissed the witness tampering charge 
after detem1ining that there was no evidence that an official 
investigation into Jones's actions was pending or *J 05 
about to be instituted at the time he spoke with Travis. 
Perhaps more importantly, the magistrate found no evidence 
that Jones believed such an investigation was pending. See 
Melessa v. Randall, 121 Fed.Appx. 803,807 (10th Cir.2005) 
(interpreting Utah Code section 76-8-508(1) as requiring 
a defendant's subjective belief "that an official proceeding 
or investigation is cutTently pending or will be initiated in 
the future"); State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874, 876-77 (Utah 
1985) (per curiam) ("The statute requires no more than that 
a defendant believe an official proceeding or investigation 
to be underway."). In the absence of evidence that Jones 
believed that an official investigation into his actions at 
Travis's house was underway or would be initiated in the 
future, the magistrate concluded that the State had failed 
to adequately establish an element of the crime of witness 
tampering and declined to bind Jones over on that charge. 9 
fl OJ ,r 32 On appeal, the State argues that Jones knew that 
Travis had been arrested for domestic violence shortly after 
Jones left the house. The State asks us to draw a reasonable 
inference that the resulting investigation of Travis would have 
necessarily led to an investigation of Jones's actions. The 
State also argues that the evidence that Jones "falsely told a 
certainly hung over and possibly memory-impaired Travis" 
that he was passed out during the incident gives rise to a 
reasonable inference that Jones wanted Travis to repeat the 
lie to investigators. We cannot accept either of the State's 
proposed inferences. 
,r 33 As discussed above, the totality of the evidence presented 
at the preliminary hearing shows that Jones went to Travis's 
house on the evening of February 15 solely on a family matter 
or "personal frolic" that did not constitute an official response 
to a domestic violence allegation. See State v. Gardiner, 814 
P.2d 568, 574 (Utah 1991) (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted). Further, there is nothing in the evidence to 
support an inference that, at any time during Jones's visit, his 
"primary role shifted from that of a [family member] to that 
of a peace officer." See Salt Lake Oty v. Christensen, 2007 
UT App 254, ,r 14, 167 P .3d 496. Thus, the mere fact that 
Jones knew of both his own actions and Travis's domestic 
violence mTest provided Jones with no reason to be1ieve that 
his actions were like1y to be the subject of any sort of official 
investigation. We cannot infer Jones's belief of an official 
investigation from his actions when-based on the evidence 
presented below-those actions did not constitute a crime or 
othenvise suggest the likelihood of au investigation. 
,r 34 We also cannot agree that the mere fact that Jones 
told Travis that he was passed out gives rise to a reasonable 
inference that Jones be]ieved an investigation was impending. 
See generally State v. Garcia-Vargas, 2012 UT App 270, ii 
17 n. 5, 287 P.3d 474 ("[A]n inference is a deduction as to 
the existence of a fact which human experience teaches us 
can reasonably and logical1y be drawn from proof of other 
facts." (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted)). If there was some independent reason for 
Jones to believe that there would be an investigation, then his 
statement to Travis might give rise to an inference that he 
lied to Travis in order to impede that investigation. But in the 
absence of other evidence that Jones believed an investigation 
was likely, we cannot "reasonably and logically" deduce that 
;.:. 
Q 
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Jones believed that an investigation was pending merely from 
the evidence that he told Travis that he was passed out. See id. 
[111 ,i 35 "Under Utah law, a magistrate is 'free to decline 
bindoverwhere the facts presented by the prosecution provide 
no more than a basis for speculation-as opposed to providing 
a basis for a reasonable belief.'" State v. Graham, 2013 UT 
App 109, ,i 17, 302 P .3d 824 ( quoting State v. Virgin, 2006 
UT 29, ,r 21, 137 P.3d 787). "[S]peculation is defined as the 
'act or practice of theorizing about matters over which there 
is no certain *106 knowledge.' " State v. Hester, 2000 UT 
App 159, iJ 16, 3 P.3d 725 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 
1407 (7th ed.1999)), abrogated on other grounds by State v. 
Clark, 2001 UT 9, 20 P.3d 300. In the absence of any other 
evidence that Jones believed that he would be subject to an 
official investigation, the State's proposed inference of Jones's 
belief from his alleged falsehood to Travis constitutes such 
speculation. 
~ ,i 36 The State's proposed inference is also not the only 
possible explanation of Jones's statement such that the 
inference might be supported as the only explanation 
available. Indeed, it seems just as likely that Jones visited 
Travis in jail simply to check on his condition and told Travis 
that he had passed out-which Travis had apparently done 
before Jones left the house-so as not to prompt a discussion 
of the prior evening's events. If there was independent 
evidence to support the State's proposed inference, then 
there would be a question for a jury to resolve. See State 
v. Maughan, 2013 UT 37, ,i,r 15-21, 305 P.3d 1058. But 
we see no other evidence to support the theory that Jones 
sought to impede an investigation of his actions. 1 o In the 
absence of such evidence, the State's proposed inference asks 
us to infer Jones's belief in an investigation merely from the 
allegation that Jones told a falsehood about the past event that 
would have been the subject of the purported investigation. 
This represents speculation rather than reasoned and logical 
deduction. See generally Garcia- Va1gas, 2012 UT App 270, 
117 n. 5,287 P.3d 474 (recognizing the "difference between 
drawing a reasonable inference and merely speculating about 
possibilities"). 
ii 37 For these reasons, the magistrate appropriately 
detem1ined that the State failed to produce evidence that Jones 
believed that there was, or would be, any official investigation 
into his actions at the time he made the alleged false statement 
to Travis. Because belief in a present or pending investigation 
is an element of the crime of witness tampering as charged 
against Jones, the magistrate properly declined to bind Jones 
over for trial on the witness tampering charge. 
CONCLUSION 
, 3 8 The magistrate appropriately concluded that the State 
did not present "evidence sufficient to support a reasonable 
belief' that Jones violated any official duties during his visit 
to Travis's house on February 15 or that he believed that 
he would face official investigation when he falsely told 
Travis the next morning that Travis had been passed out 
during the visit. See Maughan, 2013 UT 37, 114, 305 P.3d 
1058 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The 
magistrate therefore acted within its "limited discretion" in 
dismissing the charges of official neglect and misconduct, 
official misconduct, and witness tampering against Jones. 
See State v. Machan, 2013 UT 72, ~ 18, 322 P.3d 655. 
Accordingly, we affirm the magistrate's dismissal order. 
CHRISTIANSEN, Judge ( concurring in part, concurring in 
the result in part, and dissenting in part): 
,r 39 I concur in the lead opinion's analysis in Section I 
regarding official neglect and misconduct in violation of 
Utah Code section 10-3-826 and concur in the result as 
to the conclusion reached in Section III regarding witness 
tampering in violation of Utah Code section 76-8-508(1 ). I 
disagree, however, with the lead opinion's determination in 
Section II that the magistrate correctly dismissed the charge 
of official misconduct in violation of Utah Code section 76-
8-201, which provides that "[a] public servant is guilty of 
a class B misdemeanor if, with an intent to benefit himself 
or another, he ... knowingly refrains from performing a duty 
imposed on him by law or clearly inherent in the nature of 
his office." Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-201 (LexisNexis 2008). 
The magistrate determined, and the lead opinion agrees, that 
because Jones did not initially respond as a police officer 
to his brother's house on a domestic-violence call but rather 
as Travis's brother, and because no altercation occmTed in 
Jones's presence between *107 Travis and Girlfriend, Jones 
was not acting in his official capacity as a law enforcement 
officer and was thus not required to perfom1 the duties 
imposed on law enforcement officers by the Act. See id. § 
77-36-2.1 (1) ("A law enforcement officer who responds to 
an allegation of domestic violence shall use all reasonable 
means to protect the victim and prevent further violence .... "); 
id. § 77-36-2.2(2)(a) (providing that an officer responding 
to a domestic violence call "shall arrest without a warrant or 
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shall issue a citation to any person that the peace officer has 
probable cause to believe has committed an act of domestic 
violence''). I respectfully dissent as to Section II. 
,r 40 To begin, I agree that the Act "does not impose its duties 
on all police officers at all times, but rather on police officers 
who are responding to allegations of domestic violence.,, 
See supra ,r 20. I also agree that the circumstances that 
prompted Jones's visit to Travis and Girlfriend's house on 
Febmary 15, 2011, even while he was on duty, in uniform, 
and traveling in his police vehicle, do not alone give rise to 
a reasonable inference that Jones was responding in a law 
enforcement capacity to a domestic-violence call. And I agree 
that Jones's visit to Travis's house was initially "a purely 
unofficial family matter." See supra,r 24. However, I disagree 
with the magistrate's and the lead opinion's conclusion that, 
once he atTived at his brother's house and was informed of 
the situation for which it tums out he had been summoned 
' 
Jones did not at that point have a duty to officially respond as a 
law enforcement officer to Girlfriend's allegation of domestic 
violence. See id. § 77-36-2. I (I). 
,r 41 In my view, the lead opinion incorrectly concludes 
that "nothing occuned during Jones's visit to the house to 
conve1t the incident from a purely personal incident into a law 
enforcement matter." See supra ,r 28. Rather, what admittedly 
started out as a "personal frolic" turned into a situation 
requiring Jones to respond as a law enforcement officer once 
he discovered the situation at Travis and Girlfriend's house. 
Specifically, Jones arrived at his brother's residence anned 
with the know ledge of the violent history between Travis 
and Girlftiend and of Travis's tendency to become violent 
after consuming alcohol. Upon his arrival, Jones observed 
that Travis was intoxicated, found Girlfriend in her car talkino b 
on the phone, and learned from Girlfriend that "Travis was 
out of control," had allegedly kicked Girlfriend in the leg, 11 
and had hanned himself. 12 Once he received Girlfriend's 
statement that Travis had allegedly assaulted her, Jones had a 
Footnotes 
duty as a sworn peace officer "to preserve law and order [ and] 
to detect and deter crime, [ and act] within the scope of his 
authority as a peace officer.'' Salt Lake City v. Christensen, 
2007 UT App 254, ,r 14, 167 P.3d 496 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). Jones was therefore obligated to 
discharge his duties under the Act. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 
77-36-2.1, -2.2. 
,r 42 In passing the Act, our legislature has removed 
some of the discretion a police officer has in responding 
to allegations of domestic violence and has statutorily 
mandated certain procedures on the part of those police 
officers. "[B]ecause domestic violence is serious in nature 
and has a high likelihood of repeated violence, incidents 
of domestic abuse require the mandatory and immediate 
attention oflaw enforcement." State v. Farrow, 919 P.2d 50, 
54 (Utah Ct.App.1996) ( discussing the policy underlying the 
legislature's enactment of Utah Code title 77, chapter 36, then 
called the Spouse Abuse Procedures Act); see also Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-36-2.2( I) ("The primary duty oflaw enforcement 
officers responding to a domestic violence call is to protect 
the victim and enforce the law."). Given the mandatory 
*108 response required by law, once he became aware of 
Girlfriend's allegation of domestic violence, Jones had a duty 
to use all reasonable means to protect her and to prevent 
fmther violence between Travis and Girlfriend that night. 
Whether Jones failed to comply with his law enforcement 
duties as required by the Act, and whether such failure was 
committed knowingly and with the intent to benefit himself 
or Travis, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-201, are ultimately 
questions for the fact-finder. Consequently, I would reverse 
the magistrate's dismissal of the official misconduct charge 
and remand for further proceedings. I therefore dissent from 
the lead opinion on this point. 
Parallel Citations 
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The Honorable Pamela T. Greenwood, Senior Judge, sat by special assignment as authorized by law. See generally Utah Code Jud 




The interview focused on Jones's actions on the night of February 15, and there were no questions or discussions about his visit to 
Travis in jail the next moming. 
In addition to constituting a class A misdemeanor, conviction of a municipal officer for official neglect and misconduct also mandates 
removal ~rom office ~nd inel!gibility "for any municipal office thereafter." See Utah Code Ann.§ 10-3-826 (LexisNexis 2012). 
The Act imposes various duties on law enforcement officers responding to reports of domestic violence. Amono these duties arc that 
"'[a] law enforcement officer who responds to an allegation of domestic violence shall use all reasonable mean:to protect the victim 
-- ---- -··---~-
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and prevent further violence," Utah Code Ann.§ 77-36-2.1(1) (LexisNexis 2012), and "shall give written notice to the victim in 
simple language, describing the rights and remedies available" to the victim under Utah statutes addressing cohabitant abuse and 
child protective orders, id. § 77-36-2.1 (2)(a). The Act requires that a law enforcement officer responding to a domestic vio1ence call 
"shall arrest without a warrant or shall issue a citation to any person that the peace officer has probable cause to believe has committed 
an act of domestic violence." Id.§ 77-36-2.2(2)(a) (Supp.2013). The Act also imposes certain reporting requirements, including 
the requirement that an officer "who does not make an arrest after investigating a complaint of domestic violence ... shall submit a 
detailed, written report specifying the grounds for not arresting any party." Id.§ 77-36-2.2(5)(a). Additionally, "[a] law enforcement 
officer responding to a complaint of domestic violence shall prepare an incident report that includes the officer's disposition of the 
case." Id. § 77-36-2.2(6)(a). It is undisputed in this case that Jones did not give Girlfriend written notice of her rights and remedies, 
did not arrest or cite Travis for domestic violence, and did not file either a failure-to-arrest report or an incident report. 
Kamas City Ordinance # 02-1 establishes both the Kamas Police Department and the position of chief of police. See Kamas, Utah, 
Ordinance# 02-L para. 01 (May 28, 2002). Certain duties under the ordinance are exclusive to the municipal office of police chief, 
including the duty to "organize, supervise, and be responsible for all the activities of the police department'' and to "execute all lawful 
orders of the Mayor and City Council." See id. para. 02. 
Although we determine that the Act's duties arc triggered only by official responses to domestic violence, we agree with the State 
that the Act is not limited to situations where a call to authorities specifically alleges domestic violence. Police officers have many 
different types of official interactions with the public, and whether any particular incident triggers the Act's duties depends on the 
circumstances. 
In Christensen. the comt expressly stated, 
Questions about the scope of a peace officer's authority arise in many different contexts, including respondcat superior, workers' 
compensation, and civil rights cases. We specifically note that our analysis and holding in this case should not be construed as 
applying in all contexts in which the question of an officer's authority may arise. 
Salt Lake City v. Christensen, 2007 UT App 254, ~ 13 n. 3, 167 P.3d 496. 
We note that the officer in Christensen was not deemed to be acting in a law enforcement capacity until he reacted to the defendant's 
threat of immediate physical violence. See 2007 UT App 254, ,i 14, 167 P.3d 496. The officer initially remained in his unofficial, 
security guard capacity despite his knowledge that the defendant was a suspect in a recent and serious domestic violence incident. 
Id. , 3. The officer also remained in his unofficial capacity as he endured fifteen to twenty minutes of the defendant's "obscene 
outbursts," twice heard the defendant threaten to kill his brother upon being released from the hospital, and requested police backup 
due to the defendant's "large size, belligerent behavior, and the fact that he was a suspect in a domestic violence incident.'' Id. 14. 
9 The magistrate also ruled that Travis's potential testimony would have been in-elevant to any investigation into Jones's actions because 
Girlfriend was the only witness to Jones's allegedly improper response to her allegation of domestic violence against Travis. We do 




was awake when Jones arrived at the house. 
To the contrary, Jones freely discussed the events at Travis's house with the State's investigator, including the fact that Travis was 
not passed out when Jones an-ived at the house. 
A criminal assault is, among other things, "an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily injury to another 
or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another." Utah Code Ann.§ 76-5-102(1){c) (LcxisNexis 2012). An allegation of a 
kick in the leg can therefore constitute an allegation of assault. 
It is less clear what duty Jones may have had in response to Travis's initial allegation of domestic abuse against Girlfriend, given 
Travis's later admission that the allegation was false. See supra~ 5. However, because Girlfriend's allegation was sufficient to trigger 
Jones's duties under the Act, I express no opinion as to whether Travis's initial allegations would have also triggered those duties. 
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Addendum B 

§ 76-8-201. Official misconduct--Unauthorized acts or failure of duty, UT ST § 76-8-201 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code 
Chapter 8. Offenses Against the Administration of Government 
Part 2. Abuse of Office 
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-8-201 
§ 76-8-201. Official misconduct--Unauthorized acts or failure of duty 
Currentness 
A public servant is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if, with an intent to benefit himself or another or to harm another, he 
knowingly commits an unauthorized act which purports to be an act of his office, or knowingly refrains from performing a duty 
imposed on him by law or clearly inherent in the nature of his office. 
Credits 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-8-201. 
Notes of Decisions (1) 
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-8-201, UT ST§ 76-8-201 
Current through 2012 Fourth Special Session. 
Entl ofDo<"umt>nt 1t) 20\ 3 Thomson Rcutl:rs. No claim to c1riginal U.S. Governmeni Wo,ks. 
\Nestl~NNexr © 2013 ihomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government \AJorks. 
§ 76-8-508. Tampering with witness-Receiving or soliciting a bribe, UT ST § 76-8-508 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 76. Utah Ctiminal Code 
Chapter 8. Offenses Against the Administration of Government 
Part 5. Falsification in Official Matters (Refs & Annos) 
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-8-508 
§ 76-8-508. Tampering with witness--Receiving or soliciting a bribe 
Currentness 
( 1) A person is guilty of the third degree felony of tampering with a witness if, believing that an official proceeding or 
@ investigation is pending or about to be instituted, or with the intent to prevent an official proceeding or investigation, he attempts 
to induce or otherwise cause another person to: 
(a) testify or inform falsely; 
(b) withhold any testimony, information, document, or item; 
(c) elude legal process summoning him to provide evidence; or 
(d) absent himself from any proceeding or investigation to which he has been summoned. 
(2) A person is guilty of the third degree felony of soliciting or receiving a bribe as a witness if he solicits, accepts, or agrees 
to accept any benefit in consideration of his doing any of the acts specified under Subsection (1). 
(3) The offense of tampering with a witness or soliciting or receiving a bribe under this section does not merge with any other 
substantive offense committed in the course of committing any offense under this section. 
Credits 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-8-508; Laws 1988, c. 175, § 1; Laws 2000, c. I,§ 115, eff. May l, 2000; Laws 2004, c. 140, § 3, 
eff. May 3, 2004. 
Notes of Decisions (27) 
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-8-508, UT ST§ 76-8-508 
Current through 2012 Fourth Special Session. 
End of Document i.."; 2013 Thumson Reuters. No claim lo origi1rnl t:.S. Government W()rh. 
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§ 77-36-2.1. Duties of law enforcement officers--Notice to victims, UT ST § 77-36-2.1 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
Chapter 36. Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act (Refs & Annos) 
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-36-2.1 
§ 77-36-2.1. Duties oflaw enforcement officers--Notice to victims 
Currentness 
( 1) A law enforcement officer who responds to an allegation of domestic violence shall use all reasonable means to protect the 
victim and prevent further violence, including: 
(a) taking the action that, in the officer's discretion, is reasonably necessary to provide for the safety of the victim and any 
family or household member; 
(b) confiscating the weapon or weapons involved in the alleged domestic violence; 
(c) making arrangements for the victim and any child to obtain emergency housing or shelter; 
( d) providing protection while the victim removes essential personal effects; 
( e) arrange, facilitate, or provide for the victim and any child to obtain medical treatment; and 
( f) arrange, facilitate, or provide the victim with immediate and adequate notice of the rights of victims and of the remedies 
and services available to victims of domestic violence, in accordance with Subsection (2). 
(2)(a) A law enforcement officer shall give written notice to the victim in simple language, describing the rights and remedies 
available under this chapter, Title 78B, Chapter 7, Part 1, Cohabitant Abuse Act, and Title 78B, Chapter 7, Part 2, Child 
Protective Orders. 
(b) The written notice shall also include: 
(i) a statement that the fonns needed in order to obtain an order for protection are available from the court clerk's office 
in the judicial district where the victim resides or is temporarily domiciled; 
(ii) a list of shelters, services, and resources available in the appropriate community, together with telephone numbers, to 
assist the victim in accessing any needed assistance; and 
(iii) the infonnation required to be provided to both parties in accordance with Subsection 77-36-2.5 (8). 
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§ 77-36-2.1. Duties of law enforcement officers--Notice to victims, UT ST § 77-36-2.1 
Credits 
Laws 1995, c. 300, § 18, eff. July 1, 1995; Laws 1998, c. 13, § 92, eff. May 4, 1998; Laws 2003, c. 68, § 8, eff. May 5, 2003; 
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 260, eff. Feb. 7, 2008; Laws 2011, c. 113, § 2, eff. May l 0, 2011. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-36-2.1, UT ST§ 77-36-2.1 
Cllrrent through 2012 Fourth Special Session. 
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~ § 77-36-2.2. Powers and duties of law enforcement officers to ... , UT ST§ 77..JS-2.2 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
Chapter 36. Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act (Refs &Annos) 
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-36-2.2 
§ 77-36-2.2. Powers and duties of law enforcement officers to arrest--
Reports of domestic violence cases--Reports of patties' marital status 
Currentness 
(1) The primary duty of law enforcement officers responding to a domestic violence call is to protect the victim and enforce 
the law. 
(2)(a) In addition to the arrest powers described in Section 77-7-2, when a peace officer responds to a domestic violence call 
and has probable cause to believe that an act of domestic violence has been committed, the peace officer shall arrest without 
a warrant or shall issue a citation to any person that the peace officer has probable cause to believe has committed an act of 
domestic violence. 
(b)(i) If the peace officer has probable cause to believe that there will be continued violence against the alleged victim, or 
if there is evidence that the perpetrator has either recently caused serious bodily injury or used a dangerous weapon in the 
domestic violence offense, the officer shall arrest and take the alleged perpetrator into custody, and may not utilize the option 
of issuing a citation under this section. 
(ii) For purposes of Subsection (2)(b )(i), "serious bodily injury" and "dangerous weapon" mean the same as those terms 
are defined in Section 76-1-601. 
(c) lf a peace officer does not immediately exercise arrest powers or initiate criminal proceedings by citation or otherwise, 
the officer shall notify the victim of the right to initiate a criminal proceeding and of the importance of preserving evidence, 
in accordance with the requirements of Section 77-36-2.1. 
(3) If a law enforcement officer receives complaints of domestic violence from two or more opposing persons, the officer 
shall evaluate each complaint separately to determine who the predominant aggressor was. If the officer determines that one 
person was the predominant physical aggressor, the officer need not arrest the other person alleged to have committed domestic 
violence. In determining who the predominant aggressor was, the officer shall consider: 
(a) any prior complaints of domestic violence; 
(b) the relative severity of injwies inflicted on each person; 
(c) the likelihood of future injury to each of the parties; and 
WestlawNexr@ 2013 Thomson Reuters. No claim lo original U.S. Governrnent Works. 
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(d) whether one of the parties acted in self defense, 
(4) A law enforcement officer may not threaten, suggest, or otherwise indicate the possible arrest of all parties in order to 
discourage any party's request for intervention by law enforcement. 
(5)(a) A law enforcement officer who does not make an arrest after investigating a complaint of domestic violence, or who 
arrests two or more parties, shall submit a detailed, written report specifying the grounds for not arresting any party or for 
arresting both parties. 
(b) A law enforcement officer who does not make an arrest shall notify the victim of the right to initiate a criminal proceeding 
and of the importance of preserving evidence. 
(6)(a) A law enforcement officer responding to a complaint of domestic violence shall prepare an incident report that includes 
the officer's disposition of the case. 
(b) From January l, 2009 until December 31, 2013, any law enforcement officer employed by a city of the first or second 
class responding to a complaint of domestic violence shall also report, either as a part of an incident report or on a separate 
fonn, the following information: 
(i) marital status of each of the parties involved; 
{ii) social, familial, or legal relationship of the suspect to the victim; and 
(iii) whether or not an arrest was made. 
(c) The information obtained in Subsection (6)(b): 
(i) shall be reported monthly to the department; 
(ii) shall be reported as numerical data that contains no personal identifiers; and 
(iii) is a public record as defined in Section 63G-2-l03. 
(d) The incident report shall be made available to the victim, upon request, at no cost. 
(e) The law enforcement agency shall forward a copy of the incident report to the appropriate prosecuting attorney within 
five days after the complaint of domestic violence occurred. 
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(7) Each law enforcement agency shall, as soon as practicable, make a written record and maintain records of all incidents of 
domestic violence reported to it, and shall be identified by a law enforcement agency code for domestic violence. 
Credits 
Laws 1995, c. 300, § 19, eff. July 1, 1995; Laws 1998, c. 105, § 1, eff. May 4, 1998; Laws 2008, c. 375, § 2, eff. May 5, 2008. 
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SUMMIT COUNTY, UTAH - NOVEMBER 28, 2011 
JUDGE L.A. DEVER PRESIDING 
(Transcriber's note: speaker identification 
may not be accurate with audio recordings.) 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Whereupon a sidebar was held - inaudible} 
MR. BATES: We will invoke the exclusionary rule. 
THE COURT: Okay. Who all is going to be witnesses 
in this case? 
MR. BATES: I have three witnesses here, Your Honor. 
One of them is the case agent, Craig Gibson, and I ask that 
he be allowed to remain throughout the proceeding. 
THE COURT: Very well. 
(Inaudible) 
THE COURT: You have no witnesses, Mr. Yengich? 
MR. YENGICH: (Inaudible). 
THE COURT: Okay. Call your first witness. 
MR. BATES: The State would call Agent Craig Gibson. 
(Inaudible conversation) 
MR. YENGICH: Do you have the amendments to that 
(inaudible)? 
MR. BATES: I believe I amended that information 
[inaudible]. 
MR. YENGICH: If he did so I have no objection to 



























THE COURT: Very well. 
CRAIG GIBSON 
Having first been duly sworn, testified 
upon his oath as follows: 
THE COURT: Please state your name and spell your 
name for the court clerk. 
MR. GIBSON: Craig Gibson, C-R-A-I-G G-I-B-S-0-N. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
You may proceed, counsel. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BATES: 
Q Agent Gibson, what's your current occupation? 
A I'm an investigator with the Utah Attorney 
General's office. 




What did you do.before you were at the Attorney 
General's office? 
A Immediately prior I retired, but prior to that that 
I was in the Layton Police Department for four years, the 
West Valley Police Department for 20 years, University of 






































Do you know the defendant in this case, Adam Jones? 
I met Chief Jones on March 7th when I interviewed 
him. 
And what was the subject of your interview? Q 
A I was looking into a possible neglected (inaudible) 
case and wanted to interview Chief Jones regarding his 
response to a domestic violence case involving his brother 






Who is Mr. Jones's brother? 
Travis Jones. 
Who's his sister-in-law? 
Darcy Martinez Jones. 
Let's just start at the beginning of that 
interview. What kinds of questions - sort of questions did 
you ask him to start the interview? 
A I initially wanted to establish whether or not he 
was on duty, so I asked him if he was on duty, what time his 
shift began, where he was, how he received a call from Ms. 
Martinez. 
Q And what was the date of this incident, if you 
recall? 
A It was February 15th • 




























A He indicated that he was at his office in Kamas. He 
received the - a phone call and didnrt recognize the number. 
He answered the phone call, and it was on his personal phone. 
He - it was Ms. Martinez. She requested that he come over. 
At the time he thought that he wanted to ask her some - or 
she wanted to ask him some questions about her son that they 
were having some problems with, he responded to the home, and 
when he arrived he found that - they encountered his brother 
Travis (inaudible). 
Q Now did he indicate to you whether he was attired 
in uniform, or if he took his police vehicle or anything of 
that sort of information? 
A He did. He indicated that he was in uniform, I 
he came to the interview in uniform, so I asked him if he was 
dressed like he was and he indicated he was. He also 
indicated that he took his police vehicle (inaudible). 
Q And did he indicate to you whether he was, in fact, 




He did say he was, yes. 
What did you ask him next? 
Basically went into what he found when he arrived 
at the home. Wanted to find out what his observations were, 
who he contacted. 





























A He said it was about four blocks from the police 
department. I had the address on - I'm sure it's in the 
report, but he said it wasn't very far, it didn't take him 





Now, which police department are you talking about? 
Kamas Police Department where he is the chief. 
So how did he respond to that question? 
He indicated that he met his brother Travis at the 
door. His observation was that his brother was intoxicated 
and he said that his brother basically told him to go into 
the garage and talk to Ms. Martinez and get the story from 
her about what happened. 
Q Did he describe his brother's physical appearance 
to you? 
A He said he appeared to be intoxicated, I think he 
used the term drunk. He did note that he had some scratches 
on his chest. I guess his brother answered the door in his 
shorts, so he could see the scratches on his chest. He - so 
he spoke with him and he got a good indication that he did 
appear to be intoxicated. 
Q Did he speak with Ms. Martinez? 
A Yes. He proceeded to the garage, that's where Ms. 
Martinez was. He spoke with her about her condition. 
Apparently Ms. Martinez indicated to him that Travis was out 



























__.. __ , 
talk to him and control him.and get him to settle down. 
Q Did Mr. Jones tell you whether that night when he 
was investigating this incident, whether Darcy Martinez had 
reported any kind of assault by Travis Jones? 
A He did. He said that Ms. Martinez had told him 
that Travis had kicked her in the leg. He said that he looked 
at her leg and didn't see any marks and didn't see any damage 
to any of the car or anything that - they were in the garage 
and the car was in the garage. 
Q So how did - did Mr. Jones - I should say Adam 
Jones tell you how he decided to resolve this case? 
A He went back in and talked to Travis because of the 
scratches on the - on Travis's chest. He resolved that issue 
and found out that Travis had actually self-inflicted the 
scratches. He -
Q Now, did you know why Travis had self-inflicted 
those scratches? 
A Apparently what he'd been told was that he wanted 
to get Darcy in trouble, or Ms. Martinez in trouble, and that 
was his original purpose, I guess, in placing the scratches 
on his chest, 
inflicted. 
and so he found out that they were self-
Q Okay. So what did he decide to do with this case? 
A He basically put Travis to bed, I believe is what 




























involvement he couldn't get involved because he was Travis's 
brother, but if they wanted to make a police report or get 
the police involved, they would need to call Summit County 
Sheriff's office. 
Q Okay. Now, did you ask him any questions about his 
knowledge of Travis's - of Travis and Darcy's history 
together? 
A Yes. We discussed - I think Chief Jones seemed to 
be frustrated with their history together. They have had a 
history apparently of this type of domestics, and he was - he 
seemed to be frustrated with both their behaviors. He was 
aware that when his brother got drunk that he would get 
violent and had had some past history with those things. 
Q Okay. Did Mr. Jones indicate whether he was aware 
that Travis had ever assaulted Darcy before? 
A I believe he stated he had been aware of assaults 
in the past. It was some years ago, but yes, he had been 
aware when they were living I believe in West Valley, he 
mentioned that when they were in West Valley, he had been 
called before by them to try to resolve issues. 
Q Okay. What did Mr. Jones tell you - Mr. Adam Jones 
tell you about his brother when his brother gets drunk? 
A He said he can get stupid. He can be violent. He 
can be unreasonable. He said normally Chief Jones can calm 






















extremely violent. He said that he has told other police 
agencies or - I don't know if it was Summit County or who he 
was specifically talking about, but he said that he has told 
them that he will fight with police and he will run. He had 
told me that. 
Q Okay. Now, what did - let's finish that question 
we started a few minutes ago. What did Chief Jones tell you 
about how he ended up resolving this situation? 
A He basically again went back, put them to bed, made 
sure that - put Travis to bed is how he - put him in his 
bedroom, put him to bed, told them to stay away from each 
other, and then left the residence. 
Q Did he tell you whether he did anything to comply 
with the requirements of the Co-habitant Abuse Act as far as 
citing, arresting, writing reports, providing information? 
A Right, I asked him some questions regarding that 
because that's obviously the nature of a police officer's 
duties when they respond to a domestic violence case -
MR. YENGICH: Objection. Ask that that be stricken 
because that is not necessarily what the law says. He can 






THE COURT: Sustained. 
THE WITNESS: Do you want to re-ask that or do you 



























MR. BATES: Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. BATES: If I could just respond briefly to 
counsel's objection. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. BATES: This case is not simply about what the 
law requires. Under the third count that I have filed in 
this case, it is a criminal act to fail to comply with a duty 
that is imposed by the law, or a duty that is clearly 
inherent in the nature of the employment or the office. So I 
believe it's appropriate for this witness to not only testify 
about what the Co-habitant Abuse Act requires, but also to 
testify about what would be inherent and clear as far as the 
duties of a police officer responding to a domestic violence 
situation. He's an officer of 30 years' experience. I 
believe he's qualified to make that sort of testimony. 
MR. YENGICH: And I object to that, Your Honor. The 
act itself actually is not as cut and dry as counsel believes 
it to be, at least in my opinion. He can't indicate what he 
and other officers should do. He can indicate what this 
gentleman told him at the time that he interviewed him 
because he has not been established as an expert on this act, 
or how an individual should respond, and that was the 
character of the question, Your Honor. 



























Bates. I don't know if this man has ever investigated a 
domestic violence matter or not. 
MR. BATES: Well, I'll lay some foundation. 
Q (BY MR. BATES) Agent Gibson, during your 30 years 
of experience as a police officer, how many times did you 
investigate domestic violence crimes? 
A I honestly don't know, because I've investigated 
several. 
Q Okay. Have you ever received any kind of training 
on, you know, proper police tactics and procedures in 
responding to domestic violence crimes? 
A Yes, sir. Over the years I've received domestic 
violence training. 
Q Can you estimate approximately how many hours over 
how many years? 
A I honestly can't give you an estimate of the hours 
I have. Any estimate I would give would be just a guess, and 
I honestly can't. 
Q Okay. Can you estimate at least how many times in 
your career, whether it was on an annual basis or every five 
years, you might have received domestic violence training? 
A When I first went to West Valley, the department 
was piloting a victim's advocate program for a victim's 
advocate to respond to domestic violence, and so West Valley 




























proper investigation, proper handling of domestic violence 
cases. 
Q Okay. And did you receive training from West 
Valley during that time? 
A Yes, I did. 
MR. YENGICH: May I voir dire quickly, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: You may. 
VOIR DIRE 












You didn't work at West Valley after 2008. 
Correct. 
All right, and you've been with the Attorney 
General's office since when? 
A Since 2009. 
Q 2009. 
MR. YENGICH: It's irrelevant, Your Honor. 
Everything he did predates this statute. 
MR. BATES: And Your Honor, this is not just about 
the statute. The statute is one way to make out this crime. 
Another way to make out this crime is to demonstrate what is 






























THE COURT: Why don't we concentrate on what the 
statute says? Worry about that, okay? 
MR. BATES: Now, are you referring to the criminal 
statute at issue here or the Co-habitant Abuse Act? 
THE COURT: I'm assuming you're referring to count 
three, aren't you? 
MR. BATES: Yes. And Your Honor, you have my copy 
of count three. Perhaps I'm mis-remembering the language of 
the statute. It requires that I demonstrate that he 
knowingly refrained from performing the duty imposed on him 
by law, or clearly inherent in the nature of his office. So 
I think regardless of whether a particular act is required by 
the Co-habitant Abuse Act, if there's some function that is 
clearly inherent in the nature O .c -L a police officer, that 
would be the proper subject of this preliminary examination. 
MR. YENGICH: The problem with that argument - and I 
don't mind making this statement in front of the gentlemen -
is that there is nothing inherent in performing the duties of 
an officer, because officers are given general discretion 
consistently to make determinations on the basis of what they 
observed at the time. Indeed, I would argue that that's 
inherent in count three, as well as is inherent in count two, 
if you read the statute carefully. He can't make a judgment 

















thing, because it's inherent in their duties to have 
discretion, and the Court can take judicial knowledge of 
that. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. YENGICH: It happens every day, and the Court 
hears testimony relative to that every day. 
MR. BATES: And Your Honor, I think what counsel's 
asking this Court to do is to substitute its judgment about 
what proper police procedure. is for the judgment of an 
officer with 30 years' experience. 
MR. YENGICH: I'm not asking the Court to do that. 
I'm asking the Court to make a determination that it's not 
this officer's judgment as to what the purpose behind either 
count two or three is relative to the determination made by a 












to get the Court to do. And that is an opinion that not only 
has foundation not been adequately laid, it's an opinion that 
I would submit to the Court is - doesn't fall under the 701 
and 702 and that sequence of evidentiary rules even at a 
preliminary hearing because it's speculation on his part. 
THE COURT: Well, Mr. Bates, I'm going to allow you 
to have him testify as to what this man did, and what he said 
he was supposed to do. Okay? 




























DIRECT EXAMINATION (resumed) 
BY MR. BATES: 
Q Agent, will you please describe for the Court what 
Mr. Jones told you that he either did or did not do relevant 
to the investigation of this incident on February 15 th ? 
A I asked him if he had provided or facilitated 
medical attention for either his brother Travis or Ms. 
Martinez and he indicated he had not. I asked him if he had 
provided written material to either his brother or Mr. 
Martinez regarding options available to them for victim's 
assistance and he said he did not. I asked him if he 
completed a report when he left the area, and he indicated 
that he did not. 
Q And did you ask him whether he had either cited or 
arrested Travis Jones based on this incident? 
A I don't remember asking him specifically if he 
cited or arrested him, but he told me that he put him to bed 
and left. So I don't know that I specifically asked him if 
he cited or arrested either party. I don't think I did. 
MR. BATES: Can I have just a moment, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. BATES: Your Honor, that's all the questions I 
have of this witness right now. 
THE COURT: ( Inaudible) . 
Ill 
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You never interviewed Darcy, am I correct in that? 
I did interview Darcy. 
v ..... ,, -
.I.VI..( were 
Yes, sir 





I actually was the interviewer. 
You were the interviewer. 
It was a co-interview, but I was the primary 
interviewer, if that helps. 
Q Okay. All right, but you interviewed Adam first, 






No, no. I interviewed Darcy first. 
First? Okay. 
Ms. Martinez first. 
I got that wrong. When you interviewed Adam, the 
in this case, he a call from Darcy on 
his private phone; is that correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q All right. He didn't receive it on - through the 



























City; is that correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q And that when he received that phone call, he 









But he responded to that phone call and found out 
Darcy, correct? 
Yes. 
Who he knew by voice? 
Yes. 
And that he felt that the reason she was calling 
him was because earlier that day or at some point, his 
brother had brought him some photograph - or some picture 
drawings that were done by Darcy's son; is that correct? 
A 
Q 
That's what he told me. 
And that that had concerned his brother, for 
whatever reason that is irrelevant here, and that that's what 





That's what he told me, yes. 
And that had nothing to do with domestic violence, 
That particular statement has nothing to do with 
domestic violence. 
Q Okay. And so - and he told you - in fact, here are 




























gave me, all those drawings, and so my first impression was, 
she was talking about something about that. So she's like, 
come over here." Correct? 
A She said - I'd have to look at that, Mr. Yengich, 
to make sure that's exactly how it - in context, but I 
believe that that's what he told me, yes. 
Q Okay. I'm reading from the 
A Is it from the transcript? 
Q - transcript that has been provided to me by 
counsel through you. 
A 
Q 
I've got the same one I had, sir. Then that's good. 
She doesn't say in that initial conversation, me 
and Travis are in a fight and I want you to come over here 
and break it up, does she? 
A Not that she told me or Chief Jones told me. 
Q 
that that 
All right. In fact, neither one of them told you 
initial call involved domestic violence at all, did 
it? 
A No. 
Q All right. And he said, anytime somebody's - his 
brother's in a problem with somebody, they call me. Again, 
words to that effect. 
A He has said that. 































He's given them that advice. 
Well, okay, counsel asked you as an experienced 
officer. I'll ask you a question about, as an officer, if 
you have a problem that involves a family member or a friend 
and you get a call, do' you see a problem there? Just 
initially? If you're called as a police officer involving 
someone that you know, or maybe love, or are related to? 





Yeah, it is. 
Okay, good. 
Do you see the - let me put it this way. Do you 








So you don't feel as though you should refer that 
to somebody else if you receive a call about somebody that 






Not initially, no, sir. 
All right. And that's because you don't know 



























Q Okay. But, do you see at least there to be a 
potential for a conflict of interest? 
A There's always a potential for a conflict of 
interest when it involves a family member. That's a fairly 
general statement. 
Q Okay, and as an officer, you sometimes have to use 
your discretion, based upon your judgment and training, as to 




Officers use their discretion every day in their 
line of work, don't they? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Okay. But he says, I tell them to call somebody 
else because I can't deal with it. Then he said, so I went 




Now, he told you at that time, you testified 
generally about his statements. Do - he told - when he 
walked in the door, he wasn't going there for a domestic 




And in fact, when you interviewed Darcy, she said 
she wasn't calling him over there as a domestic violence 
victim, correct? 



























over there as a police officer. She was calling him over as 
his brother. 
Q Thank you very much. And that's - those are her 
exact words almost, aren't they? 
A They're - without reading them verbatim, that's 
pretty close, sir. 
Q Okay. And that's - and again, Adam told you the 
same thing. "When I got there, I saw my brother," and what 
did he tell you that he did with his brother before he ever 
dealt with Darcy? Do you recall? 
you. 
A I don't recall specifically. 





I'd have to look that up, but -
Let me - I'll read this -
I'll let you read it and refresh my memory, thank 
- I'll read it very carefully. Oh, I'm sorry. 
Six. Adam Jones. You asked him, did he lo'ok - when he was 
drunk, again levels of intoxication, how drunk would you say 
he was? And his answer, "Typical normal drunk ass self. He 
is an idiot when he is drunk. I can see it, and that is - I 
figure that is what he was at." That's what he said to you. 
A Okay. 
Q Okay? But then you asked him, "Did he look kind of 





























answer, "No, he was calm with me at that time.n 
That's correct. A 
Q Okay. You go on - or he goes on as you interview 
him, and as you're talking to him, Brother says, Darcy's in 
the garage, and go talk to her. Or again, words to that 
effect. 
Very - yes. A 
Q So when he gets there, they're net even in the same 
room, correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q Okay, and there's no yelling back and forth between 
them, correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q And although he - his brother says he's got 
scratches on him, he doesn't tell Adam when he got them or 
the location of where he got them, within the house or 
outside the house, correct? 
A I don't recall him telling any - giving any of 
those specifics. 
Q Okay. All right. So he goes into the garage, and 
at that time he meets up with Darcy, and once again Darcy 
tells him that they had been drinking, and that they got into 
an argument, or words to that effect. But he says that when 
she's drinking, she's a complete idiot too. 



























Q All right. And he says - or - and she says to him, 
again, this is what Adam tells you, "She is like, no. I just 
want you - want him to calm down, I just want him to go to 
bed, and he needs to know he can't do this to me. ,, And he 
looked at her - he told you at least he looked at her shin 
and could see no visible injuries, correct? 
That's correct. A 
Q Okay. "I am like, that is fine. I says" - this is 
what Adam tells you - "Do you want me to call the sheriff?" 
He asks her that, correct? 
A That's - by his statement, yes. 
Q Well, Darcy also told you, you said, do you want me 





Right. By her statement also. 
And she says no. 
Correct. 
All right. And he says - "I says, do you want me 
to call the sheriff's office, because if you want to file a 








Darcy also iterates that when you talk to her. 
According to their statements. 
And she said no. Right? 
Yes. 

































Later on, before he leaves, he says, "Do you want 
me to take him," meaning Travis, "with me?" Correct? 
A I don't recall that, Mr. Yengich. 
Q You don't? Okay. 
No, sir. I'll let you -A 
Q Did he - then let me ask it this way. Did he offer 
to separate the two of them? 







Both of them, that they should not be together. 
But -
I know that part. 








Neither wanted to leave. 
Neither one wanted to leave, and in fact, Darcy 
just basically said, you're his brother, put him to bed. 
A I don't recall that specifically, but that was what 
Chief Jones did, and I - if you found that in there, I'd be 





























I just said it a minute ago. 
Okay. 
Q She said, I just want you to calm him down, I just 
want him to go to bed. 
_According to Chief Jones's statement. A 
Q Okay. And - well - so did you suggest that one of 
them leave the house? You asked that question? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative}. 
Q And he nods in the affirmative, at least consistent 
with the -
Yes. A 
Q All right. And - "Okay, did you suggest it to your 
brother, or just her?" 
"I told him he needs to leave too when I first got 
there. I'm like, you just need to get away, you guys have 
been drinking. You need to get away from one another." 






- he says he told them. 
That's what he said. 
All right. You ask him, "Did you offer to 
facilitate that in any way, give your brother a ride?" 
And he says, and I'll read the whole thing in 
fairness, page 9. "Every time my brother gets into this 








get violent - to get not violent with me, but kind of want to 
push me, and he always wants to fight when he gets drunk, and 
I just didn't want to deal with it because I have dealt with 
it a hundred times before. He has come pounding on my door 
before in the middle of the night. I've tried to take him in, 




















like done. I'm not dealing with you any more when you've 
been drinking. And he knows that, because now he know - he 
doesn't call me, he doesn't come over when he gets like that. 
He will talk to me afterwards." 
He told you that. 
Yes. A 
Q In regards to treatment, you ask him, and I want to 
get the specific statement in here, you, Agent Gibson. 
"Okay, as far as the injuries" - yeah, 9 again. Thank you. 
I'm sorry. That's not fair of me, and I apologize. "Okay, 
as far as injuries, I don't know how superficial the 
scratches were, if you saw her injuries. Did you offer to 
facilitate any kind of medical treatment calls?" 
His answer, "There was just a superficial scratch 




Did you - "What about Darcy's leg?" 
His answer, "I did not see anything." 



























And he says, "And she was walking around. She 
walked up the stairs in the garage, and she seemed normal." 
Ask him if you gave him a - he gave them a 
pamphlet, and he says no. You ask him, "Did you give them 
any verbal notice? 11 Q 
And he says, "I told Darcy she could call the 
victim advocate if she needs to file a restraining order, 
because we have dealt with this a hundred thousand times. I 
told her, I'm like, you guys are not good for each other, you 
guys cannot be together, if you are not - if you're together 
you can absolutely not drink." 
That's what he said to you, right? 
A Correct. 
Q Now, at that time, at any time in your interview 
with Adam, did you ask him, did you judge either one 
people to be victims under the domestic violent act? 
A Specifically, no. 
Q Okay. And did Adam offer to you, I believe one or 






Did he offer that? 
Not that I recall. 
Okay. When he's ready to leave again, when he's 
ready to leave, he once again tells Darcy, if you have a 































He told her that a number of times. 
A number of times. And Summit County Sheriff; is 
that right? 
A That's correct. 
Q Okay. Did he ever admit or say to you, I told her 
not to call them because it was my brother, I didn't want him 
to get into trouble or anything like that? 
That statement was never made. A 
Q All right. Was there any statement that was close 




And Darcy never said he said anything like that 
either, did she? 
A No, she did not. 
MR. YENGICH: That's all the questions I have of 
this gentleman, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Do you have any other questions, Mr. 
Bates? 
MR. BATES: Yes, if I could just have 30 seconds, 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Please. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BATES: 
Q Agent Gibson, did you ask Mr. Jones - Mr. Adam 



























give him a ride somewhere or take him to jail? 
A I didn't ask him specifically why he didn't give 
him a ride or specifically why he didn't take him to jail, I 






But I did -
Do you know -
- ask him why he didn't facilitate or - if he 
facilitated a ride - and I'd have to probably go back and 
look at the statement, if you have a specific page I can 
probably -
Q Okay. 
A - look at that. 
Q Would you refer to page 9 of your -
-,,. Sure. l"i 
Q - of this transcript? And I'd like you to just 
look at the - I'm going to start at the first full paragraph 
on that page that starts with your name, and just read that. 
Read the rest of the page there to yourself. 
MR. YENGICH: Where are you at, you're on page 9, 
top of the page? 
MR. BATES: Page 9. 
THE WITNESS: Do you want me to go just from my 
name? 





























A Okay. This is the - basically the paragraph that 




- regarding - I asked him specifically, "Did he 





Give his brother a ride, and that's when he -
What did he tell you, why he didn't facilitate 
Travis leaving the house? 
A He said that - this is the one again that goes back 
to Mr. Yengich - that Mr. Yengich just read regarding the 
fact that when his brother gets into that state, he has a 
tendency to get not violent with him, but want to push him 
around, and then - I'm paraphrasing a little bit, since you 
just read it, Mr. Yengich. He's been pounding on his door 
and essentially -
THE COURT: Wait a minute. What - he's asking you a 
question. You can answer the question. You don't have to 
tell me what this says. I can read this. Is there something 
else that I don't know? 
MR. BATES: No, Your Honor. I think what's in there 
speaks for itself. I didn't realize that the Court still had 
that copy of the transcript that I provided the Court a 
couple of months ago. 



























did you talk to Adam about whether he was aware of anything 
that happened at the Jones - Darcy Martinez and Travis 
Jones's house later on that night? 
A I talked to him if he knew there'd been a followup 
call, and I asked him about that. 
Q Okay, what did he tell you? 
A He said he got a text from Ms. Martinez later in 
the night. He said he also - as he was getting ready for bed 
that evening, he missed a phone call from her, and he noticed 
that on his phone later. He also - I believe he was turning 
off his computer, or turned on his computer and noticed that 
there had been a returned call back to the residence later. 
Q Okay, did he - is there anything else he told you 
that he did to try to discover what had happened with this 





I could flip back through my notes here, but -
If you would. Would you just turn to page 14? 
MR. YENGICH: Your Honor, may I ask a question of 
THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). Yes? 
MR. YENGICH: Are we going to mark the transcript? 
THE COURT: Okay, probably appropriate. 
MR. YENGICH: In any event? 





























MR. YENGICH: We marked that as Exhibit 1, because I 
think it should be offered for the purpose of the preliminary 
hearing. 
Q 
THE COURT: Why don't we use my copy as Exhibit l? 
(BY MR. BATES) I'm sorry, Agent, did you get a 
chance to read page 14? 
A I did. I looked at the section I think your 
question is regarding. He said his computer was still on 
when he was getting ready for bed, and he saw that there was 
a call that had popped up, and he said it was about quarter 
to 11. He said he did turn on his radio and listened to the 
response. 
Q Okay. Now, in your opinion, as an officer with 30 
years' experience, in your opinion, after having interviewed 
Mr. Jones and hearing what he had to tell you about this 
case, in your opinion was either Travis Jones or Darcy 
Martinez a victim of domestic violence -
MR. YENGICH: Objection, Your Honor. 
Q (BY MR. BATES) - under the Cohabitant Abuse Act? 
MR. YENGICH: Objection. His opinion is irrelevant. 
THE COURT: It is. 
MR. BATES: Your Honor, I don't believe it's 
irrelevant. Mr. Jones's state of mind is relevant here, and 
counsel has elicited from this witness that Mr. Jones has 



























believed anybody was a victim of domestic violence. But I 
think it's entirely relevant to have another officer with a 
substantial amount of experience, both in police work and 
domestic violence at West Valley City to render an opinion 
about whether one of these was a victim of domestic violence, 
because that tends to establish whether Mr .. Jones - although 
we don't have his testimony on the subject - whether Mr. 
Jones believed that one of these people was a victim of 
domestic violence. 
THE COURT: No, I think what you need to have is you 
need to have one of these parties come in here and testify. 
And afte-r they testify, you can ask these kind of questions. 
But to have him testify as to, someone said to me that 
someone said to him that someone else said they were a 
I .j- I 
vic~im, is a little bit farfetched. 
MR. BATES: Well, I'm not asking whether someone 
else said to him, I'm - what I'd like to know from him is 
whether in his opinion as an experienced police officer - and 
keep in mind, Your Honor, we're not here to determine whether 
or not one of these people was, in fact, a victim of domestic 
violence. The question is, a police officer - this is an 
official misconduct case. Should a police officer in Mr. 
Jones's position have come to the conclusion that one of 
these people was a victim of domestic violence, and if so, 


























MR. YENGICH: May I? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. YENGICH: I disagree that that is the standard 
that we have to apply here. I asked him the question not 
what his opinion was, or not what my client's opinion was, I 
asked him, did you ask him did he think either one of them 
was? And the answer was no, I didn't ask that question. 
Indeed, the evidence is what my client told him he observed 
when he got there. That's where the Court makes the 
determination. Otherwise, we can put on 15 different 
officers to have 15 different opinions. And that - and 403 
prohibits that, but 701, 702, and that sequence of Rules of 
Evidence - and I know the Rules of Evidence don't always 
apply at preliminary hearings, but the theory at least behind 
them does, and in this instance, with due respect to the 
gentleman, who seems like one and apparently is an 
experienced officer, he is not experienced to testify to 
that. 
THE COURT: I think he's right, Mr. Bates. 
MR. BATES: No further questions, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. You may step down, sir. 
MR. YENGICH: These - just to follow up on a 
specific question -




























MR. YENGICH: Yes. I -
MR. GIBSON: Oh. I thought you said I was 
dismissed, I'm sorry. 
MR. YENGICH: He probably did. 
THE COURT: I did. I didn't know he was going to 
ask a question. 
MR. YENGICH: Well, I - and it's just a couple very 
quick questions. 
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. YENGICH: 
Q The computer that he observed, and the texts that 
he received, were both after he was off duty, correct? 
A I believe that is correct. 
MR. YENGICH: Thank you. That's all I have. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. BATES: Your Honor, the State will call Officer 
Ken Jones - Deputy Ken Jones. 
RICHARD JONES 
Having first been duly sworn, testified 
upon his oath as follows: 
THE COURT: Please state your name and spell your 
name for the court clerk. 
Ill 
MR. JONES: Richard Jones, J-O-N-E-S. 




































Deputy Jones, what agency are you employed with? 
Summit County Sheriff's Office. 
How long you been doing that? 
About 10 years. 
Okay. Were you on duty on February 15th of this 
Yes, sir. 
Q And were you dispatched to the home of Darcy 








Okay, about what time were you dispatched out 
It was about a quarter to 11. 
Okay. What was the nature of the dispatch? 
Dispatch - it was an open 9-1-1 call, they heard 
arguing in the background, the specific nature wasn't given. 
They heard the name Travis, and they gave a partial address. 
Q Okay. Now, when you arrived at that address, what 
did you find? 
A I knocked on the door and initially I didn't have a 
response. I knocked again when I heard raised voices and 
announced myself as an officer with the sheriff's office, and 




























Q Okay. Will you describe Darcy's appearance when 
she came to the door? 
A She was crying. She kind of covered her mouth and 
she pointed inside. She was obviously distraught. 
Q 
A 
Okay. What did you do next? 
I asked her if she was the one who called 9-1-1, 
she said that she was. When she said that, I heard Travis - I 
still hadn't seen him at this point - yell in a very angry 
tone, "you called the sheriff's,n with an explicative. I 
stepped in at that time, got in between her and Travis. 
Q Okay. Will you please tell the Court what Travis 
looked like that night? 
A He was just wearing drawers, nothing else. He had a 
large scratch on his chest, kind of an up and down zig-zag, 
superficial scratch on his chest. He was - he had emotional 
- he was loud, red, puffed up face, clenched fists -
Q Okay. 
A Very aggressive, bearing. 
Q Okay. Did he appear - did he appear intoxicated to 
you? 
A Yes. He was - showed several symptoms of alcohol 
intoxication. 
Q Okay. While you were investigating this incident, 



























MR. YENGICH: Objection, it's irrelevant. 
THE COURT: Why isn't it relevant? 
MR. YENGICH: It's irrelevant because, unless they 
can establish that the defendant was there at the time - he -
this is after the defendant has left. 
MR. BATES: It's after the defendant left, Your 
Honor, but it's relevant to establish the level of 
intoxication and aggression that Mr. Travis Jones was 
exhibiting that night, and it corroborates the defendant's 
own testimony that his brother is extremely violent when he 
gets drunk. 
THE COURT: So? Doesn't mean he was drunk when the 
defendant was there. 
MR. BATES: Well, the defendant - Your Honor - I'm 
sorry. 
THE COURT: In fact, he says when he is very drunk 
he acts this way. He ~idn't act that way according to 
testimony we've had from the transcript, so -
MR. BATES: Correct, Your Honor. But the defendant 
did tell Agent Gibson that when he arrived, his brother was 
drunk. Your Honor, the defendant knew when he showed up that 
his brother was drunk. The defendant knew that his brother, 
when he is drunk, can be very violent and very angry. The 
fact of the matter is he's not that way with his brother, his 



























Deputy Jones is here to testify that when his brother's not 
there, he is, in fact, a very angry, violent drunk. And 
that's part of the crux of this case, is that Mr. Jones left 
somebody that he knows is a very angry, violent drunk, who 
has a history of abusing his wife, in the home that night, 
instead of following the procedures under the Co-habitant 
Abuse Act, and removing his brother from the home. 
MR. YENGICH: That requires - I don't know that the 
State of Utah, with due respect to my brother at the bar, 
understands what their theory means. That means every 
officer, that officers that are in uniform, even an old 
officer like Sergeant Car, Sergeant to me, have to - they 
have to make a judgment. And they have to predict the future 
under their theory. 
At the time under the evidence the Court has here 
today, he left, he was calm, and he went to bed, as was the 
other lady, and he told them, I'm not an - he wasn't even 
called as an officer. He wasn't - that's the evidence before 
you, Your Honor. He wasn't called as an officer. That is 
explicit in the testimony. He's got to make a judgment that 
sometime in the future something bad may happen under their 
theory. That's not what the statute says. It is not what 
the statute says. 
THE COURT: Mr. Bates? 



























MR. YENGICH: And what he observed later on is 
irrelevant. 
MR. BATES: Your Honor -
THE COURT: What he observed later on is irrelevant, 
because we don't know that's how it was when this officer was 
here, the defendant was there. 
MR. BATES: Under the Co-habitant Abuse Act, 7736-
2.2, sub 2, sub B, sub little I, if a peace officer has 
probable cause to believe that there will be continued 
violence against the alleged victim, or if there is evidence 
that the perpetrator - well, if you have probable cause to 
believe there will be continued violence, he must arrest the 
perpetrator. 
Now, Your Honor, out of the defendant's own mouth 
to Agent Gibson, he told Agent Gibson, my brother is an 
angry, violent drunk. When I try to arrest him, he turns 
into - forgive me language, he turns into an asshole. And 
he's been violent and abusive with Darcy Martinez in the 
past. When I'm there, he's calm. But Mr. Jones knows that 
when he leaves, there is potential demonstrated, based on his 
experience and his history with his brother, that there will 
be violence. 
Deputy Jones is here to testify that, in fact, 
there was violence. Just as Mr. Jones had to suspect that 



























told Agent Gibson, I don't even want to deal with the guy, 
because when I try to arrest him he's such a jerk and becomes 
so violent and angry. 
MR. YENGICH: Well, he has to have probable cause. 
Probable cause is not the determination of what might or what 
one suspects will happen. It's based upon the evidence 
before the individual at the time. It cannot be in futuro. 
The number of cases on that are - they are legion. That an 
officer makes the determination of probable cause on the 
basis of what he observes at the time, in the place, under 
the circumstances. 
The only evidence you have is that he went to bed, 
he put him to bed, she said fine, she said I don't want you 
to call anybody. He said, if something happens, call Summit 
County, and they got that much in, that's apparently what she 
did. 
He can't be - we can't expect him to make a 
probable cause determination about what is in the future. He 
can't. It's like - it is akin to the old cases that deal 
with - and I'm going to mispronounce this word, expectatory 
warrants. And that is, you go to a judge and say, we believe 
in the future such and such is going to do this, because we 
believe it based upon their reputation, you're not going to 
sign that kind of warrant because there's not probable cause. 



























MR. BATES: Your Honor, that's exactly what the Co-
habitant Abuse Act requires. Is for officers to make a 
probable cause determination about whether -
THE COURT: Not what's going to happen in the 
future. 
MR. BATES: Well, it says, if the peace officer has 
probable cause to believe that there will be continued 
violence against the alleged victim. Now, Officer Jones had 
a report that the victim had already been assaulted by Travis 
Jones - he kicked her. He has evidence - he knows that his 
brother's a violent drunk. He knows that he's drunk right 
now, he has to have probable cause to think that if he leaves 
that house, there's going to be continued violence. 
THE COURT: I don't think so, because he said he's 
already in bed when he leaves. 
MR. BATES: Sure, he's in bed because when he's 
dealing with his brother he's calm. His brother knows how to 
handle him. 
THE COURT: That's not what he said. That's not 
what this transcript says. 
MR. YENGICH: Right. In fact, he said, he told the 
gentleman, Officer Gibson, he and I can - we get into 
arguments. That's why I don't want to deal with him. But he 
was calm that night and I put him to bed. And she was 



























MR. BATES: And Your Honor, can I just point out, 
Ms. Martinez's belief, her thoughts, what she thinks is going 
on, is entirely irrelevant to this. The whole point of the 
Co-habitant Abuse Act is to put the authority and the 
discretion of when somebody's a victim, and what to do with 
that scenario, in the hands of the police, and to require 
them to act in certain ways, even when the victim doesn't 
want it because victims so often, as Ms. Martinez did here, 
are unwilling to take action against their perpetrators. 
That's the point of the Co-habitant Abuse Act. 
MR. YENGICH: Well, but he's making that same 
judgment. As she determined to do here. We don't know what 
she determined because they haven't called her. The only 
information, and I let it in because I didn't object to it, 
but it's before the Court, is their only information is 
she and the Defendant Jones in this case said, there wasn't a 
victim here. He's got to have probable cause that that's the 
case. 
A law enforcement officer - when we start out here, 
he's not responding as a law enforcement officer - and I 
don't want to get ahead of myself - who responds to an 
allegation of domestic violence, he's not responding to an 
allegation of domestic violence, he shall use all reasonable 
means to protect the victim. He - there's no evidence that 




























quarters, and then it gives him discretion. It does. That's 
exactly the point. He has the discretion, including those 
things that are listed. 
Those aren't the only things he can do. He can 
determine if he believes it's correct that there are no 
victims, and that nobody's going to be harmed. And he did 
that in this case. That's the only evidence you have. 
Monday morning quarterbacking by this gentleman with the 
Chevron on his arms, who I'm sure is a good officer, doesn't 
cut it. And what he has to say about what he would've done, 
or what should've been done, is irrelevant to this case, Your 
Honor. 
MR. BATES: Your Honor, I don't believe there was 
any evidence as to whether Mr. Jones thought there was or 
wasn't a victim. I believe that the State - that the 
question that Mr. Gibson answers was, he didn't ask that, and 
Mr. Jones didn't answer it. We don't have any evidence 
before the Court about whether Mr. Jones thought there was or 
wasn't a victim. 
MR. YENGICH: There was no objection to my question 
about the interview with Darcy, where she - I asked him, did 
she claim to be a victim, and he said no. 
MR. BATES: And I said that's irrelevant, Your 
Honor. Co-habitant Abuse Act makes it irrelevant. Whether 



























THE COURT: Well, what do you think you're going to 
get out of this officer, is what I want to know? 
MR. BATES: Your Honor, I believe it's important -
THE COURT: We've now argued all kinds of concepts 
here. 
MR. BATES: Sure. I -
THE COURT: But the issue is, what is this officer 
going to supposedly tell me? 
MR. BATES: Your Honor, what this officer is going 
to do is corroborate Mr. Jones - Mr. Adam Jones's statement 
that, when my brother is a drunk, he becomes very violent and 
very angry. And what this officer will say is that when he 
showed up that night after Mr. Jones had left, that was, in 
fact, the case. He's establishing - he's corroborating Mr. 
Jones;s state of mind when he was there -
THE COURT: Well, first of all, that's not what Adam 
Jones said. You can have this officer testify that what he 
observed·when he got there. That's certainly within the 
realm of his ability to testify. 
MR. BATES: Sure. 
THE COURT: But his interpretation of what Mr. Jones 
said to the investigator, whether or not that meets it, is 
not for him to decide. 
MR. BATES: No. No. He has not interviewed Mr. 



























interview with him. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
Q (BY MR. BATES) Deputy Jones, will you please 
describe for the Court Travis Jones's behavior and conduct 
while you were conducting this investigation? 
A Very early in the investigation, he was - made 
aggressive moves toward me, he'd almost mock charge me. Any 
time I'd ask Darcy a question, he would turn his aggression 
towards her. He would curse at her and call her a liar. At 
this time, I placed him in handcuffs because I didn't feel 
safe to be there alone. After I got him in handcuffs, I sat 
him down at a kitchen chair, and just very briefly continued 
to try to investigate, but it would elicit such a response 
from him that my investigation was hampered. I couldn't do 
it. So I just told them both to - they kind of got into a 
shouting match, to just calm down until another officer 
arrived. Once that other officer arrived I continued my 
investigation. 






And how did he behave when you were arresting him? 
Same way. At one point he actually ducked under my 
arm and ran for a little bit. Didn't - he made these mock 




























when I interposed myself in between him and Darcy, he ducked 
around a table and turned on a light with his hands still 
cuffed behind his back, I can't even guess why, but we got a 
hold of him. We took him out to my car. On the way there he 
screamed and yelled, and he said he was going to bite my 
face, bite my nose and my ears if he got a chance. He lashed 
out and kicked a traffic cone, and just kept up with a 
violent, vulgar tirade the whole way to the jail. 






Who else was there? 
There was two children there, a 10-year-old who 
identified himself as Ryan Degrazio and Ryan Martinez, I'm 
not sure which is the proper one, and then a 2-year-old named 
Jackson who Ryan appeared to be watching. 
Q And did you observe any injuries on anyone at the 
house besides Travis Jones? 
A Yes, I observed injuries on both Darcy and Ryan. 
MR. BATES: I think that's all I have of this 
officer, Your Honor. 
Ill 
Ill 
THE COURT: Questions of this officer, Mr. Yengich? 
MR. YENGICH: Just a couple. Thank you, Your Honor. 
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Did you ever call Adam Jones that night? 
No. 
Did either - and I don't want to hear what they 
said, but did either Darcy or Travis tell you that Adam had 








Not to me. 
Not to you. 
There was another officer at the scene there. 















It wasn't in my presence. 
It was not in your presence. 
No. 
Okay. And before you cleared the scene, were you 
aware that Adam Jones had been to that house earlier that 
night? 
47 





























THE COURT: You were, or not? 
THE WITNESS: I wasn't. 
(BY MR. YENGICH) When did you find out 
chronologically that Adam had been there earlier? 
A I left Deputy Nakiishi with several tasks that I 
was unable to perform while I was there, collecting the 
statistics of the little kids, taking pictures of the 
injuries, and doing some followup interviews. I just wasn't 
able to do it at the scene due to Travis's behavior. After I 
went en route to the jail with Travis, or at the jail, Deputy 
Nakiishi called me and briefed me with the things I -
Information that Adam had been there earlier? 
Yes, sir. 











Did you call Adam then? 
No. 
Did you ever - did you call him the next day? 
I never called Adam. 
Did you direct anybody to call him and take a 
statement of what he had observed? 
A I did a command staff notification. One of the 
criteria we use for a command staff notification is any 




























relationships. So I called my immediate supervisor, 
Lieutenant Wilkinson, and briefed him about the case. 
Q Did you tell Lieutenant Wilkinson, Adam Jones, the 
police chief in Kamas, may have some information about this? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you say that we probably should interview him 
to find out what he had observed? 





You were the initial officer on the scene, correct? 
Right. 
Were you also the followup officer? 









Who was that? 
Deputy Buhler. 
Okay, so whose case would this be in the -
My case. 
It would be your case in the normal terminology. 
Right. 
And so did you make any effort to call Adam and 

































Q When Travis - you first saw Travis, he was coming 
out of the bedroom? 
Coming down the hallway. 
Coming down the hallway. 
The bedroom's that way too, so -
Okay. 
- I don't know. 







A Corning down the hallway. There's other rooms down 
this same hallway, so -
Q 
A 
Okay. Is a bedroom down that hallway too? 
Yes. 
MR. YENGICH: That's all I have of the gentleman, 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: I guess we ought to have one point in 
clarification, Officer Jones, since this seems to be a big 
family affair. Are you related to any of these people? 
THE WITNESS: No. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. YENGICH: Well done. 
THE COURT: You may step down. 
MR. YENGICH: Can we take a three-minute break? 
THE COURT: Certainly. 









THE COURT: Call your next witness. 
MR. YENGICH: He has one more question of the last 
gentleman, Your Honor, as I understand it. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. BATES: Your Honor, I didn't get a chance to 




















THE COURT: Okay. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BATES: 
Q Deputy, counsel on cross examination asked you 
whether you had talked - interviewed Adam Jones about this 
case, or about the - his report that night and you responded 
that you hadn't. Would you explain to the Court why you 
didn't? 
A I didn't think that - from what Nakiishi told me, 
that Darcy told her that Adam really had a lot to add to my 
case, which was the Travis Jones case, and I figured that 
once I let Lieutenant Wilkinson know about his involvement, 






And where on Darcy Martinez did you observe 
It was on her shin area. 
What kind of injuries were there? 
Bruising, or the starting of bruising. 




























BY MR. YENGICH: 
Q So you made the call, you used your discretion as 









To follow through? 
By calling Jones. 
I didn't feel I needed to talk to Adam about this 
That was your decision. 
That was. 
Thank you. 
A It wasn't a task I was given by anyone to follow up 
with Adam. 
Q And you didn't ask, should I or shouldn't I of 
anybody, or did you? 
A No. 
MR. YENGICH: Thank you. No further questions. 
THE COURT: You may step down. 
MR. BATES: Your Honor, the State would call Deputy 
Trace Thomsen. He's out in the hall, I'll grab him. 
TRACE THOMSEN 
Having first been duly sworn, testified 
upon his oath as follows: 



























name for the court clerk. 
MR. THOMSEN: Spell my name, sir? Corporal Trace 
Thomsen, T-R-A-C-E T-H-O-M-S-E-N. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BATES: 
Corporal, what do you do for a living? Q 
A I am a corporal corrections officer assigned to the 






Okay. And were you on duty on February 16th of 
Yes, I was. 
And where were you assigned to work on that date? 
A I'm actually a rover. I work wherever I'm needed 
basically. So at the time I was actually - of this 
occurrence, I was actually up relieving central or having 
lunch inside of central command. 
Q Okay, and at that point - let's see, what time did 







6:00 a.m. we start. It would've been a day shift. 
And at that point was Travis Jones in the detention 
Yes, he was. 
And where was he located? 





























Q Okay. And do you recall that morning Adam Jones, 














Did you speak with Adam? 
I did, briefly. 
What did Adam tell you as to why he was at the 
Check on his brother, make sure he was okay. 
Okay. Did you allow him to check on his brother? 
I did. 
And where did this visit happen? 
Over in booking where Steven, his brother, was. 
Okay. 
THE COURT: Steven? 
MR. BATES: Does he go - it's Travis - Steven 
THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, yeah it's Travis - yeah, 
it's Steven Travis, I'm sorry. I work in back, so his 
© 
© 






THE COURT: Okay. 
(BY MR. BATES) I believe he goes by Travis. 
Yeah. Q 
Okay. So did you see Adam Jones and Travis Jones 
I did. 
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Q Okay, how far away from them were you? 
A Seven feet maybe, just right at the booking counter 
of the cells, maybe seven feet or so, not very far at all. 
Q Okay. Were you able to overhear what they were 
talking about? 
A Yes. 
Q Will you please just describe for the Court the 
substance of that conversation? 
A I -
MR. YENGICH: Objection as to the substance. Excuse 
me. If he recalls specific words, I'd ask him to testify 
exactly what he heard, and then if he can't, that he advise 
that it's the substance under the rule, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Very well. Proceed that way, please. 
THE WITNESS: He - they were standing over by H3, I 
was in the middle by the booking counter between the two 
computers to observe them, and I observed Adam tell Travis 
that he was at his residence last night, and that he was 
passed out in bed while he was there. And you know, he told 
him he was obviously intoxicated. They said something -
THE COURT: Who - I thought you just said you heard 
Adam say this, and now you're saying - who said - Adam's 
saying this? You're saying Adam is saying this to his 
brother, Travis? Steven Travis? 



























THE COURT: Okay. 
Q {BY MR. BATES) So tell us - Adam told - tell us, 
what did Adam tell his brother, Travis? If you could just -
as best a quote as I can. 
A I'll refer to my report, or my statement. He said 
that when he got to his residence he was passed out on his. 
bed. I then heard something regarding a truck, and advice 
given to Travis, his brother, that he needs to do something 
about his drinking. 
Q Okay. 
A Adam then told his brother goodbye, came up behind 
the booking counter, and sat by me to speak with me. The· 
conversation was pretty brief. 
Q Okay. What did Adam tell you when you spoke with 
him? 
A Adam sat right next to me and he informed me that 
him and his wife fight all the time -
Q Now, when you say him and his wife, was he specific 
as to who him is? 





And he informed me that his sister-in-law called 
him the night of, or when the incident as occurred, as to why 





























talk or take care of his brother. 
Q Okay. Did he say any - did Adam say anything about 
what he found to you, did he say anything.about what he found 
at the residence or the state that Travis was in when he got 
to the residence? 
A Again, he informed me that his brother was passed 
out, intoxicated in his bed. And then told me that he told 
his - I guess it would be his sister-in-law, or his brother's 
girlfriend or wife - I'm not sure if they were married - that 




Because he was intoxicated. 
Q So this statement that when he got there Travis was 
passed out asleep in bed, is that essentially what you heard 





In the holding cell? 
By the cell, and then he came up and told me, I 
don't know why, but he did. 
Q Okay. Now, did he say anything to you about what 
happened after he visited his brother's residence? 
A Like after when he was over there when he was 
passed out in his bed, or? 
Q 
A 





























Q - Adam Jones obviously told you some things that he 






When he left that residence. 
Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Did he say anything to you about what he saw or 
heard or do after he had been at his brother's residence? 
A Yeah, prior to him leaving, he told his - sorry -
Travis - that told his wife or girlfriend, whoever she is, 
that if she wanted to do anything about it, that she needed 
to contact the sheriff's office about the incident to - I 
guess why he was there. 
Q So that's what he told you that he told Darcy 
before he left her home? 
A Correct. Or that -
Q Okay. Corporal, will you - do you have your 
statement that you wrote about this incident before you? 
I do. A 
Q Will you just look on page 2? The paragraph at the 
top of that page, and just read that to yourself? 





No, I'm sorry. Just read it in your mind. 
I'm sorry. Okay. 





























Q Okay, does that refresh your recollection about 
anything that Adam Jones might have told you that happened 
after he left Darcy Martinez's house? 
A He stated that Darcy called him on his cell phone. 
And he specifically stated to me he knew it was Darcy because 
he looked at the number and saw that it was Darcy calling 
him. And -




He didn't answer the phone. 
Did he say why he didn't answer the phone? 
Well, he didn't answer the phone, he informed me, 





It was about his brother. 
Okay. And then did he indicate to you whether he 
learned anything else about what had happened at that night 
after she called? 
A He indicated to me that he - after he knew that she 
called, that he turned on his police radio and heard the 
dispatch call out for - I don't know what kind of call was 
called out, but he did hear dispatch place a call out for - I 
don't know what reason, but he didn't explain that to me. 
MR. BATES: That's all the questions of this 






























BY MR. YENGICH: 
Q When you were in the jail listening to this 
conversation, were you taking any notes? 
A No. 
Q Was it tape recorded? 
A No. 
Q And relative to the distance between you and Adam 
and his brother, we've been referring to him as Travis, okay? 
A Okay. 
Q All right, between him and Travis, distance in the 
courtroom from where you're seated, how far away were you 
from them? 
A From where I'm seated right now? 
Q Yes, sir. 
A Probably here to Mr. Bates. 
Q All right. At counsel table in the courtroom. I 
don't know. 
THE COURT: Would you like to estimate how far that 
is? 
Q (BY MR. YENGICH) Would you like to estimate? 
A Eight feet or so? 10 feet? Eight to 10 feet. 
Q Okay. I would go - I don't know -
A Maybe more. 




























a weak measure. 
THE COURT: I'd say it's closer to 20 feet, isn't 
it? 
Q (BY MR. YENGICH} All right. Yeah, it's a way away. 
Right? And you weren't doing any investigation as you were 
overhearing them? 
A No, I was concerned - it was odd that he was in 
there, but I was - you know, I've never seen his brother or I 
rarely saw Chief Jones, and so I wasn't doing an 
investigation-
Yeah. 
- but I was listening to - you know. 
Did they say hello to one another? 
They did. 








Q All right. What did they say? Hi Travis. Hi Adam? 
Hey bro, how you doin'? You dumb ass, you're in jail? I -
you know, 'kick you - beat you up - what did they say? What 
was their initial statement to one another? 
A If I can refer to my report -
Q You can. 
A - I can. 
Q Is it in there? 



























Q What did he say? 
A I say - I reported he greeted his brother. I 
didn't state what he stated - greeted his brother, that's 
what I put. 
know? 




Okay. And did his brother greet Steven? Do you 
Do I know? I would assume that he did. A 
Q All right. I'm not asking you any assumption. Do 
you recall what he said to him specifically? Did he say hi 
back? Did he say hello? Again, did he admonish him for 
being in jail at that initial greeting, or do you know? 
A 
Q 
Not at the initial greeting. 
Do you know? 
A He was checking on his brother - No, I don't know 





I would assume that they - that you would. 
All right. Again, I don't want assumptions. I'm 
trying to get exactly what was said, not your - necessarily 
your summary of it. What was the next thing that was said, 
if they - if he greeted his brother back, what was the very 
next words that were used? 




























Okay, so you don't recall? Q 
A 
Q 
No, just what's in my statement I can recall from. 
Do you recall word for word the very next words 





A - I recall what's in - what I wrote in my 
statement. 
Q All right, do you recall what preceded the - what 
is in your statement where it says, "I did hear Chief Jones 
state that he did go over to his brother's residence." What 
did he say immediately before that, if you know? 
A I don't know. 
Q After that, you put in your statement, Chief Jones 
stated to Steven, "When he got to his residence, he was 
passed out in bed." What was said immediately before that? 
If you know, by either one of them. 
sir. 
A I can only refer to what I put in my statement, 




All right. Did he say to his brother Travis, you 
were passed out when I left the residence? If you know, at 
any time? 



























left the residence. 
Q Okay, he told you that. 
A Correct. 
Q Okay. Then you heard something regarding a truck. 
What was said immediately before that, if you know? 
A Like I say, I can only refer to what's in my 
statement. 
Q And so in reality, the exact words that were 
employed by either of these two men, you don't know. 
A 
Q 
Bits and pieces, but no, I don't have exact. 
Thank you. But you do recall him - him meaning 
Adam, telling you that he had told - well, let me strike 
that. Did he refer to the woman as his sister-in-law? Or 
was that your assumption? 
A Sister-in-law, wife, I'm not sure. That was my 
assumption, I guess. 
Q All right. 
A I don't know if they're married or what, I wasn't 
going to - Q 
Q All right. No one's trying to put you on the spot 
here. I want to know what words he used. Did he use sister-




I can only recall what he put in my statement. 
Did he use that word? Sister-in-law? 




























You do too -
Do I? 






Q Adam further stated to me that he told his sister-
in-law. Did he 
A Well, that's what I'll testify to then. I don't 
know. 




I would assume he used the word. 
You would assume that. You don't - you can't say 
for one hundred percent sure, can you? 
A No. I don't know if they're married or not. They 
probably cohabitated together, so I'm assuming, you know, 





Q Some of what you put in here is your assumption on 
certain things; is that correct? 
A As far as the sister-in-law -
Q As far as other things. Some of what you put in 




























A As if they were married or not married, yes, 
because I did not know that. 
Q You've indicated on direct examination that he told 
you, Adam Jones told you, that he told either - whoever she 
was, the woman in his brother's life, that if she had a 






Is that in your report? 
Yes. 
Where? 
A I put, "Adam further stated to me that he told his 
sister-in-law that if she wants to do anything about 
tonight's incident, she needs to call the sheriff's office to 
report it." 
Q Okay. Did you ask him any questions about that? 
A I didn't have anything to do with his 
investigation. I didn't know why he was there or what was 
happening with the case. I had no knowledge of the case. 
Q Your report is an email to Lieutenant Katy Booth; 





Were you asked to prepare that email by anyone? 
By my lieutenant, Katy Booth. 
Q And when - did she indicate to you why she wanted 



























MR. BATES: Objection, Your Honor. Hearsay, 
relevance. 
Q 
THE COURT: I think it's very relevant. Overruled. 
(BY MR. YENGICH) Did she tell you why? 
A Yes, she did. She wanted to know why he would - he 
came back into the jail. 
Q To see his brother. 
A Correct. And what our conversation was, or if 
there was any conversation, that was it. There was no 
questions asked. She wanted to know why -




Other than this email, were there any other notes 
or - on scraps of paper, in a book, or anything else, 
prepared by you? 
A No. Just the statement that I gave to my 
lieutenant. 
MR. YENGICH: That's all the questions I have. 
THE COURT: When did you prepare this report? 
THE WITNESS: It would've been the same day. I 
don't know if the exact time's on here, but it would've been 
the same day. 
MR. YENGICH: At 5:25 p.m. 
THE WITNESS: Yeah. 5:25. 




























THE WITNESS: I do. 
THE COURT: Okay. Okay. Anything further? 
MR. YENGICH: I have nothing further. 
THE COURT: You may step down. 
THE WITNESS: Did you have anything? 
MR. BATES: Just quickly. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BATES: 
Q To the best of your knowledge, is everything you 
put in that report true and accurate? 
A Yes. 
MR. BATES: Your Honor, that's my last witness. 
do have one exhibit to offer. 
THE COURT: Okay, what is it? 
MR. BATES: Let me provide a copy to Mr. Yengich. 
I'll mark this as State's Exhibit #2. 
I 
I'll drop some things on the floor while I'm doing 
it. 
Your Honor, State's Exhibit #2 is a copy of 
ordinance #02-1 from Kamas City, establishing a police 
department and establishing a chief of police, and I'd offer 
that in as Exhibit #2. 
MR. YENGICH: No objection, Your Honor. And I 
forgot a question of the last witness, I apologize. 


























MR. YENGICH: May I? I can -
MR. BATES: If he's still here, I'll grab him. 
MR. YENGICH: He's here. May I? 
THE COURT: Yes. Let's let him get back on the 
witness stand before you do. 
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. YENGICH: 





Did you file any other report regarding domestic 
violence as it related to Travis Jones? 
A No. 
MR. YENGICH: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Did you file anything related to Darcy 
Martinez? 
THE WITNESS: I haven't. 
MR. BATES: Can I just follow that up, Your Honor, 
real quick? 
THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
FURTHER REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BATES: 
Q Were you - at the time you were speaking to Mr. 
Jones, were you aware of any domestic violence, personal 



























Travis Jones and Darcy Martinez? 
A Never. I rarely saw Chief Jones, and probably the 
first time seeing his brother, I wasn't aware of a history or 
what their family history is. I wasn't aware of anything 
like that. 
FURTHER RE-CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. YENGICH: 
Q Have you ever filed a report - I mean you know why 
we're here today, right? 
Yeah. A 
Q Have you ever filed a report, you personally, about 
Travis or Darcy in domestic violence? 
A No. Never. 
Okay. Travis is in jail now, isn't he? 
Correct. 
You work there still, right? 









I believe so. 
Okay. Between this date, February 17 th , and the 

































Q You did become aware, however, that he had been 






I was aware that day, yes. I don't keep track of 




No, but you were aware of it that day. 
Yeah. 
MR. YENGICH: That's all. No further questions. 
THE COURT: You may step down. You're free to 
Anything further? 
MR. YENGICH: We have (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. YENGICH: I have one witness -
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. YENGICH: - to call. And I'm going to recall 
Agent Gibson to the stand just for about four questions. 
Ill 
Ill 
THE COURT: Okay. 
CRAIG GIBSON 
having been first duly sworn, testified 




























BY MR. YENGICH: 
Q When did you interview Darcy? 
A March 3, 2011. 
Q When did you interview Adam? 
7\ March 7, 2011. .M. 
Q Did you file a domestic violence report 
County after interviewing them? 
No, sir, I did not. 
Okay. Did you ever interview Travis? 





Q Okay. And in fairness to you, why didn't you file 
the report? 
A Because Summit County was handling the domestic 




You are a category one peace officer? 
That's correct. 
MR. YENGICH: No further questions. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Anything further of this 
MR. BATES: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: You may step down. 
Any other witness, Mr. Yengich? 
MR. YENGICH: I have none, Your Honor. 





























matter. I've spoken to counsel for the State. We will - I 
would like to brief it after we receive a transcript, we've 
been working on it anyway, but I didn't know how the evidence 
would come in. And I would like, depending upon when - I 
will - I'll have my secretary make the request immediately, 
I'll email her right now, I would like 30 days after we get 
the transcript to file my brief. 
THE COURT: Okay. Acceptable? 
MR. BATES: That's fine, Your Honor. 
MR. YENGICH: And giving counsel the same amount of 
time. And then giving me a week after his - instead of five 
days, a week? 
The only question I have, Judge, is this. I have a 
homicide I'm getting ready for and that comes up after the 
first of the year, and I've also got a federal case that they 
claim is going to go, though I doubt it. So if they don't 
get me the transcript until the Christmas holidays, I may 
need more than that 30 days. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. YENGICH: And ask the Court to indulge me. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much. We'll be in 
recess waiting for the memos. 
MR. YENGICH: Thank you, Judge. 
MR. BATES: Your Honor? 




























MR. BATES: Could the Court return the copy of the 
amended information that I gave the Court? Did the Court 
find the copy we filed? 
one. 
THE COURT: Yes. I have the -
MR. BATES: Okay. Thank you. 
THE COURT: - I have the -
MR. BATES: Thanks, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: - original signed by you. 
MR. YENGICH: May we be excused? 
THE COURT: Unless you want to file a collective 
MR. BATES: I can do that. 
THE COURT: Why don't you do that? 
MR. BATES: I'd be happy to do that. 
THE COURT: (Inaudible). We'll be in recess. 
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Interview of Chief Adam Jones 
Interviewed by Special Agent Craig Gibson and Special Agent Ed Spann 











Transcription by Teri Savage 
The reason I asked you to come in and talk to you is on the 15111 
you responded to a call from personal assistance from Darcy 
Martinez. 
Uh-huh (affirmative). 
I'm not quite sure; I'll just call her Darcy Martinez, because I don't 
know what the relationship is. I guess technicaliy now she is your 
sister-in-law? 
I'm not claiming her, so. 
Ok. So, let me slip the recorder on, we'll record this. We got a, 
we got a request to look into that because when you responded, 
obviously as a police officer, you understand that when you 
respond to calls of domestic violence there are certain obligations 
that we are required to, to kind of check the boxes on. 
Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Make sure that we take care of. And so we were asked to look at 
your response. What you did, what you may have not done and so 
really we are just wanting to get your side. I've talked to Darcy. 
I've look at the interview with RB, which is Ryan, right, the ten 
year old? 
Ok. 
I've talk to him. I haven' t talked to your brother cause obviousiy 
he is, he is facing charges of domestic violence so I really can't 
discuss with him right now without, you know, maybe crossing 
those boundaries of, of getting into the criminal investigation that 
is handled by Summit County. So, I haven't talked to him. I may 
still talk to him. I don't know, it depends on what we talk about 
today. So, I'm going to talk to you, you are free to go. There is no 
issue of Miranda. 
Adam Jones: Ok. 
Craig Gibson: You know where the door is. You might get lost in our building 
but I promise you can go. We'll help you get out. Sothere is you 
are not in custody. This is a criminal investigation. Basically if a 
police officer does not charge or take care of their duties, uhm, 
then there is actually a crime involved. It is a Class A 
Misdemeanor. It is basically neglect of duty, uhm and that is one 
of the reasons sometimes the AG looks at things like that. We look 
at cases that are a little bit outside the norm. We also look at cases 
that might be a conflict of interest, ok? So, we are neutral, we 
don't really have any political interest in .... 








In anything going on up in your neck of the woods, ok. We will 
look at the facts of the case. We present the facts of the case to our 
attorneys here at the AG's Office, they will evaluate it and if there 
is any merit then we will go from there. 
j 
So is th.is coming off from the Sheriffs Office, specifically? 
It came from their investigation, to my boss, which is our chief, 
our division chief, Chief Wallentine to me. 
Ok. 
And so, I a..111 charged with just looking at it, just. .... 
Ok, I have no problem. I'll tell you everything that happened. 
You want me to tell you (inaudible). 
Super. Let, let me go through my questions. 
Adam Jones: Ok. 
Craig Gibson: Cause I took the time to prepare them. I'd appreciate it if you'd let 
me at least take the time to do it. So, I've got some questions and 
what that will do is keep us focused. 
Adam Jones: Ok. 
Craig Gibson: On the focus of really the case so that the questions that are 
involved in your response. 
Adam Jones: Ok. 





















So once we get those, Pwm kind of give you time at the end if you 
want to, you know, you know want to (inaudible). 
If we haven't answered, if we haven't filled in the blanks on things 
you think we should know, please (inaudible). 
Ok. 
Let us do it. Again the questions just keep me focused and so that 
will help a lot So, it really kind of goes from, from what my 
perception of what the focus of any problems or any issues that are 
with this case. 
Ok. 
How did you recall, how did you receive the call to respond to the 
incident? 
She called my personal cell phone. 
Ok and when you use she .... 
Darcy. Darcy called my personal cell phone. 
Darcy. Ok, all right, Darcy called. And from what number did she 
caH? 
I would have to look it up. 
Ok. 
I don't have her in my phone. 
Do you recognize, did you recognize the number? 
No. 
No? Ok, so you just got a number on your personal phone? 
Uh huh (affirmative). 
Ok. About what time did you, did she call you? 











Right around there. 
And where were you at the time? 
I was sitting in the office. 
At the office? 
Yes. 
So, did you go directly over to the house or kind of what was your 
response? 
Well, when she called me she asked me if I would come over and 
talk to her. And I was trying to ask her about what, because earlier 
in that day, my brother had brought over a bunch of drawings that 
Ryan had drew, and then saying that he was trying to kill himself 
and so he was asking me what he can do because he has been down 
several avenues and no one seems to be helping him. So, I says 
well you know, those drawings, he gave me all those drawings and 
so my first impression was she was talking something about that, 
so she's like, come over here. Well, I'm like what's going on, 
because every person my brother has ever been with, they always 
call me when there is a problem. And I tell them, do not call me. 
Call the Sheriffs Office. Call somebody else because I can't deal 
with it. So, I am like, maybe it has to do with that. So I went over 
there and knocked on the door. 
Ok, let me back up. One little thing, cause you are starting to 
free ... 
Adam Jones: Ok. 
Craig Gibson: You are trying to give me the story, which is good. But on this 
(inaudible) that I will want to interrupt you too often. V/hen you 
drove over, and this may be a two-part question, were you on duty 
and did you drive your patrol vehicle? 
Adam Jones: Yes. 
Craig Gibson: Ok. So both, answers? 
Adam Jones: Yes. 




Adam Jones: Like a minute after the phone call, maybe. 
@ Craig Gibson: So, from your office to their house, I know Kamas isn't huge, but 
how far would you say? 
Adam Jones: Four blocks, maybe if that. 
I;;) Craig Gibson: Four blocks? 
Adam Jones: Might be a little longer, I mean I could count them. 
Craig Gibson: No, it is good. You kno\v, we aren't going to ... just 
~ 
approximations. 
Adam Jones: Right there. 
Craig Gibson: Ok, all right. So, just maybe a minute after? 
' w; Adam Jones: I would assume so. 
Craig Gibson: Ok, so you knocked on the door? 
Adam Jones: Uh huh (affirmative). 
VP 
Craig Gibson: Ok, who let you in? 
Adam Jones: My brother. 
~ Craig Gibson: Ok, so Travis let you in? 
Adam Jones: Uh huh (affirmative). 
Craig Gibson: Were you in uniform? 
~ Adam Jones: Uh huh (affirmative). 
Craig Gibson: Just like (inaudible)? 
Adam Jones: Uh huh (Affirmative). 
~ 
Craig Gibson: And so you talked to Travis first, right? 
Adam Jones: Uh huh (affirmative). 








He said that Darcy is in the garage, go talk to her. 
What did? 
So, I went into the garage and .... 
I guess, let me back up to Travis when you first encountered 
Travis. When you talked to Travis, what was your impression of 
Travis, you know your brother? 
That he was drunk. 
That he was drunk. Ok. And that was basically, did you see 
anything else? 














Did he look, when he was drunk, again levels of intoxication, how 
drunk would you say he was? 
Typical, normal, drunk ass self. He is an idiot when he is drunk. I 
can see it ~nd that's, I figure that is what he was at. 
Ok. 
Has kind of a glazed look like he was looking through you. 
Did he look kind of mad or was he, was he pretty calm with you? 
No, he was calm with me at that time. 
Ok. All right. And he basically just directed you to .... 
He just said Darcy is in the garage and go talk to her. 
Ok. 
I asked him 'Nhat was going on. 
Ok, that was my next question. 
Yeh, I asked him what was going on when he answered the door. 










~ Craig Gibson: 
Adam Jones: 
Craig Gibson: 










Uhm, he said look what she did to me? Cause he had three 
scratches on his chest. 
So, he pointed out some scratches. 
Yes, he just in his underwear when he answered the door. 
Ok. 
He said, she did this to me, go talk to her. 
So, where did he go after that? 
Just in the living room. I don't know where he went after that. 
That's where he went (inaudible). This jumps out a little bit, this 
jumps ahead a little bit. How long do you think you stayed at the, 
at the house between the time you got there and the time, the time 
you left? What would you say? 
Fifteen, twenty minutes. 
Sorry, that is a little out of order with my questions. Uhm, so 
when you, when you went to talk to Darcy, then what happened? 
What did she tell you and where was she? 
She was in the garage, in the car, on the phone. And then when I 
\.Valked in there she got off the phone, stepped out of the car and 
said, he can't do this to me anymore. I am like, what is he doing? 
She is like, he kicked me. I said, ok, where? She said like in the 
leg. I said, ok, I says, she's like you are the only one who can calm 
him down, so I just want you to calm him down. I said, ok. I said, 
but here's the problem, I said, he's my brother; I says I cannot deal 
with him. I says if you want to file a report I'll call Summit 
County right now and have them come over here. She's like, no; I 
don't want to do that. And so I began to talk to her and ask her 
what had happened and she said they had been drinking. This is 
probably the, I don't know, the fourth or fifth time this has 
happened between these two. 
Ok, and that goes a little ahead. 
Sorry. 
She caUed you in the past, no that is good, cause I will just jump. 









or fifth time that this has happened? Has she ever called you in 
past? 
She called me, she use to call me all the time when they lived in 
West Valley, when all this stuff would happen in West Valley. 
How long ago was that? Long time? 
Like six, six years ago. 
All right. How about within the last year, would you say? 
No. 
Ok. All right go ahead, now you go back, this happened about four 
or five times you said? 
So, I asked her what had happened. And she is like, we got 
drinking and we just talked not even three days ago, how they 
can't drink anymore, because she turns into a complete idiot when 
she is drinking and he turns into a complete idiot when he is 
drinking, and then when they both start drinking it just turns into a 
mess, so. She is like, no I just want him to calm down, I just want 
him to go to bed and he needs to know she cannot do this to me. I 
am like, that is fine, I says, do you want me to call the Sheriff's 
Office because if you want to file a report they need to come here? 
And she said, no. So, I said, ok, so I taiked to her and then I went 
and talked to my brother again and asked him what had happened. 
Well, so I asked her what happened and he come in while we were 
in the garage and again said, look what she did to me. I'm like 
Travis just go back into the house and I will come talk to you in a 
minute. And so then she began to show me a flagstick that was 
broken, saying he took that flag stick and did that to himself. And 
so I said, ok, I said, but still, I asked her, I asked her 18 thousai,d 
times, do you want to call the Sheriff's Office? And she is like, 
no, we can't afford to have him go to jail again. I can't afford it 
again. I'm like, well ifhe has done something to you, and he is 
beating you up, then you need to call. You need to have someone 
do this. She's like no. So, I said is there any marks? I looked, 
looked her body; I did not see any marks on her at all. I said, is the 
only thing he did was kick you? And she said, yes. I said, where? 
She's like in her leg. So, I said ok and went to talk to Travis. And 
then he admitted to me that he had made the marks on his body 
with the stick himself. And so, cause he's like I am going to get 
her in trouble cause he went on to tell me that she had warrants and 













whatever. I said, you guys just need to go to bed cause I knew he 
was on the verge of, of passing out, just because he was almost 
gone. So, I said, go to bed. I said, and deal with it in the morning. 
Then I went back and talked to Darcy again. Said, ok Travis is in 
bed, I said do you want to call the Sheriffs Office, do you feel safe 
here, do you want to leave, do you want to go somewhere? Have 
you been drinking? Do you need to go somewhere to call 
someone, do you want someone here? And she is like, no, she's 
like, I will be fine. As long as he is calmed down and in bed, I will 
be fine. So, I said, ok, if anything else happens you need to call 
the Sheriff's Office. And then I left. 
Ok. So, you did, you did suggest that one of them leave the house? 
Uh huh, (affirmative). 
Ok. Did you suggest it to your brother or just her? 
I told him he needs to leave too, when I first got there. I am like, 
you just need to get away. You guys have been drinking. You 
need to get away from each other. 
Did you offer to facilitate that in any way? Give your brother a 
ride? 
Every time when my brother gets into this state if I try and do 
anything, he has a tendency to want to get, not vioient with me, but 
kind of wa.."lt to push a..T1d he always wants to fight when he gets 
drunk, and I just didn't want to deal with it because I have dealt 
with it a hundred times before. He has come pounding on my door 
before in the middle of the night. I have tried to take him in and 
then he turns into a complete ass. And so I am like done, I am not 
dealing with you anymore when you are drinking. And he knows 
that cause now he doesn't call me, he doesn't come over when he 
gets like that. He will talk to me afterwards. 
Ok. As far as the injuries, I don't know how superficial the 
scratches were, if you saw her injuries? Did you offer to facilitate 
any kind of medical treatment, calls? 
There was just a superficial scratch on his chest? 
What about for Darcy's leg? 
I did not see anything. 
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And she was walking around. She walked up the stairs in the 
garage and she seemed normal. 
Did you give either one of them, since there was some allegations 
of domestic violence, did you give either of them any written 
notice of their rights and remedies available to them under the, 
under the domestic violence? 
I didn't give them a pamphlet, no. 
You didn't give them a pamphlet? 
No. 
Did you give them any verbal notice? 
I told Darcy she could call the victim advocate if she needs to file a 
restraining order because we have dealt with this a hundred 
thousand times. I told her, I'm like, you guys are not good for 
each other. You guys cannot be together. If you are together you 
can absolutely not drink. 
Ok. And Darcy told you that Travis kicked her? 
Yeh. 
Did she say that he pushed her or kicked her? 
Said that he kicked her in her shin. 
Ok. Uhm, did Travis break anything? Was there any damage to 
anything tha~ you saw? 




Ok. Did Darcy tell you about any dai-nage or did you see any 
damage? And Travis told you, he told you about the story with the 
flagstick when he crune into the garage? 
No, when I come back out. Cause when I was talking to Darcy, he 
come and opened the door and said, she did this to me. 










And that is when Darcy said, no he took this flag stick and she 
showed me that flag stick and said he ran it down his chest. And 
then after I sent him back and was talking to her I went back to 
him and he told me, yeh I did that to myself. 
So he admitted it after you went back in? 
Yes. 
Did you have to work a little to get him to do it, to make that 
admission or did he just? 
Not a whole lot, because once I saw the flag stick there and she 
said that, I asked him, I am like, what are you doing? And that is 
when he said, I did it to myself because I was going to get her in 
trouble. 
Ok. All right. Ok. Not necessarily even Darcy, but let's say in the 
last year have you, have you ever had to go over and kind of deal 
with Travis? 
Luckily I have been off every time something has happened. 
So you haven't gone over and he hasn't called you, nobody has 
called you personally to go over in the last year? 








Ok. And can you control Travis when he is drunk? 
Uhm, I can control him pretty well. I mean he will listen to me. 
Uhm, as far as like what he does, no. 
Ok. (Inaudible) 
But, I mean, I can sit down with him and I can say, heh, you need 
to relax and you need to calm down, you need to stop and he will 
stop and be calm and just start talldng about whatever. 
Ok. When he drinks does he get violent? 
Oh, very violent. 















Craig Gibson: · 
Adam Jones: 
Yep. I've, Summit County has dealt with him before. When he 
lived in Oakley they went there. I told them, heh, he likes to fight 
with police because he fought with the police in West Valley. So, 
I have told every body. He will run from you, he will fight with 
you, be careful. 
Ok. Did you know that, did you find out about the, or did you 
know about the 911 call she made to Summit County after you 
left? 
No, cause I checked, after I left there I checked off. I was 
checking off at 10:00. 
Ok, so ..... . 
So it was like 10, 10: 10 when I checked off. 
Ok, what was your schedule that day? 
Uhm, I was working. My schedule changes everyday. 
And I appreciate that with a small department. 
Yes, cause it changes all the time. Sometimes i go in at 12, . 
sometimes I go in at 2, sometimes I'll go in at 1. Depending on 
':"'hat hours I have, I'll cut it down to an 8 or 9 hour day. 
\\That would you, on that day, what would you say your, your 
schedule that day? 
Uhm, I was working 12 to 10 that day. 
12 to 10, ok. And you checked off there about? 
After I was done with them about, I am guessing, about 10: 10, I 
don't recall exactly what time I checked out. 
Do you check off on dispatch or do you just ... ? 
Sometimes, well most of the time I will check off with them if they 
have me on, then I'll always check off. Sometimes I will go to 
work without checking on. A call comes out then they check me 
on, but I pretty much always check off with them if I am locked in 
one of the computers. So, then there has been, you know, times 
where you check on and they don't hear you and then you just go 
about your day. 
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Ed Spann: So that night, did you think you checked off or you know that you 
checked on? 
@ 
No, I checked off. Adam Jones: 
Craig Gibson: You checked off. Did you do a report? Did you go in and do a 
report of the incident? 
~ . Adam Jones: No. 
Craig Gibson: You didn't do a police report on that? 
Adam Jones: No, cause I figured, my thinking of when I did it, is she called my 
~ personal phone. I said, you know, I said, I can't be here as a law 
enforcement officer, if you want that, I will call Summit County 
right now. And she said, no, I don't want to do that. And so, I'll 
just let you go on. 
~ Craig Gibson: Ok, good. I have to go back a little bit to the 911 call. Did you 
hear about it, or when did you find out that she called 911 and then 
there was some further ... ? 
Adam Jones: She sent me a text at like 1 :00 in the morning. 
~ 
Craig Gibson: Ok, so, about O 100 she sent you that text? 
Adam Jones: I don't know. She calied me .... 
VJ) Craig Gibson: Did she call you or anything after that? 
Adam Jones: I had a missed phone call from her. 
Craig Gibson: What time was that, would you say? 
~ Adam Jones: Uhm, I don't even remember. It was after I checked off, so. 
Craig Gibson: Ok, so some time after that. Did you, did you see the number or 
did you see that she called you again? 
~ Adam Jones: Afterwards I saw that I had missed a phone call from her. 
Craig Gibson: From her? 
Ed Spann: (Inaudible) 
~ 




















You say afterwards? What time? When would you have noticed 
that? 
Before I went to bed. When I put my phone on the charger. 
Ok. Do you know what time you went to bed? 
Sometime after 10: 10. 
I probably didn't go to bed until 12 midnight, 11 :30 midnight, 
something like that. 
Did you, did you turn your, did you have your police radio on 
during that time and hear anything on the response? 
No, my computer was still on and I saw on my computer that 
another call had popped up. Well, I saw a call pop up and then it 
went away and then I was doing some other stuff getting undressed 
and I saw they were going back to, back to her house. 
You saw that, about what time was that, do you remember? 
Quarter to eleven, somewhere around there. 
Did you flip your radio on and take a listen to the response and 
everything? 
Yeh. 
Did you? Ok. Uhm, have you received training in the 
investigation of domestic violence? 
Uh huh (affirmative). 
Do you remember when, do you remember when? When was the 
last time you attended specifically domestic violence training? 
I don't know. I think it was while I ·was at the Sheriffs Office. 
Ok. So it has been a little while. How about a legal update? You 
have a legal update for a while? 
Just all the legal updates that we, that they do every year. 










Uh huh (affirmative). 
Let me ask you this. This is going to be retrospective question? 
Looking back now that you have had time to kind of look back on 
what happened and all the things, what would you have done 
differently? 
Nothing. Absolutely, nothing. 
Would you have maybe thought to caii the Sheriffs Office when 
you saw this and who it was and thinking oh this is kind of .... ? 
Based on the circumstances that I'd seen with no physical injuries 
and she felt safe I would do absolutely nothing different. 









Especially after the first time when she claimed that she went after 
him with a knife in Alaska and (inaudible) and she is still with him 
and the time before that where he spent 6 months in jail and the 
time before that. She said she is absolutely not scared of him. 
So, is this, how long has those guys, how long has those two been 
together? 
The first time or the second time? 
Well, if you can separate it ok. When did they, I guess when did 
they first get together, obviously? 
Like 6 years ago, they were together when they lived in West· 
Valley. I wouldn't even dare venture to guess what, when it was. 
How long have they been back together up in Kamas, up in your 
area? 
I wouldn~t be able to tell you. A year, maybe longer. I have no 
clue. Cause he was with another girl, got her pregnant~ they 
always had their problems. I think he went to jail with her for 
domestic violence. And I don't know what happened on the last 
one. I just, I just try to stay out of it, because he just needs to go to 
jail in my opinion. 
Has he, has he, when did he start, does he have any drug problems? 
Or is there drugs involved? 
15 
Adam Jones: I'm sure he does. 
Craig Gibson: Does he? @ 
Adam Jones: I don't know any of his drug history. He doesn't talk about it. I 
know he drinks. I know that he has used drugs. As to what drugs 
he has used, I don't know, but I know, I mean, when he was 
married to his first wife, his first wife tried to kill herself in front of ® 
the kids. I know they were doing drugs then. I don't know what. 
He is crazy, when he drinks, when he, I really couldn't tell you 
what drugs he does. I've asked him recently. He said he hasn't 
been doing anything, just drinking and smoking spice, so. 
Craig Gibson: Is that, is that, so he has been drinking and smoking spice? 
@ 
Adam Jones: That is what he said. 
Craig Gibson: That is what he told you? Another question that popped in. When Q you knew about this second response, did you, again going back to 
retrospective, did you think to let Summit County know that you 
had been over there and to give a little heads up that he was 
drinking? 
Adam Jones: No. In retrospect, I probably would have but, I mean, they all Q 
know, they all know I have told them. I told everybody if you ever 
deal with him, he is an ass. He gets mean when he is drunk and he 
just wants to fight. So, I mean everybody knows that, everybody 
had dealt with him. Evef'Jbody YJ1ows who he is. 
(i) 
Craig Gibson: Do you think he will go to jail on this one? 
Adam Jones: I will be surprised ifhe doesn't. He should have went to jail on the 
last one. I still don't know what they are doing with that. He had a 
court appearance today. Him and her went to it. I have no idea G 
what happened. I wanted to go and find out what was going on but 
with everything that is going on I just want to stay, stay out of it. 
My parents were there. They called me, said that he showed up 
late and then th.ey just rescheduled it, but to my understanding the 
one today was an order to show cause on his last one. I don't even @ 
know ifhe has been charged with this other one. 
Craig Gibson: Yeh, I'm not sure what he's, I honestly don't know what his 
charges are right at the moment. I kind of stayed out of that, again 
that is why I didn't tell you too much. 
(;i) 



















You have been, you've given, you know, you have the best 
(inaudible). 
He just needs, first of all he needs to go either to an alcohol class 
and quit drinking. I think if he would quit drinking and her quit 
drinking they would be fine. But the second thing is he needs to 
go to jaii for like 5 years. I don't even lmow if that would do any 
good. He was in Salt Lake County for 6 months after he got into a 
fight with her last time. 
And that was down here? 
Yes. 
That was his last domestic? 
Well, not his last domestic. That was his last domestic, I guess I 
can't say his last domestic with her, but that was his last long jail 
time because he was with her. 
And that was the result of it? I mean that's pretty, six months is a 
long time in Salt Lake County. 
Well, I think he had, I think he had other domestic violence 
charges, I think he had like three or four cases. 
It must have compounded, because six months in jail is, at ieast i...11 
Salt Lake County, is a pretty long stretch for domestic violence. 
Yeh, I don't know, I think he had some domestic violence charges 
with Judge Stoney and I think he had some sort of burglary charge 
going into a friends home and I don't know what he was in jail for 
what and what he got charged with, with each thing, so. 
Ok. 
I know every girlfriend he's ever had, they have had problems with 
him, because the one before Kim was always t-ying to call us. \Ve 
are like, we can't do anything for you, you need to call the 
Sheriffs Office. (Inaudible) out in the county. 
Now do you guys have, does Kamas have an arrangement with 
Summit County on, because obviously there are just two guys, yeh 
two people in the department, which makes 24-7 coverage I would 
















Yes, when we are off they handle the calls. We use to be on call 
24-7, but we were getting way too many hours and so· I met with 
the Sheriff and we arranged it to when there is any calls when we 
are off they will handle it. 
And when you guys are on do you have certain calls that you 
handle. Is there times when you call, call the Sheriffs Office to 
handle certain types of calls, and again I am not that informed. 
There is a, there is a little list of some things, like, unattended 
deaths, ulun, I'd have to look at my sheet, there is like four of 
them. Felonies with only suspect information, which I mean, we 
take care of felonies all the time and don't really call them. I think 
just more of kind of if we need help, I think it was their way of 
setting some guidelines as to what they wanted to do, cause on 
every felony that we have suspect information we don't always call 
them to deal with it, because we just deal with it ourselves. 
Right. Now do you guys do your own follow-ups and your own, do 
you have your own CSI stuff? 
We don't have any, that is what we call the County in for if we 
needed stuff like that. 
Ok. That's probably just more for me to know, out of curiosity. It 
seems like it would be difficult to have two guys trj to cover 
everything all the time. 
We tried it and we were there for about 2 ½ to 3 years before we 
finally were just so worn out and beat up that we had to get some 
help. I tried to beat City Council up to get more people and they 
just won't do it. 
How long have you been with Kamas? 
About 5 years. 
Are you from that area? 
Uh huh (affirmative). 
Any questions for us? 














You have my phone number if you have any questions give me a 
call. 
I just, I've thought of this a lot, in hindsight, there is really nothing 
that I could have done different. I mean if she was obviously 
beaten and bruised and it would have been a different story but 
there were no marks on her or no nothing. It is not like this is her 
first rodeo. I don't know what else to do. 
Yeh, I think, you probably ought not to, if! was going to give you 
any advice, which is free, but, I, if you got a call from either of 
them to respond, I think the next thing I would do personally 
would be to call the Sheriffs Office and have them go and not deal 
with it. Family (inaudible). 
(Inaudible) on my phone with text messages like when he was in 
jail, she would say stuff, like what would you do, I mean she is 
crazy. 
Yeh, that is one of those things you just have to, again you would 
have to try to distance yourself and not respond. 
And I tried, like I said the only reason why I went over there was 
because I thought it had something to do with Ryan, because he 
has been saying he wants to kill himself. They have had him down 
to different places and they just refuse to help him. So, I initially 
thought it was that. Knowing it wasn't, I says lei's can the 
Sheriff's Office and she didn't want to. She didn't want to. She 
refused. There was really no marks on her that would lead me to 
believe that it was anything, you know, that she was going to die 
from. Then she goes and marries him. I don't understand that. 
That is a little curious. 
It blows my mind. I don't think those two should be together. I 
don't know why they ever got back together after the first time. 
Yeh, that is .... 
But what do you do? 
Not really much you can do, from an outside perspective. And 
again for you, the problem you have, I guess to a certain extent is, 
being a law enforcement officer then you really have to distance 













sure they always have a third, third party, third agency that comes 
in and deals with it. 
And I would just add this in there, especially since you've said, 
that you have outlined a pretty good history for both of them, that 
he has gotten violent, he was drunk, and if it hadn't been, 
somebody could draw the line and say he wasn't yet, but he could 
be and they have already reported it, so you say you weren't a cop, 
but you are in uniform and (inaudible), I came from a small agency 
so I understand this, I understand what you are saying. Sometimes 
I don't want to be (inaudible) but you got a call. That's just free 
advice, he gave you, that is mine. Whether they want you to or 
not, ..... . 
Just call. 
That is the easiest way to do it and then when in doubt, put a report 
out. 
(Inaudible). It's one of those things that the obligation of a law 
enforcement officer (inaudible) the statute is fairly clear on the 
domestic violence of what law enforcement officer's shall do, shall 
do this, shall do this, shall do this. And again, you know, you were 
on the scene, you made the determination, and that is just what we 
have to look at is those steps to what you should do. 
Ok. And then, well I'm not going to go there, it's ail good. 
All right, any questions for us? If you think of one, call, you have 
my number. In fact, I'll give you my card (inaudible). 
I don't think so. 
All right. 
But, here is my question. If I see this, I don't know, is there any 
way I can just talk to you without it being recorded? Just for 
advice questions, stuff iike that? It doesn't matter. I'll record it. It 
doesn't matter. 
Uh, you can, you can. Ok, go ahead. 
So, let's say the Sheriffs Office is doing the same thing. That they 
respond to these things and aren't doing anything and there's, and 
you know there is different situations going on. Where do I go at 




doing their job? Because I personally, believe that this is a 
personal vendetta between Dave and me. 
And that is why we look at these things, because we are a neutral 
agency. 








We are neutral. And many people could argue that but we are 
neutral and that is why people give it to us. We get a fresh look. 
We look at it. I don't know, obviously I don't know you, you 
don't know me. I have no allegiance to w7.y department, well 
except the ones that I retired from and even then I would be fair. 
And so that is why we are looking at it. We are going to look at it 
fairly. Yeh, we are pointing out some things and that is why we 
ask in retrospect, you know. (lnaudible)-we have to look at it. 
Sure. 
And the political issues up there, whatever' s going on up there, not 
my interest. 
But what can I do as a law enforcement officer to see that these 
guys are obviously doing the exact same thing and would have 
done the exact same thing. I talked to several officers afterwards 
and they would have done the exact same thing. 
Let me go back to that. I'll answer that specific question. For an 
officer to say that I would have done the exact same thing, ok, I 
can't deal with that, because they weren't there. You were there 
and that is why we are talking to you. And cops will say, well I 
would have done the same thing, or I wouldn't have done anything 
different, etc, etc, etc. With what they said they would have done, 
can't do anything with. Now, if you had instances say, on this 
particular instance this happened and this happened and this 
happened, and we would do exactly the same thing. If you called 
a..11d said, a Summit County Deputy responded to this call and did 
this, this and this, we wouid look at that. Do it the exact same way. 
Ok, but this is another thing, I mean, did Summit County or 
anybody ever come and talk to me, no. I personally think that is a 
little ridiculous, but that is just my own opinion. 
And maybe, I don't know, you just alluded to the fact that there's, 
there might be some p·olitical issues up there and so perhaps., and 
again I don't want to conjecture something inappropriately, but 
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you know, that is why, maybe, they may want us to look at it and 
have an outside look and see. If this looks like a problem we want 
an outside agency to look, that way there is no bias and if there is 
no problem, there is no problem. 
And I understand that, but why didn't they do that with the first 
Chief of Police they did this to? 
I don't know. (inaudible) 
You know, that's why I just don't know (inaudible). I understand 
you guys aren't but it is frustrating for me. 
I'm just basing everything on (inaudible). 
I completely understand. That is why I wanted to talk to you guys 
as, I mean, you guys are dealing with the same thing that I am 
doing, it is just frustrating that you have two nut cases that are 
going to try and destroy everything that you try and do. And when 
I say nut cases, I am talking about Darcy and my brother and now I 
have to go through all this because of them. 
And having been around for a long time (inaudible) and we both 
have been in administrative positions in police work and you know 
we have had a lot of times look at those things because and the 
players in it a lot of times are the ones that, that, you know, they 
are the ones that got the problems but then law enforcement 
sometimes has to answer questions about what we do. And we 
know, you know sometimes we are dealing with people with 
mental illness, you know people with problems, but sometimes we 
have to answer then questions. Then again we have to make split 
second decisions, and that is all you are going through and I will 
tell you it is never fun to have anybody ask you or second guess 
you about your tactics, your activity, that is never fun. 
Well, it is just like now, why did they not throw him in jail? He's 
obviously got a problem, so why don't they throw his ass in jail? 
And that goes to a question that you could go ..... 
I don't understand. 
You could go through any case we ever see with anybody, that you 
have ever seen, that we've ever seen, you could ask that question 
about a lot of those kind of things and if you ever find the answer 
















It is just frustrating. Here you have this person doing something 
and I am doing everything I can in my best power to do anything 
and then now I am the one getting raked over the coals. 
So, and it is never comfortable. So, we sympathize with you. 
And all the other history just kind of frustrates me and I don't 
know what to do. 
I don't have any great advice for you. Wish I did. Wish I did. 
So, what is going io happen from here? What's going on? 
Right now. I just put the report together. We have what we call a 
staffing. The attorneys here in the AG' s Office and this division 
get together and they just look at the case and they look at the 
statutes and the law and your statement and what Darcy said and 
look at the case and basically see if there is any criminal liability 
there. And that is pretty much it. I'll keep you posted. 
So, like what about, and I know they got to do stuff, what about the 
Sherifrs Office bringing her, bringing Darcy in over there and like 
sitting there telling her like, sitting there pretty much saying, do I 
intimidate her? And trying to go at some angle that I am 
intimidating her. That my family is intimidating. What, what can 
anything be done about that? · 
Probably not, because that, those are just interview questions any 
more than any of the questions that might have been uncomfortable 
for you. 
And I understand that. But the way they are going about it and 
who they are going about it with, is all because they are trying to 
attack me. Because Dave is trying to attack me. That is what I am 
saying. Do I have to get hold of a Civil Attorney and find that out? 
Yes, you probably, you probably, I interviewed Darcy last week 
but the subject of intimidation never came up. It was essentially 
these type of questions, as a matter of fact, ... 
I know that is what I am saying, the Sheriffs Office is now calling 
her and bringing her in there and saying that we are intimidating 
her. I don't care, first of all, I don't want her to be with my 
brother, I don't want my brother to be with her, because I 
· · guarantee this is going to happen again. And then they go and get 
married. 
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Craig Gibson: And that's an issue, that again, that goes back to my, the only 
sound advice I probably could give you today, is that if they, 
~ because they are together, and because it is unpredictable of what 
may happen because of their past behavior, now you can hope, we 
will all hope that maybe they have learned from this one and that 
will be good and you wont have to deal with it again. I am just 
going to tell you, don't deal with it, don't go, ... 
@ 
Adan1 Jones: Well and I don't. 
Craig Gibson: I know. 
Adam Jones: On the last one while married to Kim, I did the same thing. They @ 
are always calling me. I'm like don't call me. But what do you 
say, what do you do? 
Craig Gibson: I would just call and say look if you have a problem, or I'll call the 
Sheriff's Office for you, and you call the Sheriff's Office and let 
them respond. I'd call the Sheriff's Office, that's just me, I would 
call the Sheriffs Office. 
Adam Jones: Even if you don't see anything, even if they were having a verbal 
argument? ~ 
Craig Gibson: Absolutely. Absolutely 
Ed Spann: Especially in your type of position you have a situation, you are 
from there, I just would. 
G 
Craig Gibson: Absolutely. That's my advice and that's if I've given you any 
good advice that's it. Do not deal with it. No matter what. If you 
can see it is going down the road and you have the vision to see 
that, you see that going down the road.just tell them, (negative) as 
a matter of fact, I am calling the Sheriffs Office, I don't care what ~ ' 
you guys want to report, what you want to do; I am calling them. 
Ed Spann: Yeh. 
Craig Gibson: And then you can step away and then do a report. You are in a @ 
tough spot because it is hard to separate the two halves between 
being a family member and being a cop. 
Ed Spann: That's just it, you live there, you are from there and you've got 
your brother there, you get the call and you get there on this aspect I;) 




















Even, even like they said something happened to Ryan. I have no 
clue what happened to Ryan. But, I want to know but yet I don't 
want to go fishing and try to find out what happened. 
Did you talk to those kids or see any kids while you were there? 
No, everybody was in bed and I asked them, I am like where are 
the kids. They are all asleep. Have they been out here? They are 
like no. 
And this is what happened, obviously what now we know, because 
hindsight is twenty-twenty, when you left, it spun up again and it 
got, it went further and there were bigger problems, alleged. So, 
then Ryan gets involved and it just got out of hand because 
obviously your brother was drunk and he gets violent, and 
allegedly he did, and allegedly ... 
Why would she stay with him? I don't get it. I don't understand. 
Do you have two cell phones? Work phone and a cell phone? 
Yes, yes. You guys called me on my personal phone. 
Ok, that's the only number. 
W~hat is your work phone number? 
That is 435-731-0594. So how did you get my personal number? 
Darcy gave it to me. 
Ok. 
What is the last four, I am sorry? 
0594. So, I mean do I need to save these text messages from her? 
I would. 
I would go through and save them all. 
Yep. Save everything. Did you find the one that she sent yet? At 




















No,_you might have to (inaudible). 
Do you have his (inaudible) license? 
Do you need me to read it? 
Glasses, no I can see it? 
Inaudible 
So, I mean at this point that is exactly what I did. I ignored it 
because I didn't want to deal with it. I told her to call the Sheriff's 
Office. So, when she, you know, when she sent me the text 
message, I didn't even respond to it. 
That is when you probably, that is when you probably should have 
just called the Sheriff's Office and said, I am out of here. I'll call 
the Sheriff's Office they can ..... 
Well, I think in the incidence that something would have happened 
to the kids in the first time, that is a different story, but where they 
got into an argument, he scratched himself there is no physical 
injuries on him. It's, you know, I mean how many, how many 
times do you respond to stuff like that? 
It would be difference being in this one though, your brother, 
someone else, and then you, you have kind of gone through and 
this one you are asking in hindsight You talked about having it 
happen with her before, but the next girlfriend; his first wife and 
when he gets drunk he gets, what did you say? 
If he is dumb enough to stay with them, why is it our problem? 
Ok, well. 
Do you know what I am saying? 
Ok, well, we've been doing this a long time and so we have all 























. saying in hindsight, you get something with family members, 
someone you know, get someone else to look at it. 
Yeh, get somebody else, just bring him in. That's just, that's just 
get that other, get that other, you've got the luxury of having 
another agency that you got kind of a MOU, MOA with. You've 
got an agreement that they will come in and use that agency and 
have them come in and you know there is nothing like being able 
to give your problem over somebody else's problem to somebody 
else. 
And see that is the other thing, I mean, he is my brother and he is 
always going to be my brother. I can't change family. It's not like 
I am not going to talk him. 
No, you can talk to him (inaudible) 
What I am saying is that I don't want to go there because I don't 
want to be involved in the bull shit because she, she is just as crazy 
as he is half the time. She is nuts. 
And you've got to have the vision to say, ok, maybe I just, maybe 
I've got to see my brother. He is still your brother. But maybe 
you have to see him on your terms. 
I mean when he was in Salt Lake County., like a dumb ass I went 
and seen him, but once a week. I hope to hell he goes to Summit 
County and they don't let me go see him cause I don't want to deal 
with it. I'm done. · 
As a brother you can do that. The difference when you went there, 
you went as a visitor, here you went, whether you said you were or 
not, you're dressed like that, what would any one else assume you 
are? You're a police officer. And that is a tough thing to do, 
because \Ve cai~'t tUa.11 it on and off. 
But, if I, but I guess the hard thing is, it doesn't matter if I am in 
uniform or not they are going to always look at me as a police 
officer. If I went there in my underwear. 
And there is some truth in that? 













It wouldn't have mattered. And ifI don't answer the phone call, if 
I ignored her or something happened, then something else can 
happen to me anyway. 
Actually on that one probably not. 
But, here is the deal. You went, yo1:1 saw and you just have to go, 
ok, normally could, but on this one, family member, you got to get 
someone in there. In the allegations, you go back and look at the 
code, it says, there is allegations of she said, he kicked her, 
whether you can see or not. 
But this is the other problem I have with that, we took a case just 
like this, where the mother hit the daughter, and we took it to the 
County Attorney's and they said, we should never have arrested 
her because there was no mark. So, now I am going off of that, 
too. 
Ok. You did the report and you let those guys make those 
determination. Cause we do the investigation .... (inaudible). 
And I understand that. I'm sure you probably know how hard it is 
to, you know, here you are fighting the County Attorney's and they 
are not going to do anything. It is just frustrating. 
In your case, in this case, we are going to go back to this case a 
little bit. Again my advise, and l have repeated this too many 
times, this will be the last time I promise, in this particular case 
when youwalked in and you saw what it was looking like, which 
was a mess, your brother's drunk, you've got allegations of, even 
though he has recanted, ... 
He is always like that, though. 
And that; ... a ........ ,..'hlom rl..l J. .l.:> p.i.vu1rv.1 .1. 
So, I can't go over there? 
You need to go, well in this particular instance, you need to back 
out and say, I am just calling Summit County and let them come 
over and deal with it. Again, we're not saying, of course we are 
not saying you don't mess, you don't mix with family, but you just 
have to recognize when you get, if they are being like that, like you 
describe them, because you know that, you are not walking in to 

















doesn't looking right, I am backing out and then I am calling 
Summit County. Again ..... (Inaudible) 
I understand, it just happens so much, and everybody is just ..... 
You stay and keep the peace and call them. As soon as your 
brother said she is out in the garage, look what she did to me, right 
there, you just don't put yourself in that position. Back off, get the 
phone, call, get the radio, saying have a Deputy run this for me. 
I guess this is hard, cause my brother has hurt himself, he has done 
all kind of stupid things before and it is just, I guess I (inaudible). 
And that is why we are asking you cause we want your perception 
at the time, based on your history and those kind of things. We 
can't, we weren't there and that is why we wanted to.talk to you 
about it. 
I'm not really, I'm just based on what you told me ... 
I know, it's, it's just frustrating because you are stuck between a 
rock and a hard spot. (inaudible) 
(Inaudible) You truly are. 
So, but, you know I mean it, I don't know. 
It's a tough spot. It really is. And again we appreciate that. So. 
So, as far as, do I need to go talk to POST, what I don't .... ? 
You don't have to do anything right now. 
A thing with this? 
There is nothing to do right now, as I kind of finish this up, we are, 
I'm going to, are we done with this interview? Let's be done with 
this interview. It is, what time is it? 
11: 12. 





IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, SILVER SUMMIT 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ADAM HOWARD JONES, 
Defendant. 
RULING and ORDER 
Case No. 111 500 107 FS 
Judge: L.A. DEVER 
This matter came on for a Preliminary Hearing on November 28, 2011. The 
State was represented by Matthew Bates. The Defendant was present and 
represented by Ronald J. Yengich. 
Testimony was taken and argument made. The parties requested to brief the 
issues involved before the Court issued a decision on bindover. The matter was initially 
assigned to Judge Shaughnessy, as the trial judge. However, the parties and Judge 
Q Shaughnessy determined that the Magistrate that heard the Preliminary Hearing was 
the proper party that should be ruling on the sufficiency of the evidence fm bindover. 
The case was then re-assigned to Judge Dever, who had sat as the Magistrate. 
This Court, having reviewed the transcript and the mernoranda submitted by the 
parties as well as considering the testimony presented at the Preliminary Hearing 
makes the following Findings and Ruling. 
Background 
1. The Defendant is the Police Chief of Kamas City. 
2. (?n February 15, 2011, the Defendant received a telephone call from 
Darcy Martinez, the live-in girlfriend of his brother, Travis Jones. The call was made to 
the Defendanf s personal cell-phone. 
3. The call wa_s received just before the Defendant's shift was to end. He 
was asked by Ms. Martinez to come to his brother's house. (P.H. p.19) 
4. There is no evidence from Ms. Martinez or the Defendant that the 
conversation mentioned any domestic violence. 
5. The Defendant, in an interview, stated that he had no idea that any issue 
concerning domestic violence was involved but that he was being asked to come over 
because of a famiiy issue concerning his nephew. (Ex 1, p.19) 
6. VVhen the Defendant arrived he was met by his bmthei who vvas obviously 
intoxicatedt but calm, and was informed by his brother that he should talk with Ms. 
Martinez, who was in the garage. (P.H. pp. 5; 21) 
7. The Defendant met with Ms. Martinez. She stated that she wanted him to 
talk to his brother and calm him down. Ms. Martinez stated that his brother had kicked 
her in the leg. The Defendant stated he did not see any injury. The Defendant stated 
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that he asked Ms. Martinez if she wanted him to call the Sheriff's Office. (P.H. pp. 7, 22) 
He also informed her that if she wanted to make a police report he would call the 
Summit County Sheriff's Office for her, as he could not be involved since he was a 
family member. (P.H. p. 7) Ms. Martinez said she did not want him to contact the 
~ Sheriff, just to put his brother to bed. (P.H. p. 22) 
8. The Defendant again offered to call the Summit County Sheriff's Office 
but both his brother and Ms. Martinez declined the offer. 
9. After putting his brother to bed, the Defendant !eft the residence and went 
home. This was shortly after 10:00 p.m. The Defendant was now off duty. 
10. Approximately 10:45 p.m., Summit County Sheriffs Office received a call 
about a domestic disturbance at Jones/Martinez residence. They responded and found 
a violent altercation in progress. Travis Jones was arrested. The Defendant later saw 
~ the information about the call to Summit County Sheriff's Office on his poiice computer. 
He did not become invofved and let the Sheriff's Office handle the matter. 
11. The next morning the Defendant went to the Summit County Jail to check 
on his brother. 
12. There is conflicting testimony as to what conversation was had between 
the Defendant and his brother at the jail. 
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Standard for Bindover 
13. As pointed out by the State, the bindover standard is relatively low. The 
State bears the burden of demonstrating probable cause. As pointed out in State v. 
Clark, 2001 UT 9, ,i 16, the proof needed to esta~lish probable cause is the same as 
required to support an arrest warrant. 
14. Additionally, the magistrate does not sift nor weigh the evidence. The 
magistrate "must view all evidence in the fight most favorable to the prosecution and 
draw all ieasonable inferences in favor of the prosecution. ibid. ii 9 
15. However, the prosecution must still produce believable evidence of all the 
elements of the crime charged. Ibid. ,I 15 Additionally, the prosecution must present 
sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief that the defendant committed the 
offense charged. Ibid. ,r 16. 
Conclusions based on the Evidence 
16. It is true that the magistrate is not to "weigh" the evidence. Tllis 
prohibition applies to conflicts in the testimony presented to the Court not to the 
requirement that there be sufficient evidence to establish that the elements of the crime 
have been met by the prosecution in its case in chief. 
·17. The elements of the charges contained in Count II and Count flf of the 
Amended information are somewhat similar. Count II charges the Defendant with being 
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a municipal officer that willfully omitted performing a duty imposed. Count Ill charges 
the Defendant, with the intent to benefit another1 to knowingly refrain from performing a 
duty imposed upon him by law. 
18. Addressing Count II, the State contends, in. its memoranda, that the 
~ Defendant is a Municipal Officer with duties that include suppressing riots and 
disturbances and enforcing ordinances, citing to the Kamas City Ordinance #02-1. 
According to the State's argument, anyone who holds a position of trust and authority or 
;;)I 
'\$1 
command and is authorized to exercise a specific function is a municipal officer. Under 
the State's argument all police are municipal officers. The Court disagrees. The 
statute, UCA 10-3-826, talks about official neglect and misconduct and encompasses 
the special functions of the municipal officer. Those type of functions do not relate to 
the general duties of a police officer. In fact, the Ordinance #02-1 talks in ,i 3 of the 
~ additional powers and duties of the chief of police and all police officers. It is this 
section of the Ordinance that the State ciaims tile Defendant has violated and therefOie 
the correct statute, for this incident, is UCA 76-8-201. The Court therefore declines to 
bindover the Defendant on the Charge of Official Neglect as a Municipal Officer, a class 
A misdemeanor. 
19. The State claims that the Defendant failed to follow the obligations 
imposed on him under UCA 76-8-201. The Defendant argues that he responded to the 
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· call from Ms. Martinez as a family member and not as a police officer. The State 
argues that he appeared in his uniform and before the end of his shift and was 
therefore on duty. There is no question that he received the phone call from Ms. 
Martinez on his personal cell phone and a few minutes before the end of his shift. The 
State argues because he appeared in his uniform and police car it somehow changes 
the facts of his appearance. If this was a case of an appearance at a stranger's door 
this claim might have some merit. This was his brother's home, the fact of his dress 
has no bearing on the knowledge of his brother or Ms. Martinez nor does it imput that 
he was appearing as a law enforcement official. 
20. The State argues that the Defendant was responding to a call of domestic 
violence. There is no evidence of that claim. Nor is there any evidence of his 
encountering domestic violence when he arrived at the residence. In fact, the only 
testimony was that his brother and girlfriend were calm. If there was an altercation in 
progress when he arrived, his obligations as a police officer to prevent criminal activity 
would have been in play. That is not the evidence. Additionally, there was no sign of a 
previous altercation. 
21. The State argues that the Defendant shouid have cited or arrested his 
bmthei for domestic violence. The evidence establishes that the Defendant asked Ms. 
Martinez if she was injured, if she wanted to file a compiaint, or wanted an officer from 
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the Summit County Sheriff's Office to come and take a report. He pointed out that he 
could not take a report because he was Travis' brother. Ms. Martinez declined and said 
she wanted the Defendant to put his brother to bed. 
22. The elements to be established for a violation UCA 76-8-201, as they 
G; apply to this case are 
a. To knowingly refrain from performing a duty imposed by law, and 
b. To do so with the intent to benefit himself or another. 
In order to find a violation, the State must prove both elements. There 
certainly isn't a question that determining intent or a knowing violation is a question for 
the fact finder. However, the question of whether a duty is imposed is one of law and is 
the province of the Court. In order to determine whether a duty existed, the Court must 
look to the requirements of the Cohabitant Abuse Act. Before reviewing that Act, the 
vu Court notes that the argument that Ms. Martinez is a ''vuinerable adult" under UCA 76-
5-111.1 has no merit. The term "vulnerabie adult" is defined undei UCA 76-5-111 (1)(s) 
and there is no showing that she fits under the definition. The State contends that there 
are three requirements imposed on law enforcement by the Cohabitant Abuse Act. 
However. alt requirements of the Act are predicated on the an officer responding to an 
~ allegation of domestic violence. That is not the fact of the instant case. The evidence 
establishes that the Defendant received a phone call on his personal cell-phone from 
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the girlfriend of his brother. While there may be conflict as to the content of the 
conversation, it is clear that there was no mention of any domestic violence in the call. 
It is not disputed that Ms. Martinez was calling the brother of her boyfriend, not the 
police. It is also clear that there was no altercation occurring when the Defendant 
arrived at the house. The statute requires that a law enforcement officer has certain 
duties when responding to an allegation of domestic abuse. There is no showing that 
the Defendant was responding to an allegation of domestic abuse, therefore the statute 
and the duties arising.under it have no application to the Defendant in this incident. 
The Court would note that the Defendant asked Ms. Martinez, more than once, if she 
wanted to make a claim of domestic violence and stated that if she did, he would 
contact the Summit County Sheriff's Office for her and have an officer respond. There 
is nothing to contradict this evidence. 
23. This count is charged as a ciass B misdemeanor, therefore the Court will 
treat the Defendant's request as a Motion to Dismiss for failure to allege an essential 
element of the crime. That Motion is Granted. 
24. Count i charges the Defendant with V\/itness Tampering, a third degree 
felony. The elements of the cha;ge are that the accused 
a. believing that an official proceeding was pending or about to be 
instituted, or with the intent to prevent an investigation 
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b. attempted to induce another to testify falsely or withhold 
information. 
25. There is no evidence presented that an official proceeding was pending or 
about to be instituted when the Defendant visited his brother at the Summit County jail 
~ the morning after February 15, 2011. Nor is there any evidence that the Defendant 
believed that an investigation was pending The State argues that the Defendant should 
have known there would be an investigation. That is not the standard required by the 
statute. The question then is theie sufficient evidence to find that the Defendant's 
action was an intent to prevent an official investigation. Likewise, there is no showing of 
this aspect of the element. As pointed out in Melessa v. Randall, 121 Fed.Appx. 803 
(10th Cir. Feb. 1, 2005) (unpublished), Utah law requires 
ld. at 807 
... the offender must subjectively believe that an official proceeding 
or investigation is currently pending or will be initiated in the future, 
and he must induce false or incomplete testimony from a witness 
who may be called to testify or provide evidence concerning that 
proceeding or investigation. 
26. There is no evidence that the requirement of "belief' as outlined by 
lVlelessa has been met by the State's presentation of evidence. 
27. The second element of the crime is that the Defendant attempted to 
induce another to testify falseiy or withhoid information. There is some conflict between 
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the witnesses as to actually what was said. The jailer has given the Court two versions. 
However, for the purpose of this Ruling, the Court considers only the one relied upon by 
the State. 
28. In order to address this issue, there must be a discussion at to what is 
potentially being investigated. In this case, the investigation centers on the claim by the 
State that the Defendant failed to comply the requirements imposed on an officer by 
tile cohabitant abuse act. That act directs certain actions to be performed for the 
benefit of a victim of domestic violence. The alleged victim in this case is Darcy 
Martinez. \/\/hat relevance does the Defendant's conversation with his brother 
concerning his being awake or asleep or when he was awake or asleep have to do with 
the issue of whether the Defendant complied with the requirements alleged to be 
imposed on him by the statute. Ms. Martinez is the only witness, other than the 
Defendant as to what occurred between the Defendant and Ms. Martinez in the garage. 
The evidence estabiishes that Travis was in the house during the exchange. VVhether 
he was asleep or not is immaterial as he was not present in the garage. If he is not 
present and had no participation he is not a witness and therefore there can be no 
issue of witness tampering. The Court declines to bindover on Count f. 
Conc!usion 
29. The Court concludes that the State has not met its burden to establish 
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sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief that there has been Witness 
Tampering, Count I, a·third degree felony or Official Neglect and Misconduct, Count II, 
a class A misdemeanor, and therefore denies a bindover on those two counts. 
30. The Court concludes that the State has not met its burden to establish an 
~ essential element of the charge of Official Misconduct, Count Ill, a class B 
misdemeanor, and therefore grants the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss that count. 
This constitutes the Final ORDER of the Court 
Dated this 9th day of August, 2012. 
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BY THE COURT 
L. A. DEVER 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
·.-·) .. .-.. •,•.: 
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